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Abstract 
 
The present report argues on the assumption that UN peace operations represent intermediate 
international public goods that yield a number of positive externalities – such as peace and 
security, enhanced international stability and respect for human rights. The potential benefits 
that can be derived from these operations critically depend on how the international commu-
nity decides to provide and finance them. Despite the fact that the financing of UN peace 
operations is a crucial component of their production path, there have been surprisingly few 
attempts to examine whether and how the UN has adjusted the international public financing 
system underlying the provision of its operations to the complex tasks the organization is 
asked to undertake. The present study contributes to a better understanding of UN peace 
operations as international public goods and fills this gap by providing an up-to-date analysis 
of the several existing international financing mechanisms and tools created by the UN to help 
foster better allocation to its operations. It summarizes important UN internal reform proc-
esses related to their use and offers policy recommendations for a more integrated and innova-
tive financing approach to UN peace operations as international public goods. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years innumerable 
books, articles and papers have been 
proliferated on the study of UN peace 
operations. Many of them have exam-
ined the changing nature of these opera-
tions in the wider context of interna-
tional security in the post-Cold War 
world and innovative studies have under-
taken an important step by approaching 
the new role of UN peace operations 
from a global governance perspective 
(see e. g. Duffield 2001; Debiel 2002, 
2003). It is well-known that the UN has 
increased dramatically number, size and 
scope of UN peace operations in re-
sponse to a series of intrastate violent 
conflicts generating massive negative 
cross-border externalities. For example, 
since 1988 the number of peacekeeping 
operations has risen by more than two 
and a half times compared with the 
previous forty years (see DPKO 2004). 
The geographic scope of operations has 
expanded as well and perhaps most 
dramatically has been the expansion in 
the types of operations deployed. Even if 
the UN still holds on to a separation 
between peacekeeping operations on the 
one hand and political and peace-
building missions on the other hand (and 
consistently authorize, head and finance 
them differently), today´s operations are 
increasingly multidimensional in charac-
ter and perform multiple tasks simulta-
neously, including peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and 
peace-building, or at least move between 
the different types. 
Given the large scale of literature on UN 
peace operations, there have been sur-
prisingly few attempts to examine 
whether and how the UN has adjusted 
the international public financing system 
underlying the provision of its operations 
to the complex tasks the organization is 
asked to undertake to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. This is nearly 
beyond comprehension taking into ac-
count the fact that the extent to which 
and the way how these operations are 
financed are crucial for their failure or 
success. Even the final report of the 
Panel of UN Peace Operations (“Bra-
himi Report”), which was convened by 
the Secretary General in 2000 to under-
take a thorough review of the United 
Nations peace and security activities, 
remains quite silent on the financial 
aspects of UN peace operations. In fact, 
there are only a few studies worth men-
tioning that have examined this impor-
tant topic in greater detail. While some 
of these studies focus exclusively on the 
financing of the UN´s peacekeeping 
operations (see Mills 1990; Durch 1993; 
Mc Dermott 1994a, 1994b; UNA-USA 
1997; Laurenti 2001), others mainly 
explore the financing of UN political 
and peace-building missions including 
the voluntary funding of specific activi-
ties and programmes related to them (see 
Forman and Salomons 1998; Forman, 
Patrick and Salomons 2000; Salomons 
and Dijzeul 2001). In both cases the 
authors only look at selected financing 
arrangements, while leaving others, 
likewise relevant, disregarded. More-
over, some of the studies have lost their 
topicality since, over the last years, the 
UN has introduced a series of internal 
reform processes aimed to improve the 
financing of both mission types. Thus, 
while the knowledge on the public fi-
nancing of UN peace operations mainly 
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is a topic of consideration among a small 
number of UN practitioners and eco-
nomic experts, it still remains frag-
mented and incomplete in the academic 
literature. 
Therefore, the overall objective of the 
present study is to fill this knowledge 
gap by contributing to a more systematic 
understanding on how the financing of 
international cooperation for the provi-
sion of UN peacekeeping as well as of 
UN political and peace-building mis-
sions currently works. To accomplish 
this research objective the examination 
will be embedded in the theoretical 
framework of the global public goods 
concept.1 There is good reason to do so. 
To consider UN peace operations no 
longer merely as important international 
“concerns”, but as international public 
goods2 offers a new and beneficial ana-
lytical perspective on these operations: 
just like private goods, (UN peace opera-
tions as) public goods need to be pro-
duced in a systematic fashion in order to 
exist. Consistently, public goods like-
wise have there own production path of 
which the financing is a crucial compo-
nent (see Kaul and Le Goulven 2003a, 
2003b). Put differently, if we look at UN 
peace operations through the lens of 
                                                 
1 Triggered by the seminal 1999 study, 
“Global Public Goods: Development Co-
operation in the 21st Century”, edited by 
UNDP staff Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, 
and Marc A. Stern, the concept meanwhile 
is subject of extensive academic study and 
has attracted growing attention in interna-
tional fora and debates on how to manage 
the process of globalization. 
2 For an explanation why the present study 
considers UN peace operations as interna-
tional public goods (IPGs) instead of global 
public goods (GPGs), see chapter II.4. 
global public goods we also have to ask 
how to best provide and finance them. 
Thus, while the prevailing literature on 
UN peace operations seldom integrate 
into their analyses the public finance 
dimensions of these operations, from a 
global public good perspective it is 
imperative to encourage a more system-
atic consideration of the different financ-
ing arrangements in place in order to get 
a better understanding of the patterns of 
burden-sharing behind the provision of 
UN peace operations as public goods 
and to enable policy-recommendations 
on how to improve their production path. 
However, the notion of UN peace opera-
tions as public goods itself is rather new 
and needs to be clarified in greater de-
tail. Against this background the present 
study has two purposes: 
- First, it investigates the public good 
character of UN peace operations. 
What exactly is their public good 
nature? If UN peace operations rep-
resent public goods, to what extent 
is their degree of publicness in deci-
sionmaking, consumption, and in 
the distribution of benefits? Put dif-
ferently: How public is the decision 
when and where to deploy them? Do 
they yield regional, international or 
even global purely public benefits or 
a mixture of global and nation-
specific benefits? Do they generate 
benefits that are subject to equal and 
fair distribution? 
- Second, it provides a comprehensive 
and systematic analysis of the sev-
eral existing international financing 
arrangements created by the UN to 
finance the resource requirements of 
UN peacekeeping operations as well 
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as of UN political and peace-
building missions. How well – and 
to what extent – has the financing of 
UN peace operations been adjusted 
to their rising number, size and 
scope? What financial reforms have 
been initiated and which new fi-
nancing mechanisms and tools have 
been created to help foster better al-
location of resources to improve the 
provision of UN peace operations as 
public goods? Are the international 
financing arrangements in place ap-
propriate for an optimal provision of 
UN peace operations as public 
goods? 
While approaching these questions the 
examination does not take into consid-
eration the financing of Multinational 
Forces (MNFs) which, although author-
ized by the Security Council, are not 
actual UN forces. Rather, they are coali-
tions made up of, and financed by, will-
ing states. It also does not investigate the 
financing of peace operations conducted 
by regional organization (e. g. AU, 
ECOWAS, EU, NATO). Moreover, the 
study does not focus on the financing of 
private military companies (PMCs) and 
private security companies (PSCs), 
which are increasingly employed by the 
UN to support the activities of UN peace 
operations, but whose costs are met by 
the government of the states concerned 
rather than by the UN´s peacekeeping 
budgets. 
The study is divided into five chapters. 
Following the introduction (chapter I), 
chapter II first provides the theoretical 
framework of the study and is concerned 
with basic understandings of the (global) 
public goods concept. Doing so, it also 
briefly introduces into the current debate 
on the financing of global public goods. 
Following a short description of the 
changing nature of UN peace operations 
and an overview of the essential features 
of burden-sharing behind their current 
provision, the chapter then is devoted to 
the analysis of UN peace operations as 
international public goods. It examines 
whether UN peace operations represent 
pure public goods generating regional or 
even worldwide purely public benefits or 
international “joint-product public 
goods” (Sandler 2001) yielding both 
purely public transnational benefits and 
country-specific (private) benefits. 
Moreover it offers new insights, e. g. by 
applying the “triangle of publicness” 
developed by Kaul (2001) as an analyti-
cal tool to determine a good´s publicness 
in consumption, in decisionmaking, and 
in the distribution of net benefits. 
Chapter III provides a systematic analy-
sis – an “inventory”- of the various 
international financing mechanisms and 
tools created by the UN to finance the 
resource requirements of all types of UN 
peace operations. The chapter explores 
in great detail the manner in which UN 
Member States address burden-sharing 
and allocative issues to ensure the provi-
sion of UN peace operations as interna-
tional public goods. Chapter IV takes a 
more detailed look at the sources of 
funding allocated to UN peace opera-
tions and critically discuss the intermin-
gling of ODA and financing for these 
operations. The chapter also provides an 
outlook on the possible future shape of a 
financing system that is build up on 
alternative financing sources. Finally, 
the conclusion of the present study 
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(chapter V) brings the research findings 
together, assesses the financing ar-
rangements in place from a public good 
perspective and offers policy recom-
mendations for further improvements. 
II. UN Peace Operations as 
International Public Goods 
In a relatively short time, the concept of 
global public goods (GPGs) has gained 
ground in the debate on how to manage 
best the process of globalization. Its 
political dynamics was particularly 
triggered by the two seminal studies 
“Global Public Goods. International 
Cooperation in the 21st Century” (Kaul, 
Grunberg, Stern 1999) and “Providing 
Global Public Goods. Managing Global-
ization” (Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven, 
and Mendoza 2003) – both produced 
under the auspices of the UNDP. During 
the course of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
August 2002 in Johannesburg an “Inter-
national Task Force on Global Public 
Goods”3 was launched on the initiative 
of the Sweden and the French Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in cooperation with 
the UNDP. By applying and extending 
the classic economic theory of public 
goods (see Samuelson 1954; Olson 1971 
                                                 
                                                
3 The mandate of the Task Force which 
started working in September 2003 is to de-
fine an internationally accepted framework 
for the identification of key GPGs. In addi-
tion, its objective is to make recommenda-
tions to policy makers and other stake-
holders on how to provide and finance 
them. The Task Force is co-chaired by 
Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mex-
ico, and Tidjane Thiam, Group Strategy and 
Development Director at Aviva, London 
(see http://www.gpgtaskforce.org/bazment. 
aspx). 
[1965]) in an international context4 the 
protagonists of the GPG concept pro-
vided an additional rationale for interna-
tional cooperation: challenges and risks 
of globalization are a consequence of the 
“underprovision” of global public goods 
which can be provided effectively only 
through collective action involving 
multiple actors throughout the world. 
Vice versa, opportunities of globalization 
are due to the adequate provision of 
global public goods (see Kaul, Con-
ceição, Le Goulven, and Mendoza 2003, 
pp. 2 ff.). That apart, the concept offers a 
number of other additionalities. E. g. it 
reminds us that our well-being depends 
on private and public goods and, that 
issues such as “climate stability” or 
“peace and security” are not merely 
abstract concerns but goods in the public 
domain, which – just like private 
goods – need to be produced in a sys-
tematic fashion. Before applying the 
concept and its inherent additionalities to 
the study of UN peace operations, the 
next sections briefly introduce some 
basic definitions and understandings 
underlying the concept. 
 
4 In fact, this approach is not new but did not 
receive the same attention in the past. Im-
portant contributions on which the above-
mentioned studies could be built on inter 
alia were made by Hardin (1968); Russett 
and Sullivan (1971); Mendez (1992); and 
Sandler (1997). Moreover, the concept of 
public goods over the years was repeatedly 
applied within the context of the economic 
theory of international (military) alliances. 
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II.1 Basic Definitions and 
Understandings of the 
Global Public Good 
Concept 
The starting point of the GPG concept is 
the standard economic theory of public 
goods whose central concern is whether 
a good5 is public or private. Referring to 
Paul Samuelson´s pioneering article 
“The pure theory of public expenditure” 
(1954) economic textbooks usually 
define public goods – in contrast to 
private goods – as those which are non-
rival in consumption and which have 
non-excludable benefits. That is, con-
sumption of a public good by one indi-
vidual does not prevent its consumption 
by another – and it is either impossible 
or too costly to exclude those who do not 
pay for the good from consuming it (see 
e. g. Stiglitz 2000, pp. 128 ff.). If both 
conditions are fully satisfied, a public 
good is said to be pure. The other side of 
the public good coin are public bads 
from whose negative utility nobody can 
be excluded. Because of their two criti-
cal properties pure public goods are 
subject to free-riding6 and thus constitute 
                                                 
                                                
5 A good can be defined as a commodity, 
service or resource (see French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2002, p. 10). 
6 The free-rider problem first was described 
by David Hume in the mid-18th century and 
then taken up by Hardin (1968) and Olson 
(1971 [1965]). “Free-riding” refers to a lack 
of incentives on the part of the users to fi-
nance their supply: A free-rider is “some-
one who enjoys the benefits of a good 
without paying for it. Because it is difficult 
to keep people from using pure public 
goods, those who benefit from them have 
an incentive to avoid paying for them” 
(Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven, and Men-
doza 2003, p. 605).  
a case of market failure7 creating a ra-
tionale for their public provision (see 
Morrissey, te Velde, and Hewitt 2002, 
p. 32). The market either will not supply, 
or will supply too little of, public goods. 
Once in the (local-global) public do-
main, their adequate provision is re-
stricted by collective action problems 
such as the prisoner´s dilemma. As a 
result of the free-rider problem and the 
prisoner´s dilemma public goods tend to 
be undersupplied. In practice, however, 
only few goods are purely public. In-
stead they are mixed public and private – 
so called impure public goods that only 
partially meet the criteria of non-
excludability and non-rivalry. Impure 
public goods, again, can be classified 
into the following subclasses:8
- Club Goods: Public goods that 
possess partially rival benefits that 
can be excluded at an affordable 
cost. Examples are communication 
and transportation networks, air-
ports, and free trade agreements. 
According to Sandler (2002, 
pp. 91 ff.) club goods potentially 
promise the most efficient outcomes 
among the non-pure public goods. 
Arce M. and Sandler (2002, p. 15) 
write: “A club good is partially rival 
for its members, but excludable to 
nonmembers […]. The rationale for 
forming a club is that universal ac-
cess causes rivalry in terms of 
 
7 The term market failure describes “the 
situation in which a market fails to attain 
economic efficiency” Kaul, Grunberg, 
Stern 1999, p. 510; for a detailed discussion 
see e. g. Stiglitz 2000, pp. 76 ff.). 
8 Introductory definitions are adopted from 
Sagasti and Bezanson (2001, p. 167). 
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crowding and congestion. By re-
stricting access to fee-paying mem-
bers only, the club ensures that utili-
zation of the shared good produces a 
benefit for members that meets or 
exceeds this fee. The club fee or toll 
charges a user the crowding costs 
that a visit imposes on the member-
ship.” Kaul, Conceição, Le Goul-
ven, and Mendoza (2003, p. 604) 
stress that “the optimal size of a 
club is that which maximizes the 
group´s jointly utility”. 
- Common pool resources: A sub-
class of impure public goods, which 
are mostly non-excludable but rival-
rous in consumption. Two criteria 
are used to define a common pool 
resource: “(1) the cost of achieving 
physical exclusion from the re-
source; and (2) the presence of sub-
stractable resource-units” (Gardner, 
Ostrom and Walker 1990, cited in 
Sagasti and Benzanson 2001, 
p. 160). For example, water is often 
referred to as a common pool re-
source. 
- Joint Products – consist of those 
activities that yield two or more 
outputs or joint products, which may 
vary in their degree of publicness. 
As such, joint product outputs may 
be purely public, private, or 
impurely public. An activity that 
yields both “purely public transna-
tional benefits and country-specific 
benefits” is an instance of interna-
tional joint products (Arce M and 
Sandler 2002, p. 15; see also 
Sandler and Hartley 2001; Sandler 
2002). The present study takes up 
the concept of joint products in the 
subsequent examination of UN 
peace operations as international 
public goods. 
Closely associated with, but separate 
from the notion of public goods is the 
concept of externalities. While the the-
ory distinguishes between the two con-
cepts, in practice they overlap. External-
ities – often called third party effects – 
arise when the effects of certain actions 
are not borne directly by the responsible 
party but by someone else. Constituting 
another form of market failure, they can 
be positive or negative. In the words of 
Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999, p. 5) 
“externalities are by-products of certain 
activities – spillovers into the public 
sphere”. From an economists´ point of 
view the main problem with externalities 
is that the costs or benefits associated 
with them are not reflected in the price 
of the good itself. Thus, the challenge is 
to internalize externalities, i. e. to attrib-
ute effectively the benefits/cost of posi-
tive/negative externalities to the agent 
that generates it (see Sagasti and Bezan-
son 2001, p. 6). However, from a 
(global) public goods protagonists´ point 
of view the motivation for providing 
(global) public goods “arises from the 
desire to encourage positive external-
ities, or to correct negative ones” (Sa-
gasti and Bezanson 2001, p. 6). As many 
externalities have the property to affect 
others, they can be viewed as a form of 
public goods, or vice versa: “public 
goods can be viewed as an extreme form 
of externalities” (Stiglitz 2000, p. 136). 
Given this brief overview of some of the 
essential findings of the classic eco-
nomic theory of public goods the central 
assumption of the concept of global 
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public goods is that, as a result of global-
ization and more porous national bor-
ders, several public goods – and notably 
bads – have been “globalized” and, 
consequently can no longer be provided 
through domestic policy action alone 
(see Kaul 2000a, 2000b). In their 1999 
volume Kaul and her team at UNDP´s 
Office of Development Studies defined a 
pure global public good as “a public 
good with benefits that are strongly 
universal in terms of countries (covering 
more than one group of countries), 
people (accruing to several, preferable 
all, population groups) and generations 
(extending to both current and future 
generations, or at least meeting the needs 
of current generations without foreclos-
ing development options for future 
generations)” (Kaul, Grunberg, and 
Stern 1999, pp. 509 f.). This definition 
comprises goods such as peace and 
security, financial stability, free trade, 
and health. In a recent publication Kaul 
and Mendoza (2003, p. 100) distinguish 
three main classes of global public goods 
by the nature of their publicness: “global 
natural commons” (e. g. the high seas), 
“global humanmade commons” (e. g. 
international regimes and norms), and 
“global policy outcomes or conditions” 
(e. g. global peace). Meanwhile a num-
ber of different schemes have been 
employed in the literature that usually 
classify global public goods by sectors 
(e. g. environment, health, security), type 
of benefits (e. g. risk reduction, direct 
provision of utility), dimensions of pub-
licness, and aggregation technology9 
                                                                                                                    
9 Aggregation technology criteria classify 
public goods by the way of how individual 
contributions to the good determine the 
(see e. g. Morrissey, te Velde, and Hew-
itt 2002; Sandler 2002; Barrett 2004). 
In their 2003 volume Kaul, Conceição, 
Le Goulven, and Mendoza further de-
veloped their concept of (global) public 
goods by introducing new conceptual 
and methodological ideas that go far 
beyond the standard concepts and theo-
ries on public goods. One of the authors´ 
most important conclusions is that a 
good is not per se public or private 
because of its technical defined 
(non)rival and (non)excludable proper-
ties. Rather “publicness and privateness 
are in most cases social – human made – 
constructs” (Kaul, Conceição, Le Goul-
ven, and Mendoza 2003, p. 7). Put dif-
ferently, the publicness or privateness of 
a good first and foremost is subject to 
political decisions and can vary depend-
ing on political preferences (see Kaul 
and Mendoza 2003, pp. 81 ff.; also Kaul 
and Kocks 2003, p. 41). 
It is against this background that Kaul 
and Mendoza expand the standard defi-
nition of public goods suggesting that “a 
distinction be made between these 
good´s basic or original properties (such 
as being nonrival or non-excludable) and 
their actual characteristics – those that 
society has assigned to him” (Kaul and 
Mendoza 2003, p. 80). Accordingly, the 
authors distinguish between those goods 
which are “potential candidates for 
actual being public” and those that are 
“de facto public or inclusive”, resulting 
in a revised two-level definition of pub-
lic goods: (1) “Goods have a special 
potential for being public if they have 
overall level of the good (see Sandler 2002, 
p. 95). 
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nonexcudable benefits, nonrival benefits, 
or both”; (2) “Goods are de facto public 
if they are nonexlusive and available for 
all to consume”. By analogy, the authors 
define “de facto global public goods” as 
follows: “Global public goods are goods 
with benefits that extend to all countries, 
people, and generations” (Kaul, Con-
ceição, Le Goulven, and Mendoza 2003, 
pp. 22 f.). 
Perhaps most important, the authors also 
draw attention to two dimensions of 
publicness that hitherto were disregarded 
in the standard literature on public 
goods. While the prevailing literature 
exclusively focuses on the publicness in 
consumption to assess a good´s public-
ness, the authors go a step further by 
asking how well “publicness in con-
sumption” is matched by “publicness in 
decionmaking” and in the “distribution 
of net benefits” across various parts of 
the global public” (Kaul, Conceição, Le 
Goulven, and Mendoza 2003, p. 25). 
With regard to UN peace operations the 
present study will return to these dimen-
sions of publicness in chapter II.4.4. 
II.1.1 The Current Debate on 
Financing Global Public 
Goods 
For the last two or three years the ques-
tion of ´how best to finance global public 
goods?´ has assumed centre stage within 
the GPG discourse. This is not surpris-
ing, considering the current realities of 
international financing for global public 
goods: while an international dimension 
of public finance only exists rudimentar-
ily, financing of global public goods first 
and foremost happens nationally. Kaul 
and Le Goulven estimate that “only $1 
of every $200 spent on global public 
goods involves public spending at the 
international level” (Kaul and Le Goul-
ven 2003a, p. 329). Since neither “na-
tional self-provision“ nor “unilateral 
provision” (Kaul, Le Goulven and 
Schnupf 2002, pp. 13 f.) of global public 
goods can yield desired policy outputs, 
there is an enormous need for a more 
structured international public financing 
of global public goods. This would help 
“shifting the emphasis from controlling 
bads” – what usually happens at the 
national level – to “producing goods” 
(Kaul and Le Goulven 2003a, p. 359). 
The current international financing 
practice, however, looks different. One 
of the most critical aspects is that at the 
international level global public goods 
on a large scale are financed through 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). Recent empirical analyses and 
studies on public goods estimate the sum 
of aid which is spent on purposes related 
to GPGs at 15 to 30 percent of total 
annual ODA resources (see te Velde, 
Morrissey and Hewitt 2002, Kaul and Le 
Goulven 2003a). It goes without saying 
that aid allocated to finance GPGs is at 
the expense of those core purposes 
which aid spending was originally 
thought for, namely fighting poverty, 
unemployment and stark social con-
trasts: “The intermingling of aid and 
financing for global public goods con-
straints the effectiveness of both – hurt-
ing, in particular, poor people.” (Kaul 
and Le Goulven 2003a, p. 330). Kaul 
demonstrates that ODA statistics in fact 
would look very different, if one sub-
tracts the sum of aid which is spent on 
the provision of GPGs from total ODA. 
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Then total annual ODA would not 
amount to about 0.25 percent of total 
DAC members´ GDP on an average, but 
to about 0.15 percent to 0.18 percent 
only (see Kaul 2004, p. 3). As already 
recommended by the ´UN High-Level 
Panel on Financing for Development´ 
(“Zedillo Report”) it is therefore “im-
perative to separate finance for devel-
opment and humanitarian assistance 
from finance for global public goods” 
(UN Doc. A/55/1000, p. v). Also Kaul 
and Le Goulven (2002, p. 11) stress the 
importance of a “dual agenda of interna-
tional development”: one of ensuring an 
“adequate provision of public goods” 
and one of providing assistance to poor 
countries. The current intermingling of 
aid financing for international public 
goods is consistently due to the absence 
of a clear discussion on ´Who are the 
net-beneficiaries of the resources pro-
vided for?´ In this context Kaul and Le 
Goulven critically note that “interna-
tional financing of global public goods 
often follows a ´beneficiary pays´ prin-
ciple. For many key global concerns, the 
payers (´donor´ countries) are also the 
main beneficiaries of their spending on 
international cooperation.” (Kaul and Le 
Goulven 2003a, p. 329) 
Reforming the international public fi-
nancing system in its current shape, inter 
alia, would require creating new and 
innovative international financing 
mechanisms and tools10 suitable to ade-
quately channel resources to interna-
tional cooperation aimed at the provision 
of global public goods. According to 
Sagasti and Bezanson (2001, p. 40) the 
                                                 
10 For definitions see chapter III.1 
several mechanisms and tools currently 
under debate for financing international 
and global public goods at least can be 
grouped into four main categories: (1) 
Payments by users and beneficiaries 
which are associated with internalising 
externalities and which take the form of 
market mechanisms and of international 
taxes and fees; (2) Private sources of 
finance including funds provided by 
profit making firms, private independent 
foundations, corporate foundations, 
academic institutions, NGOs and indi-
vidual persons; (3) Public sources of 
funding which comprise funds provided 
by government agencies in developed 
and developing countries, tax incentives 
that imply governments foregoing reve-
nues, and funds from international finan-
cial institutions and other international 
organizations; (4) A combination of 
various sources of financing which 
usually take the form of partnerships 
between government agencies, private 
firms, foundations, civil society organi-
zations and international institutions. 
Most of these financing arrangements 
still primarily are utilized at the national 
level – especially those dealing with 
internalizing externalities (e. g. taxes, 
user charges, fees, levies). However, 
even if some of the innovative means of 
financing already are existent as “prece-
dents” at the international level, they are 
far away from being embedded in a 
coherent and structured framework 
suitable for a sustainable international 
financing of global public goods. Rather 
they often are part of an “ad hoc” financ-
ing system created in response to urgent 
international challenges. Against this 
background further research is needed 
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that aims at the systematic analysis of 
currently existing and possible future 
international financing arrangements. 
II.2 New Security Issues and 
the Changing Nature of 
UN Peace Operations 
Since the early 1990s a series of violent 
conflicts, often entitled “new wars” 
(Kaldor 2000; Münkler 2002) or “net-
work-wars” (Duffield 2001) has con-
fronted the international community with 
extreme human suffering. Characteristic 
for these conflicts that erupted with the 
end of the Cold War is widespread 
violence against civilians, a multitude of 
different non-state actors willing to use 
force and an increasing privatization of 
military conflict. At first glance these 
conflicts seem to be intrastate, but they 
have a tendency to shift along a sliding 
scale between intrastate and interstate 
because they permeate easily across 
territorial borders (as e. g. in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Great 
Lakes region) – often escalating to re-
gional conflict complexes (see e. g. 
Debiel 2002a, 2002b, 2003). From a 
global public good point of view these 
violent conflicts represent public bads 
which have the potential to generate 
large negative cross-border externalities 
(spillovers) such as war economies, 
illicit trade of natural resources, and 
contagious political and economic insta-
bility. “Intra-state warfare is often 
viewed, in the prosperous West, simply 
as set of discrete and unrelated crisis 
occurring in distant and unimportant 
regions. In reality, what is happening is a 
convulsive process of state fragmenta-
tion and state formation that is trans-
forming the international order itself. 
Moreover, the rich world is deeply 
implicated in the process. Civil conflicts 
are fuelled by arms and monetary trans-
fers that originate in the developed 
world, and their destabilizing effects are 
felt in the developed world in everything 
from globally interconnected terrorism 
to refugee flows, the export of drugs, the 
spread of infectious disease and organ-
ized crime.” (ICISS 2001, p. 5) 
Violent intrastate conflicts are a clear 
consequence of the underprovision of 
peace and security on the local-global 
continuum. They do not only destroy 
public goods in developing countries 
where they most often occur, and there-
fore damage “disproportionately the 
countries most dependent on them” 
(Pottebaum and Kanbur 2001, p. 1) their 
negative externalities also can be felt 
regionally, internationally, or even glob-
ally – depending on their cross-border 
range. Against this background the 
provision of UN peace operations is the 
effort to correct as much as possible 
these negative externalities and to “pro-
duce” positive ones. 
With the increasing deployment of UN 
peace operations in intrastate violent 
conflicts – notably in failing or failed 
states, such as Somalia, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Kosovo where the central 
authority of the state has collapsed, law 
and order are non-existent and territory 
is controlled by competing warlords and 
other private actors – (see e. g. Münkler 
2002; Crocker 2003) the dimensions and 
functions of UN peace operations have 
expanded as well. While the task of 
traditional UN peacekeeping operations 
during the Cold War was limited to 
monitoring and reinforcing a cease-fire 
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between opposing national armed forces 
(see e. g. Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 
1998), “post-Westphalian” peace opera-
tions (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 
2004, p. 2) instead perform a variety of 
tasks, such as peace-making, peace-
enforcement, and peace-building, that go 
far beyond the traditional peacekeeping 
model. 
Since UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali sparked a widespread 
debate on the performance of UN peace 
operations in the post-Cold War era by 
introducing these interrelated concepts in 
his “Agenda for Peace” (UN Doc. 
A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992) 
there have been several different ap-
proaches to classifying contemporary 
UN peace operations according to its 
characteristics, functions and types. 
William Durch (1997, p. 8), for example, 
identifies four types of peace operations 
based on broad characteristics: “tradi-
tional peacekeeping”, “multidimensional 
peace operations”, “peace enforcement” 
and “humanitarian intervention”. Others 
offer more specific taxonomies. Diehl, 
Druckman, and Wall (1998, pp. 39 f.), 
for instance, put forward twelve different 
types of peacekeeping operations, rang-
ing from “traditional peacekeeping” to 
“sanction enforcement”, while Bellamy, 
Williams, and Griffin (2004, pp 5 ff.) 
identify five types of peacekeeping 
operations: “traditional peacekeeping”, 
managing transition”, “wider peacekeep-
ing”, peace-enforcement and peace-
support operations”. An alternative 
approach is to categorize peace opera-
tions chronologically by referring to 
more recent operations as “new peace-
keeping” (Ratner 1997) or “second 
generation” missions (Mackinlay and 
Chopra 1992). 
However, many of these classifications 
suffer from one essential weakness: they 
do not take into consideration that the 
same operation may perform multiple 
functions simultaneously or sequentially. 
In this context Jeong states that “differ-
ent types of UN operations should not be 
regarded as distinct activities, but as a 
point on a continuum – not only because 
various military functions can be used in 
a parallel fashion but also because dif-
ferent roles and functions need to be 
integrated at a strategic level. Most 
international mandates fall somewhere 
between maintenance of order and 
peacebuilding.” (Jeong 2004, p. 19) 
In fact, many of today´s operations are 
increasingly multidimensional since they 
incorporate elements of peacekeeping as 
well as of peace-making, peace-enforce-
ment, and peace-building. Against this 
background it is important to note that 
the UN in authorizing, heading and 
financing UN peace operations only 
distinguishes peacekeeping operations 
(while using peacekeeping as an um-
brella term for the whole range of prin-
ciple activities as mentioned above) from 
so-called political and peace-building 
missions. While the former are directed 
and supported by the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the 
latter are directed and supported by the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPO). 
This artificial separation is not only 
misleading because many contemporary 
peacekeeping operations are character-
ized by a symbiotic relationship between 
peacekeeping and peace-building func-
tions – as eloquently described in the 
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“Brahimi Report” (UN Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809) –, it also has created a 
variety of administrative and financial 
problems which are topic of considera-
tion in chapter III of the present study. 
Given this brief picture, it is obvious that 
the UN has undertaken important steps 
to adjust the alignment of its peace 
operations to the changing nature of 
violent conflicts. Thereby the list of 
tasks performed has expanded im-
mensely, including measures such as 
electoral support, humanitarian assis-
tance and movement of refugees and 
displaced persons; mine clearance; 
observation and verification of cease-fire 
agreements; foreign troop withdrawal; 
preventive deployments; demobilization 
of forces; collection, custody and de-
struction of weapons; disarming para-
military forces, private and irregular 
units; reconstruction of social infrastruc-
ture; institution building; and transitional 
assistance. 
II.3 Provision Status of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations 
at a Glance 
The number of peacekeeping operations 
increased sharply for the years after 
1987 compared to those before 1987. 
During the period 1948 to 1987 only 13 
peacekeeping operations were con-
ducted. After 1987, 46 new operations 
were deployed – of which 16 are cur-
rently active (August 2004). The ap-
proved budgets for the period from 1 
July 2004 to 30 June 2005 amount to 
about US$ 2.80 billion. The total costs of 
all peacekeeping operations from 1948 
to 30 June 2004 are estimated at roughly 
US$ 31.54 billion (see UNDPI 2004). 
All UN Member States are obliged to 
pay their share of peacekeeping costs 
under a formula that they themselves 
agreed upon (see chapter III.2). Com-
pared with nation states´ military expen-
ditures peacekeeping is not expensive – 
and it is far cheaper than the alternative, 
which is war. World military expendi-
Figure 1: United Nations peacekeeping operations - Assessments 
(Millions of United States dollars) 
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ture in 2002, for example, is estimated at 
US$ 794 billion, accounting for 2.5 
percent world GDP and representing an 
average of US$ 128 per capita (see 
SIPRI 2003, p. 301). In that same year 
total expenditures for all UN peacekeep-
ing operations and political and peace-
building missions combined amounted to 
roughly US$ 2.8 billion only (see UN 
Docs. A/58/5 (Vol. II), p. 3 and 
A/C.5/58/20, p. 12). Given these figures 
the ratio of expenditures for UN peace 
operations to world military expendi-
tures was 1:284 in 2002. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
total peacekeeping budget levels (as-
sessments) during the period 1999 to 
2003. 
Despite the fact that UN Member States 
are legally obliged to pay for peacekeep-
ing it is common practice that they 
withhold their assessed contributions to 
the Peacekeeping Assessment Accounts. 
Thus, financing is the major problem for 
UN Peace Operations. Outstanding 
contributions to peacekeeping budgets 
currently amount to about US$ 2.48 
billion (as of 31 July 2004). The figures 
of the previous years were similar: US$ 
1.69 billion in 1999; US$ 2.13 billion in 
2000; US$ 2.35 billion in 2001; US$ 
1.25 billion in 2002; and US$ 1.08 
billion in 2003 (see UN Doc. A/58/5 
(Vol. II), p. 4). One reason for the high 
amounts of outstanding contributions is 
that the authorization of peacekeeping 
operations typically does not coincide 
with the normal budgetary cycles. This, 
however, is only one side of the coin 
considering the political reasons behind 
these figures (for a critical discussion, 
see chapter III). 
Figure 2 contrasts total UN peacekeep-
ing operations expenditure per year vs. 
total payment arrears by all UN Member 
States for the period from 1975 through 
2003. 
 
Figure 2: Total UN Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures Per Year vs Total
 Payment Arrears by All Member States 
(Millions of United States dollars) 
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The differences between assessment 
schedules and payments made can shed 
light on national stances toward the 
provision of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions as international public goods. 
However, when states are in arrears, the 
UN is unable to reimburse states that 
contribute troops, equipment, and sup-
plies to peacekeeping operations. It goes 
without saying that the frequent and 
lengthy delay of reimbursements to 
troop-contributing countries most affects 
those countries that can least afford such 
deficits, and creates a disincentive to 
contribute troops. But even some devel-
oped countries are affected: “This la-
mentable record has engendered a cer-
tain fatalism among the wealthier (mid-
dle industrial) countries – such as Can-
ada and the Scandinavians – who have 
come to recognize, if not accept, that 
they will never be fully reimbursed for 
their contributions.” (Mc Dermott 1994, 
p. 178). Barrett (2004, p. 32) points out 
that the UN´s inability to reimburse 
troop contributing countries makes 
“these states less inclined to contribute 
in future peacekeeping operations, to the 
harm of all states, including those in 
arrears”. However, this does not avert 
wealthy states from withholding their 
payments. Table 1 shows that the main 
payers can also be the largest debtors. 
The largest troop contributors usually are 
developing countries. Among the top ten 
troop-contributing countries to UN 
peacekeeping operations during the 
period 1997 to 2004 usually were India, 
Bangladesh, Nepal; Pakistan¸ Nigeria, 
Table 1: 15 main payers and debtors to UN peacekeeping budgets in 2003 
 
 Main Payers Main Debtors 
No. Country Assessment Rates Country Debts (in Mio. US$) 
1. USA 26,7 USA 482
2. Japan 19,5 Japan 154
3. Germany 8,7 Ukraine 154
4. United Kingdom 7,4 China 49
5. France 7,3 Belarus 42
6. Italy 4,9 Republic of Korea 31
7. Canada 2,8 Brazil 28
8. Spain 2,5 Argentina 28
9. China 2,5 Belgium 9
10. Netherlands 1,7 United Arab Emirates 8
11. Australia 1,6 Poland 6
12. Republic of Korea 1,5 Iraq 6
13. Russian Federation 1,3 Mexico 4
14. Switzerland 1,2 Venezuela 3
15. Belgium 1,1 Russian Federation 0,5
Source: Assessment rates are adopted from UN Doc. A/58/157/Add. 1; Debt figures are adopted from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/pko 
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Ghana, and Kenya (see UNDPKO 2005). 
Industrialized countries instead prioritize 
deployment of their troops to operations 
led by NATO, the EU and / or ad hoc 
coalitions authorized by the Security 
Council. In this context Khanna, 
Sandler, and Shimizu (1998, p. 180) 
note: “From an incentive perspective, it 
is not surprising that some countries with 
low opportunity costs […] are among the 
largest troop contributors in recent years. 
For many troop-contributing nations, the 
supplying of troops is a negative burden 
or a subsidy, whereas for others (e. g. 
United Kingdom, France, United States), 
it is an additional burden.” However, it is 
obvious that rich countries pay (if they 
pay) – and poor countries´ soldiers are 
sent into the field. 
 
II.4 Approaching UN Peace 
Operations from a Public 
Good Perspective 
Recent attempts to explore UN peace-
keeping as international public goods are 
in the tradition of economic theory of 
alliances which has its origin in Mancur 
Olson´s seminal study “The Logic of 
Collective Action” (1965) where he used 
alliances, and NATO in particular, as an 
example of the different kinds of interna-
tional organizations which face alloca-
tive efficiency problems from sharing a 
pure public good (see Olson 1971 
[1965], p. 36). A formal model then 
followed in Olson and Zeckhauser 
(1966) which focused on burden-sharing 
among NATO members to provide 
common defence as a public good. The 
authors´ findings have shown that the 
large rich allies shoulder a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden, i. e. the 
defence burden of the small, poor allies 
by providing the latter with a relatively 
free ride. The proposition became 
known as the exploitation hypothesis 
(see Sandler and Hartley 2001, p. 869). 
In recent years few authors have applied 
the methods and insights gained from the 
study of alliances to the study of peace-
keeping (see e. g. Bobrow and Boyer 
1997; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 
1998, 1999; Sandler and Hartley 1999; 
Arce M. and Sandler 2002). Doing so, 
the authors developed a joint-product 
explanation of peacekeeping leading to 
collective action implications that differ 
from those of the pure public good 
scenario provided by Olson and Zeck-
hauser. 
In contrast to above-mentioned authors 
which define peacekeeping as an interna-
tional public good, the present study 
follows the conviction that peacekeeping 
as well as peace-making, peace-
enforcement, and peace-building are not 
public goods but measures, activities or 
functions of UN peace operations. Thus, 
it makes more sense to approach UN 
peace operations as public goods. More-
over, whereas one could argue that the 
provision of all UN peace operations 
together can be viewed as one public 
good, this study treats each single opera-
tion as a public good. Since different UN 
peace operations can vary in their degree 
of publicness there is good reason to do 
so. 
Before returning to the joint-product 
model of UN peace operations in sub-
chapter II.4.3, as a starting point it is 
useful to take a closer look a) at the basic 
questions of whether they represent 
intermediate or final public goods, and 
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b) at the geographic range of the purely 
public benefits yielded by UN peace 
operations to determine whether they 
represent regional, international, or even 
global public goods. 
II.4.1 The Intermediate Public 
Good Nature of UN Peace 
Operations 
According to Kaul et al. public goods 
can be differentiated by the stages of 
their production path: “Final public 
goods are those desired for consumption, 
such as clean air, efficient markets […]. 
Producing final public goods often 
requires inputs of many private goods, 
public goods, or both. Public goods that 
contribute to the production of a final 
public good are called intermediate 
public goods.” (Kaul, Conceição, Le 
Goulven, and Mendoza 2003, p. 604) 
Even if the consumption of intermediate 
public goods is of an instrumental char-
acter as they constitute “building blocks 
of the production path leading to a final 
public good” (ODS 2002, p. 5), they 
fulfil the properties of public goods as 
well and are also subject to public con-
sumption. For example, international 
regimes, agreements and organizations 
fall within the definition of intermediate 
(international) public goods (see Kaul 
and Mendoza 2003, p. 104). 
From an idealistic point of view the 
motivation for providing UN peace 
operations arise from the desire to en-
courage public consumable positive 
externalities, i. e. pure global public 
goods such as peace and security and 
enhanced world-political stability. 
Against this background UN peace 
operations can be viewed as intermediate 
public goods or inputs into the final 
global public goods of peace and secu-
rity and enhanced world-political stabil-
ity. It goes without saying that the provi-
sion of UN peace operations only is one 
important building block of a more 
comprehensive intermediate public 
goods “delivery system” (Sagasti and 
Bezanson 2001, p. 27) ensuring the 
provision of peace and security as a final 
global public good. 
Figure 3 provides a simple model illus-
trating the idealistic approach to UN 
peace operations as inputs to provide 
final pure global public goods. Chapter 
II.4.3, however, will demonstrate that 
this basic model must be differentiated 
as, in practice, the provision of peace 
operations also yield private benefits – a 
fact that raises the question whether 
peace operations are provided for 
´idealistic´ reasons only. 
Figure 3: An ´idealized´ intermediate public good model of UN peace operations 
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II.4.2 Spill-Over Range of Public 
Benefits 
Before exploring the private benefits that 
some nations derive from the provision 
of UN peace operations it makes sense 
first to identify the geographical range – 
often termed “spatial range” or “spill-
over range” (Morrisey, te Velde, and 
Hewitt 2002, p. 34) of the (purely) pub-
lic benefits (externalities) of these opera-
tions. The spill-over ranges distinguished 
in literature are: local, national, regional 
and global. In case of local public goods 
(LPGs) the benefits are substantially 
local. National public goods (NPGs) are 
those whose benefits are limited to the 
national public. Instead, regional public 
goods (RPGs) convey benefits to the 
public of neighbouring states (see Sa-
gasti and Bezanson 2001, Arce M. and 
Sandler 2002). While there is broad 
consensus on these categories, it is more 
problematic to distinguish between 
international public goods (IPGs) and 
global public goods (GPGs). Consider-
ing that Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven, 
and Mendoza (2003, p. 61) define public 
goods as global if their “benefits (or 
costs) cut across countries in several 
regions and across current and future 
generations, and do not discriminate 
against any population group”, it be-
comes obvious that only few public 
goods de facto fall within this definition. 
Thus, instead of treating the terms IPGs 
and GPGs as synonyms, it seems reason-
able to use the terms IPGs when refer-
ring to those public goods whose bene-
fits can be felt beyond national bounda-
ries but not completely globally in the 
sense of Kaul´s et al. definition (see also 
Morrisey, te Velde, and Hewitt 2002, 
p. 34). 
In case of UN peace operations the spill-
over range of public benefits derived 
from these operations varies as the ex-
ternalities can range from the local to the 
global level. Apart from those benefits 
that are privately – i. e. locally or nation-
ally – consumed by the conflict-ridden 
country into which an operation has been 
deployed (see below), UN peace opera-
tions can contribute to the maintenance 
of regional peace and stability, reduce 
the likelihood of unwelcome interven-
tions by regional powers, promote stabil-
ity for commercial and economic devel-
opment interests in a region, and help to 
manage regional refugee problems (see 
Bobrow and Boyer 1997, pp. 726 f.). 
That is, UN peace operations produce 
positive regional externalities and no-
body within a region can be excluded 
from consumption of these pure public 
outputs. 
But UN peace operations can also yield 
worldwide purely public benefits: “[…] 
if successful [they, A.K.] provide an 
increased measure of world stability and 
security that benefits all nations – con-
tributors and non-contributors – so that 
benefits are nonexcludable. Maintenance 
of world peace also yields nonrival 
benefits worldwide because one nation´s 
gain from world peace do not detract 
from other nations ´s available gains.” 
(Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu 1998, 
p. 181) Moreover, UN peace operations 
can help curbing the international spread 
of crime and terrorism, preventing the 
spread of infectious diseases, fostering 
worldwide democracy, human rights and 
enhanced economic stability. In case of 
some of these outputs the international 
public consumption is indirect and may 
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well be of a somewhat smaller quantity 
than that consumed within the region. 
However, many (purely) public benefits 
of peace operations shift along a sliding 
scale between regional and international. 
Thus, it seems unhelpful to embrace 
absolute dichotomies – such as purely 
regional versus purely international – 
when referring to the public consumable 
outputs of UN peace operations.  
Given the existence of purely public 
international benefits one could argue 
that UN peace operations represent pure 
IPGs (rather than GPGs because it is 
questionable if their benefits are com-
pletely global). But since there is evi-
dence that UN peace operations also 
yield excludable benefits, it seems that 
they rather are impure than pure. The 
next section investigates this issue in 
greater detail. 
II.4.3 UN Peace Operations as 
International Joint-Product 
Public Goods 
The existence of several private benefits 
that nations can derive from the provi-
sion of UN peace operations already has 
been identified by a number of authors 
(see e. g. Bobrow and Boyer 1997; 
Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; 
Sandler and Hartley 1999; Arce M. and 
Sandler 2002). Bringing the authors´ 
findings together and adding some more 
examples the private – country-specific – 
outputs of UN peace operations at least 
can be classified into three different 
main types: 
• Type 1: Conflict-country specific 
benefits refer to the private benefits 
that a conflict-ridden country receives 
from the deployment of a peace op-
eration within its borders. That is, the 
positive externalities generated by an 
operation are first and foremost con-
sumed by the conflict-ridden country 
itself (or at least by the local commu-
nity). Examples are: 
- local and/or national peace and se-
curity (or at least lower levels of 
violence) 
- national law and order 
- reconstructed infrastructure 
- free elections and keeping of hu-
man rights  
• Type 2: Neighbouring state specific 
benefits refer to private benefits that a 
country gains with the end of a con-
flict in the country next to its borders. 
Examples are: 
- neighbourhood stability for a coun-
try whose proximity to the conflict 
represents special risks 
- enhanced trade flows and eco-
nomic growth with return of politi-
cal stability 
• Type 3: Contributor specific benefits 
refer to private benefits that countries 
(and other actors) gain from support-
ing the deployment of UN peace op-
erations. These benefits again can be 
classified into three sub-types: 
a) Status enhancement for contribut-
ing countries being recognized as 
major promoter of world peace 
b) Profit making from participating in 
UN peace operations 
- Some poorer countries channel 
the reimbursements for troop-
contribution (see chapter 
III.2.3) into central coffers 
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while paying their troops much 
less 
- Some keep equipment and sup-
plies provided by the UN and in 
addition receive the benefits of 
experience and training 
- Some send troublesome military 
units and personnel to faraway 
places 
- Contracts for military and secu-
rity companies employed by the 
UN to support its operations 
- Contracts for (I)NGOs and 
other relevant actors involved in 
activities related to UN peace 
operations (e. g. peace-building 
measures) 
c) Pursue of national political and 
economic interests by powerful 
states contributing to peace opera-
tions. Examples are: 
- access to raw materials and 
primary commodities in the 
conflict-ridden country 
- security interests 
- serving the defense industry / 
arms sales 
Recalling the subclasses of impure 
public goods provided in chapter II.1 of 
the present study it is obvious that UN 
peace operations represent an instance of 
activities with joint products – or put 
differently of international “joint-product 
public goods” (Sandler 2001, p. 190) – 
as they yield a mixture of re-
gional/international purely public bene-
fits and nation-specific benefits. Accord-
ing to Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 
(1998, p. 182) the joint product model 
“is a generalization of both the pure 
public and private good models, includ-
ing each as a special case”. 
What does this mean for the provision 
and financing of UN peace operations? 
As we know from the classic economic 
theory of public goods, especially the 
provision of purely public goods is 
restricted by collective action problems 
(see Samuelson 1954; Olson 1971 
[1965]). And, of course, in case of 
purely global public goods collective 
action yielding to adequate provision is 
even much more difficult. Instead, in 
case of activities with joint products, 
provision under certain circumstances 
can be expected to be more efficient – 
depending on whether excludable or 
purely public benefits are prevailing (see 
Sandler and Hartley 2001, pp. 876 ff.). 
Provided that excludable benefits are 
prevailing, “disproportionate burden 
shares need not result” (Sandler and 
Hartley 1999, p. 104). With regard to the 
financing of UN peace operations (nota-
bly peacekeeping) Arce M. and Sandler 
get to the heart of it: “Efficiency hinges 
on the ratio of excludable benefits (i. e., 
country-specific and club good outputs) 
to total benefits associated with peace-
keeping. As this ratio nears one in value, 
so that all peacekeeping benefits are 
excludable, nations can be expected to 
support peacekeeping operations. If, 
however, the ratio is near zero, then 
peacekeeping benefits are primarily non-
excludable and free riding is a greater 
concern.” (Arce M. and Sandler 2001, 
p. 58) 
It goes without saying that the ratio of 
private to public benefits is difficult to 
measure directly. In this context Arce M. 
and Sandler note: “By examining the 
 
ALEXANDER KOCKS 24 
way in which peacekeeping burdens are 
actually carried, a researcher can infer 
something about the size of this ratio. If 
such burdens, as measured by the per-
centage of GDP devoted to peacekeep-
ing, are disproportionately shouldered by 
the rich countries, then this suggests that 
the ratio is near zero, indicating mostly 
pure public benefits. If instead, peace-
keeping burdens are not positively corre-
lated with income, then the ratio is closer 
to one with a high proportion of exclud-
able benefits.” (Arce M. and Sandler 
2001, p. 58). 
In two empirical analyses Khanna, 
Sandler, and Shimizu, (1998; 1999) have 
found evidence of a positive correlation 
between peacekeeping burdens and GDP 
suggesting that “rich countries are carry-
ing a disproportionate burden for the 
poor countries in terms of the financing 
of peacekeeping and enforcement mis-
sions” (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 
1998, p. 192) – and thus indicating 
mostly purely public benefits. In other 
words, when considering UN peace 
operations as international joint-product 
public goods, the pure public good 
component is more dominant than the 
private one. Thus, even with regard to 
peacekeeping burden-sharing, there is 
evidence of Olson and Zeckhauser´s 
(1966) “exploitation hypothesis" (see 
above). But how are these findings to 
interpret? Do they suggest unfair burden-
sharing on the costs of the richer coun-
tries as repeatedly expressed (implicitly, 
at least) by Sandler and others? And 
what about the issue that the rich coun-
tries also can be expected to be the main 
net-beneficiaries of the purely public 
outputs of UN peace operations, such as 
global stability? We will be returning to 
these important questions in greater 
detail in the further course of the present 
study. Figure 4, again, illustrates the 
understanding of UN peace operations as 
international joint-product public goods. 
No doubt, the figure exclusively focuses 
on public and private positive external-
ities generated by UN peace operations. 
That apart, it must be borne in mind that 
these operations potentially can generate 
a number of negative externalities – or to 
put it differently, in same cases, UN 
peace operations can represent interna-
tional public bads. It is well-known that 
there are examples of UN peace opera-
tions that turned out as insufficient, 
rather fostering conflict dynamics than 
promoting peace (see e. g. Debiel 2003). 
Thus, future analyses that approach the 
public good – or bad – character of UN 
peace operations must do this on a mis-
sion-by-mission basis. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical model as represented in 
figure 4 expresses the view that UN 
peace operations, if conducted appropri-
ately (e. g. clear mandated, supported by 
sufficient political will and deployed 
with well-equipped and –trained person-
nel) rather have public good than public 
bad properties. 
II.4.4 Beyond Publicness in 
Consumption 
Up to here the present study exclusively 
has focused on the question of whether 
UN pace operations are purely public or 
mixed private and public in consump-
tion. The foregoing has shown that 
publicness in consumption is limited in a 
twofold   sense:   First,   from   a   global 
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Figure 4: An international joint-product model of UN peace operations 
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public good perspective the nonrival and 
nonexcludable benefits gained from UN 
peace operations (e. g. peace and secu-
rity) rather are consumed regionally and 
internationally than globally. Thus, the 
present study treats peace operations as 
IPGs. Global publicness in consumption 
is not complete in the sense that the 
purely public benefits of UN peace 
operations are not consumable by all 
people around the globe. Rather the 
scope of nonrival and nonexludable 
benefits is limited. Second, publicness in 
consumption is limited since UN peace 
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operations also yield benefits that are 
exclusive and rival “in nature” such as 
contracts for military companies cooper-
ating with the UN. 
However, focussing on the publicness in 
consumption only is one possibility 
(notably the most conventional) to assess 
a good´s publicness. As noted above, in 
two recent studies Kaul (2001) and Kaul 
and Mendoza (2003) draw attention to 
further two dimensions of publicness 
that are not part of the standard defini-
tion of public goods: “publicness in 
decisionmaking” and “publicness in the 
distribution of net benefits”. Thereby the 
authors offer a new perspective based on 
the normative notions of ´participation´ 
and ´equity´ and ´fairness´. According to 
Kaul and Mendoza (2003, p. 92) the 
publicness of a good does not only rely 
on the criterion of nonexlusiveness 
(publicness in consumption) but also on 
the “participatory nature” of the deci-
sionmaking through which the good is 
selected and placed in the public domain 
(publicness in decionmaking) and on the 
“equity of the distribution of benefits”, 
i. e. on “the extent to which various 
groups (consumers of the good) derive 
benefits” (publicness in the distribution 
of net benefits). These are often disre-
garded aspects, since many public goods 
are subject to public consumption but 
not to equitable distribution (e. g. be-
cause they have limited benefits for 
minority groups) and not a result of 
participatory decisionmaking. If all three 
dimensions of publicness are complete 
they result in an “ideal ´triangle of pub-
licness´” (Kaul and Mendoza 2003, 
p. 92) as represented in figure 5. 
Figure 5: Kaul´s ideal triangle of publicness 
 
 
Source: Kaul and Mendoza 2003, p. 92 (first in Kaul 2001, p. 16) 
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The “triangle of publicness” serves as a 
simple framework for examining how 
various goods fare along the three di-
mensions: “The vertical axis measures 
publicness in comsumption, the left side 
of the base publicness in decionmaking, 
and the right side publicness (or equity) 
in the distribution of a good´s benefits.” 
(Kaul, Conceição, Le Goulven, and 
Mendoza 2003, p. 24) The ideal triangle 
represents a good with complete public-
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ness in all three dimensions. If one or 
more dimensions of publicness are not 
complete, the shape of the triangle corre-
spondingly will change. 
What does the triangle look like if we 
apply it to assess the publicness of UN 
peace operations along the three dimen-
sions? As already mentioned, publicness 
in consumption is limited so that the 
vertical axis has to be shortened. What 
about the left and the right side of the 
base? Is there evidence for full public-
ness in decisonmaking and in the distri-
bution of benefits? 
Publicness in Decisionmaking 
With regard to desionmaking the answer 
certainly is no. According to the UN 
Charter the UN Security Council (as the 
organ with primary responsibility for 
maintaining peace and security) is the 
only entity which has the legal capacity 
to authorize UN peacekeeping operations 
(i. e. the use of force). It is well-known 
that, under the UN Charter, Member 
States are obliged to accept and carry out 
its decisions. Consequently, the UN 
General Assembly´s role in matters of 
peace and security is subordinate to the 
Security Council. Its legal capacity, for 
example, is limited to the authorization 
of non-military political and peace-
building missions. Put differently, deci-
sionmaking on the essential issue of war 
and peace – of military intervention and 
the deployment of UN peacekeeping 
operations – is left up to fifteen Security 
Council members (with the Permanent 
Five (P5) enjoying a veto power), who 
hardly can claim to be the representa-
tives of the international community. 
The UN Security Council, in its current 
exclusive shape, clearly is lacking de-
mocratic, pluralistic and participatory 
decionmaking on the question of when 
and where to deploy UN peace opera-
tions. As a consequence the deployment 
of UN peace operations remains subject 
to power politics and national interests 
of the P5. And above all it remains 
selective11 yielding to exclusiveness in 
consumption.  
Against this background it must be 
concluded that decionmaking with re-
gard to UN peace operations first and 
foremost is a matter of a handful of 
powerful states. Instead those countries 
into which peace operations are de-
ployed often have limited access to 
decisionmaking. This imbalance does 
not only go for the highest decision-
levels. For example, the UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) – 
as the department responsible for the 
backstopping and support of peacekeep-
ing operations at Headquarters – like-
wise is lacking publicness in decionmak-
ing – at least in a quantitative sense since 
only few UN Member States are repre-
sented at DPKO. The UN is aware of 
this problem and the General Assembly 
repeatedly has expressed its concern on 
this aspect. 
Publicness in the Distribution of 
Benefits 
Do UN peace operations generate bene-
fits that are subject to equal and fair 
distribution? Do the consumers of UN 
peace operations derive benefits to the 
                                                 
11 During the 1990s the Security Council, e. g. 
authorized military interventions in Iraq 
(1991), Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, but not 
in Sudan, Angola, and Myamar. 
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same extent? Assumed that they are 
available for all to consume (which 
certainly is not true) insofar as each 
country ridden by a violent conflict can 
be expected to receive support by the 
UN, i. e. that peacekeepers are sent into 
its country. Then a possible question 
aimed at the publicness in the distribu-
tion of benefits could be whether the UN 
provides “an equitable quality of care” 
(Gilligan and Stedman 2003, p. 52) to 
the countries into which it deploys its 
troops. As a measure of the quality of 
UN peace operations Gilligan and Sted-
man (2003) have used their total costs 
(in million of US$). If the UN lived up 
to its universal aspiration it could be 
expected to allocate (proportionally) 
equal amounts of resources to its mis-
sions. Based on a sample of nineteen 
peace operations deployed in five differ-
ent world regions (see table 2) the au-
thors instead have found evidence that 
the average cost of a mission in Europe 
was significantly higher than the cost of 
a mission in Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, or the Middle East. Only 
the one mission in Asia was also quite 
expensive (see Gilligan and Stedman 
2003, p. 52). 
Of course the authors´ findings are 
preliminary and several things can be 
said about them. For example, it could 
be possible that missions in Africa and 
Latin America cost less simply because 
the missions in those regions required 
fewer resources. But if there really is 
evidence for “discrepant levels of UN 
funding by region” (Gilligan and Sted-
man 2003, p. 53), then this raises ques-
tions on the publicness in the distribution 
of benefits that various groups can de-
rive from UN peace operations. The 
findings could indicate that, for example, 
consumers of UN peace operations in 
Africa cannot benefit from it to the same 
extent as consumers in Europe can be-
cause due to lower budgets peace opera-
tions in Africa do not yield the same 
amount of benefits as peace operations 
in Africa do. That is, both Africans and 
Europeans derive benefits of UN peace 
operations but the distribution of benefits 
is unequal. 
Assessment 
Bringing the findings together it seems 
that all three dimensions of publicness 
are not complete. Even if the findings 
presented here are preliminary and re-
Table 2: Peace operations costs by region 
 
 Observed Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Full Sample 19 591.44 1101.53 4.57 4642.83 
Africa 8 480.24 5550.42 16.40 1686.42 
Europe 3 1583.66 2649.45 27.04 4642.83 
Asia 1 1620.96 -- 1620.96 1620.96 
Latin America & Caribbean 5 196.07 185.16 4.57 443.41 
Middle East 2 21.55 12.99 12.37 30.74 
Source: Gilligan and Stedman 2003, p. 53 
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quire further research – especially the 
use of empirical data – one could argue 
that in case of UN peace operations 
incomplete publicness in consumption is 
matched by incomplete publicness in 
decionmaking and in the distribution of 
benefits. Thus, the present study sug-
gests a “triangle of publicness” (Kaul 
2001) in the following shape: 
II.5 Résumé 
The present chapter investigated the 
(international) public good character of 
UN peace operations. It classified UN 
peace operations by a number of differ-
ent criteria. With regard to non-
excludability and non-rivalry criteria it 
subscribed to Sandler´s understanding of 
peace operations as international “joint-
product public goods” (Sandler 2001, 
p. 190). According to “goals vs. means 
criteria” (Sagasti and Bezanson 2001, 
p. 167) the chapter presented an inter-
mediate public good model of UN peace 
operations. By applying the spill-over 
dimension criteria it became obvious that 
the spill-over range of benefits generated 
by UN peace operations varies: UN 
peace operations are international pro-
duced public goods with local-
international purely public outputs as 
well as private local-international out-
puts. The application of Kaul´s (2001) 
“triangle of publicness” to UN peace 
operations demonstrated that incomplete 
publicness in consumption is matched by 
incomplete publicness in decionmaking 
and in the distribution of benefits. Re-
calling Kaul and Mendoza´s (2003) two-
level definition of public goods given in 
chapter II.1 of the present study, a final 
question is whether UN peace operations 
represent goods that only have “a special 
potential for being public” or “de facto” 
international public goods. Hitherto, the 
present study treated each single opera-
tion as a public good. Doing so, one 
could argue that, once an operation is 
deployed generating benefits available 
for all to consume, it is de facto in the 
Figure 6: Kaul´s ideal triangle of publicness applied to UN Peace Operations 
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public domain. But when considering the 
principle provision of all UN peace 
operations as one international public 
good, then it must be concluded that this 
good is de facto not in the public domain 
since countries in need are excluded 
from consumption of the good. 
III. Inventory of International 
Mechanisms and Tools for 
the Financing of UN Peace 
Operations 
Given these critical findings on UN 
peace operations as international public 
goods the overall objective of this chap-
ter is to take a detailed look at the fi-
nancing of international cooperation 
underlying their provision. The forego-
ing already illuminated some of the 
essential features of burden-sharing. 
From an incentive perspective we know 
that the provision of UN peace opera-
tions is restricted by collective action 
problems, consequently they tend to be 
undersupplied. But how does the interna-
tional public financing system for these 
operations exactly look like? What 
financial reforms have been initiated and 
which financing arrangements have been 
created by the UN to help foster better 
allocation of resources to improve the 
provision of UN peace operations? To 
what extent did reforms related to the 
arrangements in place had an impact on 
the burden sharing among UN Member 
States? As was pointed out in the intro-
duction to this study the knowledge 
about these issues is still fragmented and 
incomplete and requires further research. 
Thus, the overall objective of this chap-
ter is to provide a comprehensive and 
systematic analysis – an “inventory” – of 
the several existing international financ-
ing arrangements created by the UN to 
finance the resource requirements of UN 
peacekeeping operations as well as of 
UN political and peace-building mis-
sions. 
III.1 Methodological Remarks 
The methodology presented in this 
chapter follows the framework of Con-
ceição (forthcoming in 2005)12, which 
developed an inventory of mechanisms 
and tools that support the financing of 
international cooperation. According to 
Conceição the arrangements on which 
the subsequent examination will focus 
on can be classified into different main 
categories of financing arrangements 
depending on their objective and struc-
ture:13
(a) international financing mechanisms 
which are run and funded by more 
than one country have a concrete 
organizational structure, collect and 
channel resources to international 
cooperation purposes, and are con-
sidered as financial intermediaries, 
when they collect and disburse 
money – or as regulatory financing 
mechanisms when they only collect 
                                                 
12 Conceição, Pedro. Forthcoming in 2005. 
“An Inventory of Financing Mechanisms 
and Tools.” In Inge Kaul et al., eds., The 
New Public Finance: Responding to Global 
Challenges. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
13 While the definitions of financing “mecha-
nisms”, “tools”, and “principles” are 
adopted from Conceição, the category and 
definition of financing methodologies is 
given by the author. The author thanks Inge 
Kaul (Director) and Pedro Conceico (Dep-
uty Director) of UNDP´s Office of Devel-
opment Studies (ODS), New York, for their 
useful comments and for being allowed to 
make use of their theoretical considerations. 
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money and when the result of their 
activities directly affect the nature 
of level of funding. 
(b) international financing tools which 
can be understood as abstract prin-
ciples used as policy-making in-
struments to mobilize or influence 
the allocation of resources. 
(c) financing methodologies which 
determine the burden-sharing 
among actors using the mechanisms 
and tools, often are concrete formu-
lae based on fundamental financing 
principles that reflect notions about 
fair burden-sharing such as “ability 
to pay” or “beneficiary pays”, are 
used to calculate the amounts of 
contributions, disbursements and re-
imbursements. 
According to its composition table 3 
assigns each of the financing arrange-
ments to be explored in this chapter to 
one of the main categories. Moreover, 
the table names their date of creation and 
if possible, the legislative mandate by 
which they were established. As can be 
derived from this listing the examination 
focuses on both: (a) UN core-budgetary 
financing mechanisms, which are regular 
components of the UN´s financing and 
mainly receive their income from as-
sessed contributions of Member States, 
and (b) non-core budgetary, funding 
mechanisms (trust funds) and tools (cost-
sharing, parallel financing) which enable 
the allocation of voluntary contributions 
to (specific activities and programmes 
related to) UN peace operations. The 
different voluntary funding arrangements 
that have arisen over the years play a 
considerable role in the financing of UN 
peace operations – especially of those 
with a peace-building alignment – and 
therefore are likewise subject to the 
subsequent analysis. 
Apart from the main financing arrange-
ments currently “in operation” to finan-
cially support UN peace operations the 
examination, if necessary, also draws 
attention to those arrangements which 
were applied in the past but turned out to 
be insufficient, and to those which are of 
relevance because they are closely inter-
twined with the main ones (such as the 
UN regular budget scale of assessments, 
on which the peacekeeping scale of 
assessments builds up). 
Factual information on each of the 
mechanisms, tools, and methodologies, 
including important UN internal reform 
processes related to them, are mainly 
gathered from the extensive analysis of a 
wide range of corresponding United 
Nations Documents. Information on 
voluntary co-financing arrangements are 
mainly drawn from documents and 
Internet websites of those United Na-
tions system partners most frequently 
using these arrangements to complement 
the peacekeeping and –building strate-
gies of the UN Secretariat, such as 
UNDP and the World Bank. The infor-
mation which is necessary to complete 
the picture of the respective arrange-
ments, but not given in the publicly 
available sources, is drawn from inter-
views by the author conducted at the 
Financial Management Office of the UN 
Department of Administration and Man-
agement and the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), New 
York. Apart from that the analysis, if 
possible, builds up on relevant secondary 
literature. 
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The subsequent examinations do not 
only provide neutral fact-based informa-
tion, but also assess the performance of 
each of the financing arrangements. If 
reasonable, interpretations are already 
given in the descriptions. Moreover, 
each description is followed by a final 
assessment which draws attention to 
critical aspects and weak points and, if 
need be, offers recommendations for 
further improvements. Following the 
conceptual framework of Conceição 
(forthcoming in 2005) the subsequent list 
provides an overview of some of the 
most important aspects that will be 
addressed in each arrangement´s analy-
sis.14 Thereby the focus of examination 
varies depending on whether the ar-
rangement is a mechanism, tool, or 
methodology: 
I. History [date of creation; context of 
creation, i. e. created on whose ini-
tiative; actor/body/legislative man-
date by which it was established] 
II. Purpose and Role [main objectives 
of the arrangement; description of 
how it works; redefining of purpose 
(when, why and how?); organiza-
tional context (actors, members, de-
partments involved, attached to 
which organizational unit/used by 
whom); equity considerations and 
transfers vs. better allocation of re-
sources to public goods; regarding 
                                                 
14 Different from Conceição´s research that is 
limited to the provision of “profiles” of a 
variety of mechanisms and tools that sup-
port the financing of international coopera-
tion in different policy fields, the examina-
tions of the financing arrangements in this 
chapter go beyond that approach as they are 
more interpretative in nature. 
tools: how does it influence resource 
allocation?] 
III. Modalities of operation [general 
modalities for the use of the ar-
rangement; budgetary process; re-
source aspects: resource collection 
process (the way how funds do flow 
into the mechanisms, underlying fi-
nancing principle, main contribu-
tors, sources of funds, amount of 
funds generated); resource dis-
bursement and/or reimbursement 
process (procedures and criteria for 
authorizing disbursements and allo-
cating funding, allocation to whom 
and for which purpose, procedures 
of how actors get access to the use 
of the arrangement); general aspects 
of management, authority and gov-
ernance; resource collection and 
disbursement problems] 
IV. Applications [tool: examples where 
it has been applied] 
This list of aspects is not exhaustive; 
rather does it serve as an orientation by 
illustrating the main dimensions to be 
considered in evaluating the different 
financing arrangements in support of UN 
peace operations. 
III.2 Peacekeeping Assessment 
Accounts 
Although peacekeeping is not specifi-
cally mentioned in the United Nations 
Charter, the Charter gives the UN Secu-
rity Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The Council, therefore, 
creates and defines peacekeeping opera-
tions. To finance these operations, in-
stead, is the collective responsibility of 
all UN Member States – based on Arti-
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cle 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter 
which specifies that “the expenses of the 
Organisation shall be borne by the 
Members as apportioned by the General 
Assembly”. 
Before a General Assembly resolution in 
1973 requested the Secretary-General to 
open separate accounts15 for each UN 
peacekeeping operation, which were to 
be financed by special assessed contribu-
tions from Members States on the basis 
of a scale of assessments different from 
that for UN regular budget assessments, 
the General Assembly, in the early years 
of the organization, repeatedly decided 
provisions for peacekeeping operations 
should be made in the regular budget 
since this was the only method in use at 
the time to finance the activities of the 
Organization (see Mills 1990). When the 
UN was facing new and more expensive 
operations in subsequent years, this 
funding method turned out as insuffi-
cient. 
In need of finding alternatives peace-
keeping then was funded on a mission-
by-mission-basis by: assessed contribu-
tions on the basis of different ad hoc 
approaches; temporary solutions due to 
Member States´ withholdings of such 
assessed contributions like issuing 
bonds, using an UN internal Working 
Capital Fund, and establishing a Special 
Account to collect voluntary contribu-
tions from those Members which refused 
to pay their assessed contributions; and 
                                                 
                                                
15 The term “accounts” is defined by the UN 
as the “official records of the income, ex-
penditures, assets and liabilities of each 
peacekeeping operation” (UN Doc. 
A/57/764, para. 2). 
payments which the parties most directly 
concerned were obliged to pay16. 
The history of the different efforts by the 
UN to arrive at an equitable and practical 
way of financing UN peacekeeping 
operations is a protracted one. It is char-
acterized by numerous setbacks and 
financial disputes among UN Member 
States and demonstrates the collective 
action problem underlying the provision 
and financing of UN peace operations as 
a public good. 
The search for alternative funding meth-
ods in peacekeeping financing during the 
1950s and 1960s has been succinctly 
chronicled by Mills (1990), Durch 
(1993), Mc Dermott (1994a; 1994b), and 
Laurenti (2001). As Mills reports the 
costs of the first two peacekeeping op-
erations established – the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO) in 1948 and the United Na-
tions Military Observer Group in India 
and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 – 
were covered by the regular budget. 
While no other operation was established 
until 1956, the General Assembly ex-
perienced with different financial ar-
rangements in connection with the estab-
lishment of the first United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 and 
the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) in 1960. At a time when 
 
16 This approach was applied only twice: first, 
to cover the costs of the United Nations 
Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) 
which were borne by Egypt and Saudi Ara-
bia and second, to cover the costs of the 
United Nations Temporary Executive Au-
thority/United Nations Security Force in 
West Guinea (UNTEA/UNSF) which were 
shared by Indonesia and the Netherlands 
(see Mills 1990, p. 91). 
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UN Member States already refused to 
pay their assessed contributions to the 
regular budget (see Mills 1990, p. 93; 
also Mendez 1999, p. 401) alternative 
financing included meeting the costs 
outside the regular budget, but appor-
tioning them on the basis of regular 
assessments (as was used initially for 
UNEF I), using variants of the regular 
assessments for part of the costs and 
sliding scales taking the financial burden 
from the poorer countries (as was used at 
a later stage for UNEF I and then for 
ONUC), and meeting all costs from 
voluntary contributions17 (see Mills 
1990, pp. 93 ff., Mc Dermott 1994a, 
p. 173, UNA-USA 1997, p. 35).  
Because Member States were unable (or 
unwilling) to reach consensus on how to 
meet the costs for UNEF I and ONUC, 
many of them did not pay their assess-
ments under these arrangements.18 Oth-
                                                 
                                                
17 The only peacekeeping operation that ever 
was financed wholly by voluntary contribu-
tions is the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in 
1964. Its costs have been shouldered by the 
government of Cyprus, the troop-
contributing states and by other voluntary 
donations. Given the uncertain nature of 
voluntary contributions this type of financ-
ing is unlikely to be used another time (see 
Mills 1990, p. 100; also McDermott 1994a, 
p. 177). Moreover, it became evident that 
voluntary contributions were insufficient to 
cover all the costs of UNFICYP, assess-
ments were applied to this mission in the 
1990s, too (see e. g. UN Doc. A/57/838). 
18 It goes without saying that the delinquency 
of some Member States with regard to their 
assessed obligations was also a symptom of 
the overall world political crisis at that 
time. This especially serves for ONUC. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that Member 
States have specific objections to particular 
missions. Thus, Arab states refused to con-
tribute to UNEF which was deployed in re-
sponse to the Suez Crisis. 
ers, namely the newly independent 
developing countries, “fell into delin-
quency on their rapidly spiralling peace-
keeping bills” as their national budgets 
could not “absorb the shock of un-
planned special assessments for peace-
keeping missions” (Laurenti 2001, 
p. 31). Thus, starting in 1960, the UN 
experienced its first genuine cash crisis 
precipitated by peacekeeping operations. 
In October 1960 the Secretary-General 
was compelled to meet the main costs of 
ONUC from the Working Capital Fund 
(WCF) which was established in 1946 as 
a form of cash reserve to cover regular 
budget expenditures, i. e. to meet the 
Organization´s day-to-day expenditures 
when contributions to the regular budget 
are late. Starting with ONUC the WCF 
has been repeatedly misused as a cash 
reserve to meet early “unforeseen” and 
“extraordinary” expenses of new peace 
operations until the Peacekeeping Re-
serve Fund (see below) was established 
in 1992 for the same purpose exclu-
sively.19
 
19 The term ”Unforeseen Expenses“ means 
expenses “arising from, or identical to, the 
carrying out of a programme in accord with 
General Assembly approved policies, 
which expenses were not foreseen when es-
timates were made”. The term “Extraordi-
nary Expenses” means expenses “for items 
or objects outside the scope of the budget 
estimates, i. e. outside the programme on 
which the estimates were based.” (UN Doc. 
A/RES/68 (1)). Since the1960s the financ-
ing of start-up needs of new operations was 
defined as an unforeseen and extraordinary 
expenditure (see Mills 1990, p. 98 f.; 
McDermott 1994a, p. 174). Assessments of 
advances of Member States´ to the WCF 
were made in accordance with the UN 
regular scale of assessments. The limited 
reserves of the WCF were temporarily ex-
hausted by mid 1991 and the UN was ironi-
cally forced to cross-borrow funds from the 
peacekeeping accounts (see below) to meet 
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At the end of 1961 when the Organiza-
tion “was facing imminent bankruptcy” 
(Mills 1990, p. 97) the General Assem-
bly authorized the Secretary-General, as 
a temporary solution, to issue bonds up 
to an amount of US$ 200 million to pay 
for ONUC. By including a provision in 
the regular budget the interest and prin-
cipal of these bonds have been repaid 
over a twenty-five year period beginning 
in 1963. Mills critically notes that the 
bond issue in turn caused a new kind of 
financial crisis as those Member States 
which were unwilling to pay for UNEF I 
and ONUC “began also to withhold a 
portion of their assessed contributions to 
the regular budget, in amounts which 
they considered represented their propor-
tionate share of the repayment of the 
bond issue” (Mills 1990, p. 97). Even if 
indirectly the UN regular budget once 
again was used to finance peacekeeping 
operations.  
Though unable to agree on an appropri-
ate formula which stipulates in detail 
how the financial burdens of future 
peacekeeping operations should be 
shared among Member States, in 1963 
the General Assembly adopted the reso-
lution 1874 (S-IV) that, for the first time, 
specifically linked permanent member-
ship on the Security Council with the 
financing of peace operations while 
specifying the distinctive principles for 
establishing a special peacekeeping 
scale: 
a) “Whereas the economically more 
developed countries are in a position 
to make relatively larger contribu-
                                                                   
regular expenditures (see UNA-UK 1999, 
p. 2). 
tions, the economically less devel-
oped countries have a relatively lim-
ited capacity to contribute towards 
peace-keeping operations involving 
heavy expenditures; 
b) Without prejudice to the principle of 
collective responsibility, every ef-
fort should be made to encourage 
voluntary contributions from Mem-
ber States; 
c) The special responsibilities of the 
permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council [A.K.] for the mainte-
nance of peace and security should 
be borne in mind in connection with 
their contributions to the financing 
of peace and security operations; 
d) Where circumstances warrant, the 
General Assembly should give spe-
cial consideration to the situation of 
any Member States which are vic-
tims of, and those which are other-
wise involved in, the events or ac-
tions leading to a peace-keeping op-
eration.” (UN Doc. A/RES/1874 (S-
IV) of 27 June 1963) 
It took more than ten years until the 
General Assembly settled on a formula 
consistent with these principles: On 11 
December 1973, the General Assembly 
adopted resolution 3101 (XXVIII) on the 
financing of UNEF II. The resolution 
asked the Secretary-General to set up an 
Assessment Account outside the regular 
budget to cover the costs of UNEF II. As 
an “ad hoc arrangement” Member States 
were assessed according to a special 
scale that assigned each member a fixed 
share of the annual costs of the operation 
(UN Doc A/RES/3101 (XXVIII)). 
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III.2.1 Ad Hoc Peacekeeping 
Assessment Scale 1973-2000 
The methodology of this scale – as 
adopted by the General Assembly on the 
advice of the UN Committee on Con-
tributions20 – goes back to a proposal of 
37 developing states which the United 
States and other Western Countries 
agreed to as a “compromise of a com-
promise” (US Department of State 
2000). Originally intended to serve as a 
temporary solution for the financing of 
UNEF II exclusively, it turned out to be 
durable for the next 27 years and became 
the model for almost all peacekeeping 
operations until 2000. While the peace-
keeping scale of assessments was re-
formed in that year the practice to estab-
lish a separate assessment account for 
each peacekeeping operation has re-
mained until today. 
As represented in box 1 the first scale 
divided the then 135 Member States into 
four groups, according to UN privileges 
(permanent membership of the Security 
Council) and ability to pay21, based on 
gross domestic product (GDP) as well as 
the level of external debts for smaller 
states: (A) the five permanent members 
of the Security Council; (B) 23 eco-
nomically developed countries, not 
permanent members of the Security 
Council; (C) 82 economically less de-
                                                 
20 The Committee on Contributions was 
established by the General Assembly in 
1946 as a group of experts that, among 
other things, advises the General Assembly 
on the apportionment among UN members 
of the expenses of the UN. Its 18 members 
are elected by the General Assembly and 
serve for three years in their personal ca-
pacity. 
21 Some authors synonymously use the term 
capacity to pay. 
veloped states; and (D) 25 economically 
less developed states (see UN Doc 
A/RES/3101 (XXVIII)). In its resolution 
the General Assembly also decided that 
(1) 63.15 percent of the total appropri-
ated should be apportioned among group 
A in proportions determined by the 
regular scale of assessments then appli-
cable; (2) 34.78 percent of the total 
appropriated should be apportioned 
among group B; (3) 2.02 percent of the 
total costs should be apportioned in 
proportions determined by the scale of 
assessments among group C; and (4) 
0.05 percent should be proportionally 
apportioned among group D. 
 
Box 1: Ad Hoc Peacekeeping Assess-
ment Scale 1973-2000 
Contributions from Member States to the Peace-
keeping Assessment Accounts are assessed 
according ability to pay, based on gross domestic 
product (GDP) as well as the level of external 
debts for smaller states. Moreover, the permanent 
members the Security Council are assessed on a 
higher rate because of their “special responsibili-
ties” for the maintenance of peace and security. 
This is translated into a graded scale: 
• Group A (the five permanent members of the 
Security Council) pays 63.15 % 
• Group B (developed countries, not permanent 
members of the Council) pays 34.78 % 
• Group C (wealthier developing countries) 
pays 2.02 % 
• Group D (specifically identified less devel-
oped countries) pays 0.05 
These assessed payments are in addition to 
regular budget assessments for membership. 
Note: Between 1973 and 2000 the relative shares 
of the total costs shifted among the four groups 
but the basic arrangements remained. 
Sources: UN Doc A/RES/3101 (XXVIII); UN Doc. 
A/RES/1874 (S-IV); Mills 1990; UNA-UK 2001; Arce 
M. and Sandler 2002 
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By comparing Member States´ peace-
keeping assessments under this formula 
with their regular budget assessments the 
main effects of the “ad hoc” scale be-
come evident: while in relation to regu-
lar budget assessments the charges on 
the five permanent members were in-
creased the burden of dollar costs borne 
by group C and D were reduced signifi-
cantly. This is demonstrated in table 4 by 
contrasting the proportions of the total 
costs of UNEF II which were assigned to 
each of the four groups with the propor-
tions of regular budget assessments at 
that time. 
The majority of UN members received 
discounts of 80 percent (group C) and 90 
percent (group D) whereas the five 
permanent members of the Security 
Council were assigned to pay a premium 
to offset the discounts given to group C 
and D. Instead, the countries in group B 
were designated to pay their regular 
budget contribution percentages. Put 
differently: On the basis of this financing 
methodology which was the model for 
all peacekeeping operation established 
between 1973 and 200022 group A coun-
                                                 
22 Except the United Nations Good Offices 
Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP). 
tries paid about 10 percent more than 
their regular budget assessments whereas 
group B countries paid contributions 
equivalent to their regular budget as-
sessments. Group C countries paid about 
one fifth their regular budget assess-
ments whereas group D countries paid 
one tenth their regular budget assess-
ments (see also Durch 1993, p. 46; 
Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998, 
p. 180). As mentioned in box 1 over the 
years there were some changes regarding 
Member States´ relative shares of the 
annual costs of peacekeeping operations 
but without having an impact on group D 
countries. This is mainly due to the fact 
“that the methodology by which the 
General Assembly divides the total costs 
of peacekeeping operations among the 
four groups is consciously designed to 
produce a substantial reduction in the 
dollar amounts to be borne by the less 
and least economically developed mem-
ber states. Thus, even though the number 
of member states in Group D has virtu-
ally doubled since 1973, the part of 
peacekeeping costs to be shared by that 
group has been maintained at 0.05 per 
cent.” (Mills 1990, pp 101 f.) 
Table 4: Ratio of UNEF II assessments to regular budget assessments in 1973 
 
 UNEF II Assessments (percent of total) 
Regular Budget Assessments in 1973 
(percent of total) 
Group A 63.15 54.64 
Group B 34.78 34.78 
Group C 2.02 10.08 
Group D 0.05 0.50 
Source: after Mills (1990), p. 101 
As a consequence the shares of costs 
continuously shifted to the permanent 
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members of the Security Council (group 
A) so that in 1997 the U.S. under this 
apportionment was assessed nearly at a 
31 percent share of total peacekeeping 
costs (see UNA-USA 1997, p. 36). 
Among the 189 UN Members in 2000 98 
percent of the costs were borne by 30 
Members with the other 159 collectively 
paying 2 percent. All group A countries 
together paid more than 75 percent of the 
expenses (see US Department of State 
2000). 
Considering this “disproportionate bur-
dens” (Sandler and Hartley 1999, p. 101) 
the permanent five repeatedly com-
plained about the size of its assessed 
contributions and as early as in 1997 the 
U.S. Congress insisted that it no longer 
would pay “any peacekeeping bill in 
excess of 25 percent of a mission costs” 
(UNA-USA 1997, p. 36). A typical 
argument raised at that time was: “In the 
absence of any established criteria, the 
assignment of peacekeeping discounts to 
UN Members is totally arbitrary, and 
frequently based upon anecdotal evi-
dence.” (US Department of State 2000).  
Even if that is a one-sided argument not 
reflecting the United States´ withhold-
ings of assessed contributions23 and its 
low personnel participation in UN peace 
operations it can not be denied that the 
use of the scale for the purpose of as-
sessments indeed was not always objec-
tive over the years. Some countries were 
classified as “economically less devel-
oped” (while receiving 80 percent dis-
                                                 
23 Since the 1990s the U.S. has withheld 
payments to negotiate down its percentage 
of assessments to the peacekeeping ac-
counts that stood at roughly 31 percent (see 
chapter III.2.2). 
counts) though they actually would have 
had a greater “ability to pay” if more 
objective criteria had been applied by the 
General Assembly. The fact that coun-
tries with high per capita incomes like 
Brunei and United Arab Emirates (with 
1998 per capita incomes of US$ 18.038 
and US$ 16.666 respectively) (see 
Laurenti 2001, p. 34) and newly indus-
trializing countries like Singapore were 
classified as group C countries shows 
clearly that the relationship between 
national income and peacekeeping fi-
nancial obligations was far from being 
perfect. For that reason the methodology 
of the scale was subject to controversial 
debates among UN Member States and 
has been critically reviewed by a variety 
of policy analysts (see e. g. Bobrow and 
Boyer 1997; Khanna, Sandler and Shi-
mizu 1999). When above-mentioned 
“high income ´developing´ countries” 
(Laurenti 2001, p. 34) found themselves 
under growing pressure from Washing-
ton as well as from some developing 
countries willing to change the method-
ology of the scale the time for reform 
had come. 
III.2.2 Peacekeeping Assessment 
Scale Established in 2000 
After 27 years the General Assembly 
reformed the methodology for apportion-
ing the expenses of peacekeeping opera-
tions by its resolution 55/235 of 23 
December 2000, replacing the ad hoc 
arrangement as described above. A new 
scale titled “Scale of assessments for the 
apportionment of the expenses of United 
Nations peacekeeping operations” was 
adopted. Likewise the old scale, the new 
one is based on the scale of assessments 
for the UN regular budget (“Scale of 
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assessments for the apportionment of the 
expenses of the United Nations”) as it 
offers less and least developed countries 
discounts from their regular rates of 
assessments. 
According to the resolution “all dis-
counts shall be borne on a pro rata basis 
by the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council” (UN Doc A/RES/55/235, 
para. 6). Reflecting the principles speci-
fied in its resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 
June 1963 (see above) the General As-
sembly decided on the parameters of a 
new set of 10 levels for Member States 
to be implemented on a three-year basis 
beginning on 1 July 2001. Thereby the 
apportionments range from a premium 
payable by permanent Member States of 
the Security Council (Level A) to a 90 
percent discount for least developed 
countries (Level J). That means least 
developed countries still pay for peace-
keeping a rate that is a tenth of their 
regular budget share. Those high income 
countries which formerly received 80 
percent discounts – namely Brunei 
Darussalam, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore 
and United Arab Emirates – were classi-
fied into a separate level (level C) and 
receive a “nominal” discount of 7.5 
percent from their regular rate of as-
sessments, “allowing them still to claim 
to be part of the developing world” 
(Laurenti 2001, p. 35). 
The placement of Member States in 
levels B and D to I was based on the 
average per capita gross national prod-
uct (GNP) of each Member State during 
the six-year base period 1993-199824 in 
                                                 
                                                                   
24 This base period was used for preparing the 
regular budget scale of assessments 2001-
relation to the corresponding average 
per capita GNP of all Member States 
which was US$ 4797 (see UN Doc. 
A/RES/55/235, para. 12). Each of these 
levels prescribes the rate of discount that 
is accorded to Members States for 
peacekeeping assessments, relative to 
their assessments for the regular budget. 
The thresholds resulting from the calcu-
lation were applied for the period 1 July 
2000 to 31 December 2003 as the resolu-
tion requested the Secretary-General “to 
update the composition of the levels […] 
on a triennial basis, in conjunction with 
the regular budget scale of assessments 
reviews, in accordance with the criteria 
established [in the resolution, A.K.]” 
(UN Doc. A/RES/55/235, para. 15). 
In his report of 15 July 2003 (UN Doc. 
A/58/157) the Secretary-General re-
sponded to that request and provided 
information on changes in the peace-
keeping levels of Member States based 
on an average per capita gross national 
income (GNI) during the period 1996-
2001.25 According to the report the use 
of per capita GNI instead of per capita 
GNP for the purpose of assessing Mem-
ber States´ shares of peacekeeping costs 
during 2004-2006  is  due to  changes  in 
the performance of statistics: “…the 
concept of GNP in the System of Na-
2003 as well as for preparing the peace-
keeping scale of assessments 2001-2003 
(see UN Docs. A/RES/55/5 B-F and 
A/RES/55/235). 
25 For the purpose of updating the composi-
tion of peacekeeping levels for the trien-
nium 2004-2006 the Secretary-General has 
used the same data as the Committee on 
Contributions in considering the regular 
budget scale of assessments for the period 
2004-2006 (see UN Doc. A/58/157, para. 
6). 
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tional Accounts, 1968 has renamed GNI 
in the System of National Accounts, 
1993 but this is just a refinement of 
product and income concepts and does 
not entail a change in the actual coverage 
of the concept.” (UN Doc. A/58/157, 
para. 6). This calculation, however, 
resulted in an average per capita GNI of 
all Member States amounting to US$ 
5094 and, correspondingly, in new 
thresholds on the levels D to I. The 
updated composition of peacekeeping 
levels was approved by the General 
Assembly in its resolution 
A/RES/58/256 of 11 February 2004. 
Box 2 highlights the main elements of 
the new peacekeeping assessment scale 
established in 2000 while taking into 
account the changes made for the scale 
period 2004-2006. 
As a result of the adoption of the new 
peacekeeping scale of assessments the 
United States could reduce its percentage 
of assessments from 31 percent to under 
27 percent of each peacekeeping opera-
tions´ total costs. That was the minimum 
condition Washington had negotiated 
when the new scale was outlined, even if 
it still seeks to further reduce peacekeep-
ing assessments to 25 percent (see UNA-
Box 2: Methodology of the Peacekeeping Assessment Scale established in 2000 (with 
updated composition of contribution levels for the scale period 2004-2006) 
• For the purpose of apportioning the costs of peacekeeping operations UN Member States are distributed 
among ten different levels (from level A to level J) according to ability to pay and UN privileges: 
• Level A: permanent members of the Security Council; pay assessments equivalent to their regular budget 
assessments plus a surcharge calculated on the reallocation of the remaining costs after discounts to 
poorer countries have been made. 
• Level B: Developed countries, not permanent members of the Security Council; pay assessments 
equivalent to their regular budget assessments and receive no discount (all Member States not included in 
level A and C-J). 
• Level C: Specified “high income developing countries” (Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore 
and United Arab Emirates); pay the same rate as regular dues minus a discount of 7.5 %. 
• Level D-I: less developed countries (except level A, C and J contributors); receive different discounts 
from their regular budget rate of assessments, based on their average per capita GNI in relation to the 
average per capita GNI of all Member States (= US$ 5094 based on 1996-2001 figures - for assessments 
in 2004-2006): 
 Level D: Member States with per capita GNI less than 2 times the average for all Member States 
(threshold for 2004-2006: under US$ 10188): 20 % discount 
 Level E: Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.8 times the average for all Member States 
(threshold for 2004-2006: under US$ 9169): 40 % discount 
 Level F: Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.6 times the average for all Member States 
(threshold for 2004-2006: under US$ 8150): 60 % discount 
 Level G: Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.4 times the average for all Member States 
(threshold for 2004-2006: under US$ 7131): 70 % discount 
 Level H: Member States with per capita GNI less than 1.2 times the average for all Member States 
(threshold for 2004-2006: under US$ 6112): 80 % discount (or 70 % on a voluntary basis) 
 Level I: Member States with per capita GNI less than the average for all Member States (threshold for 
2004-2006: under US$ 5094): 80 % discount 
• Level J: Least developed countries; receive 90 % discount and thus pay only 10 percent of their regular 
budget share. 
Sources: UN Doc. A/RES/55/235; UN Doc. A/RES/58/157; UN Doc. A/RES/58/157/Add.1 
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UK 2000; Barett 2004, p. 32). The new 
rates consequently require other devel-
oped states to pay more in order to com-
pensate the reductions for the United 
States. 
Under the new arrangement, however, 
the apportionment of peacekeeping 
expenses better reflects the wealth of UN 
Member States, especially of those 
assigned to level C. At the same time it 
still takes into account the reality of 
many developing countries and their 
limited capacities to contribute. Put 
differently, under the new scale only 
those countries are assessed higher 
which de facto have the capacity to do 
so. Moreover, it is to judge positively 
that some countries have shown good-
will with regard to their assessments as 
they voluntarily moved to a higher level 
of the scale and consequently contribute 
to peacekeeping operations a higher rate 
than required by their per capita income 
(see UN Docs A/RES/55/236 and 
A/RES/58/157). 
Table 5 illustrates the apportionment of 
the annual costs of peacekeeping opera-
tions among the ten different contribu-
tion levels of the new peacekeeping 
scale of assessments for the period 2004-
2006. Moreover, the table shows the 
contrast between the proportions of 
Table 5: Ratio of regular budget assessment rates to peacekeeping assessment 
rates based on the scale of assessments for the period 2004-2006 
 
Peacekeeping Assessment Rates  
Level a / number of 
countries 
Regular Budget 
Assessment Rates 
(percent of total) b (percent of total) c percent of discount
Level A 
5 countries 37.310 45.2639 Premium 
Level B 
32 countries 50.164 50.1640 0 
Level C 
5 countries: 0.883 0.8168 7.5 
Level D 
1 county 1.796 1.5086 20 
Level E 
3 countries: 0.014 0.0083 40 
Level F 
2 countries: 0.715 0.2860 60 
Level G 
4 countries: 1.159 0.3411 70 
Level H 
9 countries: 0.954 0.2814 70 (voluntary) 
Level I 
91 countries: 6.891 1.3782 80 
Level J 
49 countries: 0.114 0.0114 90 
Total 100.000 100.0000  
a taking into account movements based on new per capita GNI thresholds and voluntary movements 
b  Figures taken from UN Doc. A/58/157/Add.1; regular assessment rates are displaced at 3 decimal places 
c  Figures adopted from UN Doc. A/58/157/Add.1; peacekeeping assessment rates are displaced at 4 decimal places 
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peacekeeping costs and the proportions 
of regular budget costs assigned to each 
of the ten levels during this period. 
By comparing table 5 with table 4 it 
becomes obvious that the main burden of 
peacekeeping costs to bear by the per-
manent members of the Security Council 
because of their “special responsibili-
ties” has been reduced from 63.15 per-
cent (regular budget: 54.64) in 1973 to 
45.26 percent (regular budget: 37.31) for 
the period 2004-2006. Thus, the devel-
oped countries assigned to level B (for-
mer group B) have been assessed at a 
correspondingly higher rate to balance 
these reductions: Their regular budget 
and peacekeeping assessment rate has 
been increased from 34.78 percent in 
1973 to 50.16 percent for 2004-2006. 
The relation between level (group) A 
and level (group) B is the most signifi-
cant change in peacekeeping as well as 
in regular budget assessments. Under the 
new scale, however, 95 percent of the 
annual expenses of peacekeeping are still 
borne by level A and B countries to-
gether – a decrease of 3 percent in rela-
tion to assessments between 1973 and 
2000 (see above). The remaining 5 
percent are apportioned among the de-
veloping countries (level C-J) represent-
ing an increase of 3 percent compared to 
assessments under the old scale.26 As 
explained above their assignment to the 
different levels is now based on more 
precise criteria than under the old ar-
rangement.  
                                                 
                                                                   
26 As the number of UN Members which are 
to be categorized as developing countries 
has been increased, the increase of 3 per-
cent of total peacekeeping costs to be 
III.2.3 The Budgetary Process: From 
Security Council Decision to 
Resource Disbursement 
Since the mid 1990s a number of UN 
internal reforms have been undertaken to 
improve the efficiency of UN adminis-
trative practices related to the financing 
of peacekeeping in general and to the 
establishment of Assessment Accounts 
in particular. Inter alia, a Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund was created as a cash-flow 
mechanism to ensure rapid start-up 
funding of new and expanding peace-
keeping operations, the budgetary proc-
ess has been standardized and stream-
lined, budget cycles were harmonized, 
and standardized costing was introduced. 
Most of these reforms were introduced 
by General Assembly resolution 49/233 
of 23 December 1994. In that resolution 
the General Assembly decided to insti-
tute a financial period for each peace-
keeping operation from 1 July to 30 
June. This has been a major improve-
ment considering the fact that in the 
early 1990s the financial cycles of the 
peacekeeping operations still depended 
on the mandate period approved sepa-
rately for each mission by the Security 
Council and thus, Member States were 
asked to make payments at unexpected 
moments throughout their domestic 
budget cycles. 
However, even if the frequency of as-
sessments on Members States could have 
been reduced by establishing a unified 
budget cycle of twelve months and 
spending authority based on an annual 
shouldered by these countries is to be con-
sidered relatively. 
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basis27 the budgetary process is quite 
protracted and involves a number of UN 
bodies: Before Member States can make 
payments into an Assessment Account 
for a new operation the Secretariat after 
the adoption of a Security Council Reso-
lution28 must first prepare a budget on 
the basis of a “Standard Cost Manual” 
that ensures to standardize and compare 
cost. The Advisory Committee on Ad-
ministrative and Budgetary Questions 
(ACABQ)29 is charged with examining 
the peacekeeping budget proposal in 
consultation with the Security Council 
and Field Operations Divisions. The 
results of its review are then sent to the 
General Assembly´s Fifth Committee 
(Financial and Budgetary) to further 
review the budget and ACABQ´s pro-
posals. Finally, the budget is voted on in 
                                                 
27 There is a fundamental exception: as 
described in greater detail in chapter III.3.1 
the Secretary-General is authorized by the 
General Assembly to use the Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund to allot funds (US$ 50 mil-
lion per mission, not exceeding US$ 150 
million per annum) before the General As-
sembly has found time to consider a budget. 
Put differently, he is not dependent on the 
entire budget cycle to make cash available 
for meeting the start-up needs of new 
peacekeeping operations. 
28 During the writing of this study it was 
under debate if the Secretary-General 
should be allowed to allot funds prior to the 
adoption of a Security Council resolution. 
29 The ACABQ currently is comprised of 16 
experts who are appointed by the General 
Assembly on the recommendation of the 
Fifth Committee but who serve (for three 
years) in their own personal capacity. 
ACABQ´s main task is to examine and re-
port on the regular and peacekeeping budg-
ets and the accounts of the UN. The Com-
mittee reviews all reports of the Secretary 
General on financial questions relating to 
peacekeeping and submits its finding to the 
General Assembly (see e. g. UNDPI 2000, 
p. 19). 
the General Assembly and Member 
States can be assessed (see McDermott 
1994b, p. 9; UNA-UK 2000; Salomons 
and Dijkzeul 2001, pp. 19 ff.). In the 
words of the UN Secretary-General, the 
current practice again can be summa-
rized as follows: 
“For each peacekeeping operation: 
a) A special account is maintained for 
the recording of income and expen-
diture; 
b) A separate budget is prepared and 
reported on; 
c) A separate resolution is adopted 
approving the budget and the 
method of financing; 
d) The timing of assessments is linked 
to the budget cycles (1 July to 30 
June) and to the period of the man-
date approved by the Security 
Council.” (UN Doc. A/57/746, para. 
3) 
Against the background of this time-
consuming procedure it is doubtful 
whether the budgetary reforms under-
taken since 1994 represent a sufficient 
solution for streamlining financing of 
peacekeeping. A more comprehensive 
approach would be to “establish a uni-
fied budget for UN peacekeeping with 
separate line items for each peacekeep-
ing operation” – a proposal made by 
former Australian Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans as early as 1993 (Evans 
1993, p. 120). During its fifty-sixth 
session the General Assembly took up 
this idea and requested the Secretary-
General “to submit a report on the feasi-
bility of consolidating the accounts of 
the different peacekeeping operations” 
(UN Doc. A/RES/56/293, para. 10). The 
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Secretary-General, in turn, concluded 
that such a consolidation is not compati-
ble with the current finance practices 
which treat each peacekeeping mission 
independently (see UN Doc. A/57/746, 
para. 4). Thus, he provided an analysis 
of a wide range of issues which would 
be necessary to be taken into account 
before any consolidation could be im-
plemented. Following his report (paras 
7-9) these issues would vary depending 
on whether all accounts were consoli-
dated and whether this was done “retro-
actively” or “prospectively”. A third 
option would be to consolidate the ac-
counts of active peacekeeping operations 
only, “and to do so prospectively”. In 
examining the Secretary-General´s 
proposals the ACABQ points out in its 
corresponding report that any of those 
actions would require revision of the 
Financial Regulations and Rules of the 
United Nations (see UN Doc. A/57/772, 
para. 24). 
In view of the difficulties and barriers 
inherent to this approach the General 
Assembly has so far failed to translate 
the consolidation of the various accounts 
into action (August 2004). Even though 
it cannot be expected that the consolida-
tion of the peacekeeping assessment 
accounts will be realized in the short-
term, the Secretary-General as well the 
ACABQ are aware of the potential 
benefits of this reform. According to the 
Secretary-General the approach would 
streamline the budget approval process 
for the UN and reduce the number of 
legislative decisions required as well as 
the number of assessments; it would also 
facilitate planning for Member States 
(see UN Doc. A/57/746, para. 5-6). 
Moreover, he mentioned that one of the 
most beneficial impacts of the approach 
would be on the current practice of 
reimbursement to troop-contributing 
Governments: “Under the current prac-
tice, it is often necessary to defer pay-
ments for troops and contingent-owed 
equipment for a particular mission be-
cause of delays in the payment of as-
sessed contributions for that mission 
[…]. The pooling of accounts would 
eliminate the need for cross borrowing 
and could permit more consistent and 
timely reimbursement […].” (UN Doc. 
A/57/746, para. 5) 
Considering the current practice of some 
Member States´ withholdings with re-
gard to their assessed contributions to 
the peacekeeping accounts it is question-
able if these members under the condi-
tion of a unified budget for UN peace-
keeping are more willing to pay their 
assessments in full and on time. Cer-
tainly, consolidated accounts would have 
an impact, but in the end political obsta-
cles cannot solely be averted by budget-
ary reforms. So the question is, is there 
any penalty for Member States failing to 
pay? 
Under the UN´s Financial Regulations 
and Rules UN Member States are re-
quired to pay their assessed contributions 
in full within 30 days of receiving a 
statement of their obligations whether 
for the UN regular budget or peacekeep-
ing operations. Article 19 of the UN 
Charter provides that a Member State 
“which is in arrears in the payment of its 
financial contributions to the Organiza-
tion shall have no vote in the General 
Assembly if the amount of its arrears 
equals or exceeds the amount of the 
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contributions due from it for the preced-
ing two full years.” This is the only 
sanction which can be applied for failure 
to pay assessed contributions (see Durch 
1993; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 
1999, p. 348). Over the years various 
Member States actually have lost their 
right to vote, but – as a several number 
of authors have found out – there is 
evidence that the threat of Article 19 has 
not constituted an adequate incentive to 
pay to those Member States who are not 
willing to do so: Given the insignifi-
cance of a General Assembly vote for 
Security Council members, “the sanction 
of Article 19, used on occasion, is not 
much of a deterrent” (Sandler and Hart-
ley 1999, p. 100). 
Throughout the UN´s history this has led 
many Member States not to fulfil their 
legal obligation either in terms of the 
completeness or the timeliness of their 
payments to the assessment accounts. As 
a consequence of the high number of 
arrears of assessments to the peacekeep-
ing accounts, the UN frequently has 
fallen behind in its reimbursements of 
contributing governments for the costs 
they incurred by participating in peace-
keeping operations. Thus, the Secretary-
General repeatedly has expressed con-
cern at the Member States´ unwilling-
ness to pay their assessed contributions 
on time and in various reports he has 
drawn attention to the negative impact of 
these arrears on countries’ willingness to 
contribute troops, knowing they would 
not be reimbursed for years. 
If resources are available (!), troop-
contributing States are reimbursed by the 
UN at a flat rate of meanwhile a little 
over US$ 1100 per month for each 
soldier regardless of rank. That is, 
peacekeeping soldiers are not directly 
paid by the UN but by their own Gov-
ernments according to their national rank 
and salary scale. Consequently, those 
few developed countries which provide 
well-trained troops (e. g. Canada) “do 
not come close to recovering their op-
portunity costs which can run upward of 
$ 4,500 per month, whereas those send-
ing poorly trained troops may receive 3 
½ times their opportunity costs” 
(Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998, 
p. 180). This is quite astonishing as the 
UN standard rates of reimbursement (see 
below) were, inter alia, established on 
the basis of the following two principles: 
“(a) No Government should receive a 
higher reimbursement than its actual 
costs, that is, no Member State should 
profit from its participation in the opera-
tion; (b) Some Governments would not 
be fully reimbursed on the basis of any 
standard cost-reimbursement formula, 
but they should be reimbursed at least 
the amount that was actually paid to their 
troops as overseas allowance.” (UN Doc. 
A/55/887, para. 9).  
Reimbursement to Member States for 
contingent-owed equipment and troop 
costs is determined by a “standard cost-
reimbursement formula” (UN Doc. 
A/55/887, para. 9) which has been re-
vised several times, last time by General 
Assembly resolution 55/274 of 14 June 
2001. On the recommendation of the 
ACABQ (UN Doc. A/55/887) the Gen-
eral Assembly decided to increase the 
rates of reimbursement for troop costs by 
4 percent amounting to US$ 1101 (in-
cluding US$ 1028 as basic pay and US$ 
73 for clothing, gear, and equipment). 
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Technical and civilian specialists are 
reimbursed at a higher rate and receive a 
surplus of US$ 303. In addition, the UN 
has developed several other standard 
reimbursement rates, among other things 
for major equipment and self-
sustainment, painting and repainting of 
major equipment, medical services and 
transportation claims (see UN Doc. 
A/55/815). 
Assessment 
• Due to UN Member States´ inability 
to agree on the establishment of an 
appropriate financing mechanism for 
peacekeeping operations the organi-
zation in its early years was urged to 
experiment with various insufficient 
ad hoc approaches and temporary so-
lutions. With its decision to establish 
a separate peacekeeping Assessment 
Account outside the UN regular 
budget to cover the costs of UNEF II 
the General Assembly in its resolu-
tion 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 
1973 created a “financial intermedi-
ary” that collects and disburses 
money for peacekeeping in a more 
equitable and practical way than ever 
before. This financing mechanism has 
turned out to be durable for the fi-
nancing of almost all peacekeeping 
operations deployed since then. 
• With the standardization and stream-
lining of budgetary processes, the in-
troduction of standardized costing and 
the establishment of unified budget 
cycles a number of initiatives have 
been undertaken to improve the effi-
ciency of UN administrative practices 
related to the use of the mechanism. 
As indicated above the logical next 
step is to establish a unified peace-
keeping budget by consolidating the 
Assessment Accounts of the different 
operations. Apart from other potential 
benefits this would save considerably 
in the administration of numerous 
peacekeeping operation budgets and 
would possibly permit more consis-
tent and timely reimbursement to 
troop-contributing countries. 
• Any critical assessment of the peace-
keeping Assessment Accounts must 
take into consideration that the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund as well 
as the Support Account for peace-
keeping operations (see below) and 
the United Nations Logistic Base at 
Brindisi (UNLB) are financially 
linked to the peacekeeping Assess-
ment Accounts. Therefore, they suffer 
from Member States´ unpaid assessed 
contributions to the Assessment Ac-
counts as well. Should the UN decide 
to de-link them from unreliable 
peacekeeping assessments it conse-
quently must search for alternative 
income sources. 
• With regard to the reform of the 
peacekeeping assessment scale made 
in 2000 it is difficult to answer if the 
new conception will help foster better 
allocation of resources to the peace-
keeping accounts: 
a) On the one hand, the new distribu-
tion of Member States among the 
10 different contribution levels is 
based on more objective criteria 
and thus less arbitrary than in case 
of the old scale. While still taking 
into account the developing coun-
tries´ limited “ability to pay” the 
new scale only assesses those for-
mer free-riders at higher rates 
which over years refused to pay 
higher shares of peacekeeping 
costs that they were de facto capa-
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ble to pay while at the same time 
enjoying the positive externalities 
of peacekeeping as well. However, 
under the new peacekeeping scale 
of assessments based upon the 
principle of “ability to pay” 95 
percent of the total costs of peace-
keeping are still borne by level A 
and B countries together (old 
scale: 98 percent). 
b) On the other hand, under the new 
arrangement the main burden of 
peacekeeping costs to be shoul-
dered by the permanent members 
of the Security Council (level A) 
because of their “special responsi-
bilities” for the maintenance of 
peace and security has been re-
duced significantly. As a conse-
quence other developed countries 
(level B) have been assessed at 
corresponding higher rates to bal-
ance these reductions. Put differ-
ently, those permanent members of 
the Security Council who have 
succeeded in negotiating down 
their percentage share of peace-
keeping costs likewise have suc-
ceeded in extending their “special 
responsibilities” to other countries. 
Due to the fact that under the new 
peacekeeping scale of assessments 
all level B countries together pay 5 
percent more than all level A coun-
tries together the question to be 
raised is whether this new propor-
tion is in violation to General As-
sembly resolution 1874 of 27 June 
1963 which specifically linked 
permanent membership on the Se-
curity Council with the financing 
of peacekeeping, and whether a 
Security Council reform would not 
be the logical consequence of 
some permanent members´ refusal 
to pay a larger share of peacekeep-
ing burdens that was originally as-
signed to them. Thus, one could 
argue that in the long term the new 
proportion might yield to a greater 
say of level B countries in the de-
cision-making processes. This 
again might yield to an enhanced 
provision of UN peace operations 
(see Barett 2004). 
• Most critical is the weak impact of 
Article 19 of the UN Charter as a 
sanction mechanism for Member 
States who are arrears with their as-
sessed contributions. Given that Ar-
ticle 19 is not much of a deterrent – 
especially not to permanent members 
of the Security Council the UN 
should not completely rule out the 
possibility of applying alternative 
sanctions. 
III.3 Special Purpose Accounts 
III.3.1 Peacekeeping Reserve Fund 
In view of the UN´s inability to ensure 
rapid start-up funding of new peacekeep-
ing operations, caused by cash flow 
problems through unpaid contributions 
to the peacekeeping accounts, in 1992, 
former Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” 
(UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 70) 
stressed the necessity for “a temporary 
Peace-keeping Reserve Fund, at a level 
of $50 million, to meet initial expenses 
of peace-keeping operations”. Taking up 
the Secretary-General´s proposal the 
Fifth Committee of the General Assem-
bly approved “after protracted negotia-
tions” (Mc Dermott 1994, p. 57) the 
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establishment of the Fund by resolution 
47/217 of 23 December 1992 to serve 
“as a cash flow mechanism to ensure the 
rapid response of the Organization to the 
needs of peace-keeping operations”. In 
accordance with that resolution the 
initial level of the reserve fund was set at 
$150 million which was allocated from 
unencumbered balances in the special 
account of the United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group ($49,242,762), from 
unencumbered balances in the special 
account of the United Nations Iran-Iraq 
Military Observer Group ($18,156,200) 
and from authorized retained savings in 
the United Nations General Fund 
($82,601,038) (see UN Doc. A/58/5 
(Vol. II), p. 171). Those Member States 
that joined the UN subsequently to the 
adoption of that resolution (and conse-
quently did not contribute to the special 
accounts) contributed to the Fund in 
accordance with the peacekeeping as-
sessment scale. 
Through the above-cited resolution the 
General Assembly authorized the Secre-
tary-General to advance from the Fund 
“such sums as may be necessary to 
finance: (i) unforeseen and extraordinary 
expenses relating to peace-keeping 
operations within the commitment au-
thority established by the General As-
sembly; (ii) budgetary appropriations, 
including start-up costs, approved by the 
General Assembly for new, expanded or 
renewed peace-keeping operations pend-
ing the collection of assessed contribu-
tions.” (UN Doc. A/RES/47/217) 
This was a major improvement to meet 
start-up needs of peacekeeping opera-
tions “and to buffer temporarily the 
unpredictable receipt of peace-keeping 
assessments” (UN Doc. A/48/945, para. 
40) but it did not resolve the problem of 
time lag between the Security Council´s 
mandate and the General Assembly´s 
release of Funds: the wording of the 
resolution shows “how the General 
Assembly kept a tight rein on the proc-
ess: this was no green light for the Secre-
tary-General to allot funds before the 
General Assembly had found time to 
consider a budget, but only a permit to 
spend resources before they had been 
collected”. (Salomons and Dijkzeul 
2001, p. 21) Consequently, the necessary 
flexibility was not given. 
Further improvements with regard to the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund were made 
two years later. Considering the continu-
ous cash crisis of the UN system the 
General Assembly in its resolution 
49/233 of 23 December 1994 decided to 
“limit the utilization of the Peace-
keeping Reserve Fund to the start-up 
phase of new peacekeeping operations, 
to the expansion of new ones or to un-
foreseen and extraordinary expenditures 
related to peace-keeping” and urged all 
Member States to ensure full and timely 
payment of their assessed contributions, 
so as “to improve the cash-flow situation 
by enabling replenishment of the rele-
vant reserves”. (UN Doc. A/RES/49/233, 
XI). Beyond the limitation of the Fund 
the Secretary-General was authorized 
“with the prior concurrence of the Advi-
sory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions…, to enter into 
commitments [using the Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund] not to exceed 50 million 
United States dollars per decision of the 
Security Council” (UN Doc. 
A/RES/49/233, IV). 
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Put differently, for the start-up period of 
a peacekeeping operation there would be 
an initial ceiling of US$ 50 million30. 
Moreover, the resolution stipulates that 
all start-ups together shall not exceed 
US$ 150 million per annum and that, 
whenever the General Assembly appro-
priated “outstanding commitments” the 
reserve of US$ 150 million shall be 
replenished automatically. The fund 
shall be replenished from assessed con-
tributions to the peacekeeping operations 
which used it. For commitment request 
in excess of US$ 50 million per opera-
tion the General Assembly´s approval is 
required31. These ceilings have not been 
redefined till today. 
Focusing on the limits of the Peacekeep-
ing Reserve Fund´s effectiveness, in 
2000 the “Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations” (“Brahimi 
Report”) recommended to increase the 
size of the fund as well as to give author-
ity to the Secretary-General to use up to 
US$ 50 million before the Security 
Council authorizes a new operation: 
“The Secretary-General should be given 
                                                 
                                                
30 Before the adaption of resolution 49/233 
the ceiling was set at US$ 10 million per 
operation for start-up costs, and this money 
could be accessed only if contributions had 
been received (see Salomons and Dijkzeul 
2001, p. 23). In this context the Secretary-
General has proposed the level of the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund be increased 
from US$ 150 million to US$ 800 million. 
(see UN Docs. A/48/403-S/26450 and 
A/48/945, para 41). An amount that never 
could be reached.  
31 The Brahimi Report notes that in excep-
tional cases the General Assembly has 
granted authority to the Secretary-General 
to commit up to US$ 200 million to start up 
large operations, such as UNTAET, 
UNMIK and MONUC (see UN Doc. 
A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 160). 
authority to draw up to $50 million from 
the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund once it 
became clear that an operation was 
likely to be established, with the ap-
proval of ACABQ but prior to the adop-
tion of a Security Council resolution”. 
(UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 
para. 169 (c)) 
These essential recommendations have 
not been translated into action up to 
now32. In 2004 during the 58th session of 
the General Assembly the ACABQ 
indicated that an increase of the level of 
the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund would 
have little or no impact on the short-term 
cash-flow problem, “which can be 
solved only by an improved pattern of 
payment of assessed contributions” (UN 
Doc. A/58/732, para. 16). Referring to 
the Secretary-General´s recommendation 
that the level of the Peacekeeping Re-
serve Fund be maintained at its current 
authorized level (see A/58/724, para. 8), 
ACABQ furthermore points out that the 
fund will be required to meet immediate 
cash requirements of UNOCI, 
UNMISET and operations in Haiti and 
Sudan. 
The financial “Report of the Board of 
Auditors” (UN Doc. A/58/5 (Vol. II)) on 
United Nations peacekeeping operations 
provides detailed information on the 
status of the Fund for the 12-month 
period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003. 
As reflected in the report the level of the 
fund of 30 June 2003 was US$ 194.297 
million which is approximately 
US$ 44.3 million higher than the ap-
 
32 The important question of ”pre-mandate 
commitment authority“ currently is under 
review (see UN Doc. A/RES/57/317). 
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proved level of US$ 150 million because 
of accrued interest income. Of that 
amount US$ 33.3 million were trans-
ferred to the Support Account for peace-
keeping operations for the period from 1 
July 2003 to 30 June 2004 under the 
terms of the General Assembly resolu-
tion 57/317 of 18 June 2003, leaving an 
amount of US$ 161.0 million or an 
excess balance of approximately US$ 11 
million (see UN Doc. A/58/5 (Vol. II)), 
p. 20). US$ 14.1 million in interest 
income of the fund were transferred to 
the Strategic Deployment Stocks.33
Pursuant to the report of the Secretary-
General on the Fund the fund balance of 
29 February 2004 was US$ 162.977 
million while the amount of available 
cash was US$ 73.957 million of which 
US$ 12.820 million in loans to 
MINURCA were still outstanding and 
US$ 76.200 million to UNMIL for its 
start-up requirements (see A/58/724, 
para. 3). 
Assessment 
• The establishment of the Peacekeep-
ing Reserve Fund has been a major 
improvement of short-term financing 
as it helps the Secretary-General to 
make cash available for more rapid 
deployment of new or expanding 
peacekeeping operations pending the 
receipt of assessed contributions. Vice 
versa, without this cash-flow mecha-
                                                 
33 Strategic deployment stocks were estab-
lished in 2002 to ensure rapid deployment 
of peacekeeping operations within 30 days 
(for a traditional mission) and 90 days (for 
a complex mission). These stocks comprise 
items such as vehicles, communications, 
engineering equipment and accommoda-
tions (see UN Doc. A/58/5 (Vol. II), p. 29). 
nism the Secretary-General would 
still be struggling to meet start-up 
needs of peacekeeping operations, es-
pecially during the first crucial weeks. 
• In this context the Brahimi Report 
with some satisfaction notes that the 
Fund now provides “a standing pool 
of money from which to draw 
quickly”. (UN Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809, para. 159) 
• Since its establishment the mecha-
nism has been made more efficient by 
authorizing the Secretary-General to 
allot funds before the General As-
sembly has found time to consider a 
budget (resolution 49/233), and po-
tentially (as still under debate) prior 
to the adoption of a Security Council 
resolution. Consequently the im-
provements made with regard to the 
Peacekeeping Reserve Fund have 
strengthened the Secretary-General´s 
ability to act more quickly and flexi-
ble in responding to crisis – when 
speed is of the essence. 
• However, Member States´ non-
payments of assessed contributions 
threaten the viability of the Peace-
keeping Reserve Fund as loans from 
the fund must be reimbursed from the 
Peacekeeping Assessment Accounts. 
• Considering the distinction made by 
the UN between peacekeeping opera-
tions on the one hand, and political 
and peace-building missions on the 
other hand, Salomon and Dijkzeul 
(2001, p. 36) raise the question 
whether the DPA, as the Department 
responsible for political and peace-
building missions, should also have 
access to the Peacekeeping Reserve 
Fund, or the DPKA only – as cur-
rently practised. This is a pertinent 
question as it points to a more inte-
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grated financing of both types of 
peace operations. 
III.3.2 Support Account for 
Peacekeeping Operations 
Since the UN has been involved in a 
significantly larger number of peace-
keeping operations it has also been 
compelled to authorize additional posts – 
so-called “overload posts” – in the rele-
vant Headquarters offices engaged in 
peacekeeping support, such as DPKO 
and DPI, to alleviate the additional 
work-load – and to ensure the efficient 
“backstopping”34 of these operations (see 
UN Doc A/45/493)35. 
Those posts were originally financed in 
an ad-hoc manner from the budgets of 
the ongoing peacekeeping operations – 
supplementary to those posts provided 
under the UN regular budget. But this 
arrangement was found wanting because 
overload posts were derived from the 
financial resources of an existing opera-
tion and were not available “before the 
enabling resolution of the Security 
Council established the operation” (UN 
Doc. A/45/493). Moreover, it became 
                                                 
34 The “backstopping” of peacekeeping 
operations is defined as “the overall direc-
tion, assistance and guidance given by de-
partments/offices and other units, at Head-
quarters, for ensuring the effective plan-
ning, implementation and liquidation of 
peace-keeping operations” (UN Doc. 
A/50/876, p. 6). 
35 Even if the practice of providing overload 
posts - under the budgets of peacekeeping 
operations - goes back to the first peace-
keeping operation established in 1956 in-
volving the deployment of military contin-
gents (UNEF I), there has been a significant 
increase in additional work-loads caused by 
new and expanding peace operations since 
the 1990s (see UN Doc A/45/493). 
apparent “that identifying an overload 
post against a specific mission was 
arbitrary, since the incumbents of such 
posts performed tasks for any number of 
missions interchangeable” (UN Doc. 
A/50/876, p. 8). 
At its forty-fourth session the General 
Assembly by its resolution 44/192 of 21 
December 1989 therefore requested the 
Secretary-General to provide informa-
tion on the proposed establishment of a 
Support Account for peacekeeping 
operations – a separate account that was 
supposed to replace the previous over-
load post arrangement. In his report the 
Secretary-General formulated the techni-
cal guidelines relating to the use and 
operation of the Support Account for 
peacekeeping operations (see UN Doc. 
A/45/493). Based on these guidelines the 
General Assembly by its resolution 
45/258 of 3 May 1991 approved the 
establishment of the Support Account, 
effective 1 January 1990. 
Following the report of the Secretary-
General the account originally was 
designed “to continue meeting the needs 
caused by existing peace-keeping opera-
tions as well as the additional work-load 
in connection with the pre-
implementation phase of prospective 
operations and good offices activities 
that are clearly not within the confines of 
the biennium programme budget financ-
ing.” Moreover it should provide the 
Organization with the “necessary re-
sources to allow it to respond effectively 
and in timely and efficient way to initia-
tives that need to be undertaken as and 
when the occasions arise in relation to 
such good offices and peace-keeping 
activities.” In addition it had to provide 
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“flexibility in the use of resources to 
respond to the administrative and politi-
cal backstopping tasks of the various 
operations in accordance with their 
changing requirements.” (UN Doc. 
A/45/493, para. 11-12) 
By resolution 49/250 of 20 July 1995 the 
General Assembly limited this broad 
formulated scope of the account and 
decided “that support account funds shall 
be used for the sole purpose of financing 
human and non-human resource re-
quirements for backstopping and sup-
porting peace-keeping operations at 
Headquarters, and that any change to this 
limitation will require the prior approval 
of the General Assembly.” (UN Doc. 
A/RES/49/250, para. 2) In other words, 
the Support Account shall be merely 
used to cover direct non-field support 
costs for peacekeeping operations, i. e. to 
improve the administrative management 
of the relevant Headquarters offices, and 
not any “on the ground” action.  
The original Support Account funding 
formula is likewise expounded in the 
above-mentioned report of the Secretary-
General and was adopted by the account 
establishing resolution as well. Accord-
ing to the report the account was initially 
to be financed from resources already 
included in the approved peacekeeping 
budgets. Beginning in 1991 financing 
should be through the “inclusion of a 
provision in each of the budgets of 
peacekeeping operations, in an amount 
equal to the average ratio in 1990 of the 
costs of overload posts to the cost of the 
civilian establishment in the mission 
areas, excluding UNTAG, and is esti-
mated at approximately $7 million gross 
($5.6 million net) at 1991 rates. […] The 
proposed average ratio to be applied, 
beginning in 1991, in calculating the 
amounts to be included in each of the 
budgets of peace-keeping operations is 
8.5 per cent of the cost […] of the civil-
ian component in the mission area of the 
respective peace-keeping operation.” 
(UN Doc. A/45/493, para. 13)36
This fixed percentage approach (8.5 
percent of the total civilian staff cost 
component of ongoing peacekeeping 
operations) for the annual budget of the 
Support Account had been in place until 
1996, when the General Assembly de-
cided “to review the methodology, in the 
light of the changing requirements for 
and nature of backstopping peacekeep-
ing operations at Headquarters” (GA 
decision 50/473, cited in UN Doc. 
A/50/876, p. 1). Actually, the funding 
methodology based on the above-
described “8.5 percent-formula” had a 
number of weaknesses and could not 
provide an adequate annual level of 
resources to meet the minimum back-
stopping requirements.37 Therefore, the 
Secretary-General recommended, as an 
alternative approach, “that once the 
General Assembly has discussed and 
approved the minimum requirements for 
backstopping activities at Headquarters 
                                                 
36 The ratio was based on five active peace-
keeping operations in 1990: the United Na-
tions Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), the United Nations Disen-
gagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), the United Nations Iran-Iraq 
Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), and 
the United Nations Observer Group in Cen-
tral America (ONUCA) (see UN Doc. 
A/45/493). 
37 For a detailed discussion see UN Docs. 
A/50/876 and A/55/305-S/2000/809. 
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for the 12-month periods ending 30 June 
of the following year, it should then 
appropriate the related resources, which 
should be assessed on the same scale as 
at that for peace-keeping assessments”. 
(UN Doc. A/50/876, p. 25). Further-
more, he pointed out that according to 
the new approach the review and ap-
proval of the budgetary requirements 
“would be based on actual workload 
experience of the backstopping require-
ments of the prior year and projected 
workload for the next year, taking into 
account the number, scope, scale and 
complexity of active, completed and 
closed peace-keeping missions sup-
ported”, and that such reviews shall take 
place “in conjunction with the annual 
review and approval of peace-keeping 
budgets” (UN Doc. A/50/876, p. 25). 
This new funding methodology for the 
Support Account was adopted in its 
resolution 50/221 of 11 April 1996 by 
the General Assembly and has not been 
replaced since then. In accordance with 
this methodology every post funded by 
the Support Account requires an annual 
justification and has to be approved by 
the General Assembly. In this context 
the Brahimi Report critically notes that 
even under the new system DPKO staff-
ing levels grew little, “partly because the 
Secretariat seems to have tailored its 
submissions to what it thought the politi-
cal market would bear” (UN 
Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 175). 
Table 6: Ratio of total Support Account budgets to total Peacekeeping operations 
budgets for the period 2001-2005 
(Millions of United States dollars) 
 
 July 2001- June 2002 
July 2002- 
June 2003 
July 2003- 
June 2004 
July 2004- 
June 2005 c 
Total Peacekeeping budget level a 2 679.9 2 606.5 2 818.7 2 682.1 
Total Support Account budget level b 97.3 104.5 112.1 122.1 
Support Account budget as a percentage of 
the Total Peacekeeping budget 3.63 % 4.01 % 3.98 % 4.55 % 
a Includes United Nations Logistic Base at Brindisi (UNLB) and the Support Account 
Figures adopted from UN Docs. A/58/5 (Vol. II), p. 2) for 2001/02; and A/58/705, p. 3 for 2002-2005 
b Figures taken from UN Docs. A/57/5 (Vol.II), p. 118 for 2001/02; A/58/5 (Vol. II), p. 118 for 2002/03; and UN Doc. 
A/58/715, p. 4 for 2003-2005 
c Estimated 
Table 6 lists the total Support Account 
budgets and the total budgets for peace-
keeping operations from mid 2001 
through mid 2005. It also shows that the 
Support Account budgets covering 
Headquarters support staff have not 
exceeded 5 percent of the total budgets 
for peacekeeping operations. 
Table 7 shows the contrast between the 
deployed strength of peacekeeping 
operation´s field personnel (including 
deployed troops, military observers, 
civilian police, and civilian staff) and the 
authorized strength of their Headquar-
ters support staffs (funded by the Sup-
port Account). Expressed in percentages 
only 1.2 % of the total personnel in-
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volved in peacekeeping activities in 
2004/05 (not taking into account a small 
number of posts funded by the regular 
budget) are responsible for the backstop-
ping and support of peacekeeping opera-
tions at Headquarters. 
Tables 8 and 7 combined illustrate that 
the Support Account for the period from 
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 amounts to 
US$ 122.1 million and provides for 762 
posts (2003/04: US$ 112.1 million for 
743 posts), i. e. only 762 persons in the 
relevant Headquarters offices have the 
responsibility to provide for 63.402 
persons in the field (in 12 peacekeeping 
operations) with substantive and opera-
tional support. 
When focussing on the proportion be-
tween the military and civilian police 
units in the field and the corresponding 
military and civilian police divisions 
inside the DPKO, the imbalance is simi-
lar: According to the proposed staffing 
of the DPKO for the period 2004/05 79 
posts within DPKO´s Military Division 
are funded by the Support Account and 
only 4 posts by the regular budget. 
Within the DPKO´s Civilian Police 
Division 24 posts are funded by the 
Support Account and no post by the 
regular budget (see table 8). In contrast, 
48.500 troops (including military ob-
servers) and 4250 police officers are 
intended to be sent into the field. Conse-
quently, 83 officers of DPKO´s Military 
Division (funded by the Support Ac-
count and the regular budget) and 24 
officers of DPKO´s Civilian Police 
Division (funded by the Support Ac-
count) are responsible for 48.500 troops 
and 4250 police officers in the field. 
That is a percentage of 0.2 % and 0.6 % 
respectively. 
Table 7: Ratio of total Support Account funded staff at Headquarters to total field 
personnel for the period 2001-2005 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Ongoing peacekeeping operations a, c 13 11 12 12 
Total field personnel b, c 64 483 54 176 61 080 63 402 
Staff at Headquarters c 687 702 743 762 
Headquarters: field ratio 1.07 % 1.30 % 1.22 % 1.20 % 
a Includes United Nations Logistic Base at Brindisi (UNLB) 
b Includes deployed troops, military observers, civilian police, and civilian staff in missions 
c Figures adopted from UN Doc. A/58/705, p. 5 
The Support Account funds 85 percent 
of the DPKO budget – until 2001 about 
US$ 40 million annually – while the rest 
comes from the regular biennium budget 
(see UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 
para. 174). Due to an increase of posts 
the support account resources for the 
DPKO for 2003/2004 amount to some 
US$ 77.33 million – an increase of US$ 
4.39 million (6 percent) over the appro-
priation of US$ 72.94 million for the 
current year (see UN Doc. GA/AB/3563 
of 12 May 2003).  
The overall staffing requirements of the 
DPKO for the period 2004-2005 amount 
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to 601 posts out of which 539 posts are 
funded by the Support Account and only 
62 posts by the regular budget (see UN 
Doc. A/58/715, Annex I). That is seven 
out of eight posts in the DPKO are 
funded by the Support Account and have 
to be re-justified every year, which is “to 
treat [DPKO] as though it were a tempo-
rary creation and peacekeeping a tempo-
rary responsibility of the Organization” 
(UN Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809, 
para. 176). 
In view of the above-described dispro-
portions it is surprising the ACABQ in 
its report was of the opinion that “if the 
decrease in peacekeeping operations 
were to continue, it would be diffi-
cult…to justify the level of the support 
account” because “a direct link between 
the size and complexity of peacekeeping 
operations and the level of the support 
account is difficult to establish” (UN 
Doc. A/57/776, para. 24). Even though it 
is comprehensible in terms of methodical 
difficulties it is obvious that the Head-
quarters offices involved in peacekeep-
ing activities are understaffed and cannot 
provide adequate support. As early as 
2000, the Brahimi Report therefore 
recommended “an emergency supple-
mental increase to the Support Account 
to allow immediate recruitment of addi-
tional personnel, particularly in DPKO” 
(see UN Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809, 
para. 197). In more concrete terms the 
Brahimi Report proposed as a temporary 
arrangement to replace once again the 
existing funding methodology “by calcu-
lating the regular budget baseline for 
Headquarters support of peacekeeping as 
a percentage of the average cost of 
peacekeeping over the preceding five 
years” (UN Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809, 
para. 194). In the long term the resource 
requirements should then be funded 
mainly through the regular United Na-
tions budget instead of the Support 
Account which has to be justified year 
by year and post by post. None of these 
proposals have been carried out till 
today. However, using the Brahimi 
Report´s formula on the total peacekeep-
ing operations budgets for the period 
2001-2005, as represented in table 6, 
would result in an amount of US$ 134.1 
million of the Support Account (5 % of 
Table 8: Ratio of military and civilian police staff at DPKO to military and civilian 
police personnel in the field for the period 2004-2005 
 
 Military personnel b Civilian police 
Field personnel a 48 500 4 250 
DPKO staff: c 
- funded by regular budget 
- funded by Support Account 
- total 
 
4 
79 
83 
 
-- 
24 
24 
DPKO: field ratio 0.2 % 0.6 % 
a Figures adopted from UN Doc. A/58/705, p. 5 
b Includes deployed troops and military observers 
c Figures adopted from UN Doc. A/58/715, Annex I
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the average) – only US$ 12 million 
higher than the actual Support Account 
budget level for the period 2004/05. But 
despite the constant increase in the level 
of the Support Account over the last 
years it could by no means solve the 
problem of the above-indicated dispro-
portions between the number of the 
operation´s field personnel and the 
authorized strength of their Headquarters 
support staff, since the number of field 
personnel has grown, too. 
In view of the need for a better assess-
ment of financial resource requirements 
and for a more efficient and effective 
management of the available resources, 
in 2002 the UN Secretariat introduced 
the result-based budgeting format to the 
Support Account for peacekeeping 
operations. Result-based budgeting has 
been defined by the UN as a “pro-
gramme budgetary process in which 
programme formulation revolves around 
a set of predefined objectives and ex-
pected results (accomplishments), which 
are derived from and linked to outputs 
required to achieve such results and in 
which actual performance in achieving 
those results is measured by means of 
performance indicators for each objec-
tive” (UN Doc. A/57/5 (Vol. II)). 
Assessment 
• The introduction of the result-based 
budgeting as a standard modus oper-
andi for the use of the Support Ac-
count has been an important im-
provement to guarantee a more pro-
fessional and objective review of hu-
man and financial resource require-
ments at Headquarters offices en-
gaged in the backstopping of peace-
keeping operations. Within the result-
based budgeting framework the re-
source and staffing needs are increas-
ingly determined by objective man-
agement and productivity criteria. 
• But this internal management reform 
can by no means replace the continu-
ing treatment of the Headquarters 
support offices as if they were a tem-
porary organizational phenomenon. 
The two above-mentioned main prob-
lems averting a substantial improve-
ment of backstopping activities both 
in terms of quantity and quality still 
remain: First, the high disproportion 
between the strength of field person-
nel and the authorized strength of 
their Headquarters support staff. 
Which national Government would 
send 48.500 troops into the field with 
just 83 officers back home to provide 
them with substantive and operational 
military guidance? Which police or-
ganization would deploy 4250 police 
officers with only 24 headquarters 
staff to provide them with substantive 
and operational policing support? 
Second, the fact that every post 
funded by the Support Account re-
quires an annual (re-) justification and 
has to be approved by the General 
Assembly. Considering the fact that 
seven out of eight posts in the DPKO 
are funded by the Support Account, it 
becomes obvious that DPKO as the 
Department most engaged in peace-
keeping support has “no predictable 
baseline level of funding and posts 
against which [it] can recruit and re-
tain staff” (UN Doc.A/55/305-
S/2000/809, para. 177). 
• Support Account funding method-
ologies have been replaced several 
times without reaching a sustainable 
solution. A future finance option 
would be to treat Headquarters sup-
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port for peacekeeping as a core ac-
tivity of the United Nations that 
should be funded mainly through the 
regular budget, as already recom-
mended by the Brahimi Report. 
III.4 A Case Apart: Funding 
UN Political and Peace-
Building Missions 
According to the UN´s distinction be-
tween peacekeeping operations on the 
one hand and political and peace-
building missions on the other hand 
there are some important differences in 
the way they are authorized, headed and 
financed. Nevertheless, it should be 
considered that many of today´s mis-
sions actually combine the aspects of 
both types of missions. 
Table 9 summarizes the main differ-
ences, including the differences in their 
funding modality and introduces the 
focus of examination in this section. 
Similar to the allocation of resources for 
UN peacekeeping operations the General 
Assembly has to establish a Special 
Account for every political mission 
authorized by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly (in case of peace-
keeping operations the Security Council 
is the only authorizing entity). But in 
contrast to UN peacekeeping operations 
which are mainly funded on the peace-
keeping assessment scale the scale of 
assessments used for political missions is 
the one used for the regular budget. 
Salomons and Dijkzeul complain that 
political missions suffer from the same 
administrative handicaps and liquidity 
problems that were partly overcome for 
peacekeeping operations: “lack of start-
up funding, complex and time consum-
ing budgetary processes, and second tier 
attention with regard to logistics and 
staffing” (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 
p. 10). 
In fact, there is no cash-flow mechanism 
for political missions to ensure rapid 
start-up funding comparable to the Re-
serve Fund for peacekeeping operations. 
According to that Salomons and Di-
jkzeul (2001, p. 31) describe the lack of 
start-up funding during the end of the 
1990s as follows: “No financial com-
mitment could be made until the Con-
troller had given an ´allotment´. No 
´allotment´ could be made until 
ACABQ, the Fifth Committee and the 
General Assembly had approved the 
budget. Even now, the General Assem-
Table 9: Main Differences between Political and Peacekeeping Missions 
 
Type of  
mission 
Authorizing 
entity 
Funding 
modality 
Department 
responsible 
Role of  
military 
Political and 
Peace-building 
General 
Assembly or 
Security Council 
Regular budget 
assessments 
(with voluntary 
contributions) 
DPA No military involvement 
Peacekeeping Security Council 
Peacekeeping 
budget 
assessments 
(with voluntary 
contributions) 
DPKO 
Military  
involvement 
crucial 
Source: After Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, p. 30 
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bly will not even adopt a resolution to 
establish a political mission until it has 
approved its budgetary implications.” 
In this regard, however, a major im-
provement was made when the General 
Assembly in its resolution 53/306 of 5 
February 1999 decided that a provision 
for political missions should be included 
in the regular biennium budget. This 
principle to treat the provision as a part 
and parcel of the regular biennium 
budget has not been revised in the sub-
sequent years, and the overall require-
ments for the current 20 political mis-
sions for the calendar year 2004 amount 
to US$ 140 million prorated of the 
regular biennium budget. 
The Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA) as the Department responsible for 
setting up, supporting and advising 
political missions and peace-building 
offices can now access the necessary 
resources with ACABQ approval with-
out involving the General Assembly or 
the Security Council. Moreover, the 
above-mentioned General Assembly 
decision “has strengthened somewhat the 
Secretary-General´s capacity to mobilize 
political missions at short notice, and it 
has belatedly created a parity of sorts in 
the manner peacekeeping and political 
missions are treated with respect of start-
up funding” (Salomons and Dijkzeul 
2001, p. 11). A further improvement 
worth mentioning is the application of 
result-based budgeting techniques to 
seven of the largest political missions 
representing over US$ 125 million of the 
US$ 140 million for the above-indicated 
period (see UN Doc. A/C.5/58/20, 
para. 5). 
Apart from these improvements aimed to 
facilitate the funding of political mis-
sions and to ensure better financial 
management administrative obstacles 
still remain for an effective and efficient 
support of these types of missions. The 
DPA as the designated focal point of 
Headquarters support for United Nations 
political and peace-building missions 
face severe management and authority 
constraints that could not be fully over-
come until today: First, DPA´s support 
structure – funded by the regular budget 
and voluntary contributions – is even 
more inadequate than DPKO´s support 
structure for peacekeeping operations. 
There is e. g. no structure parallel to 
DPKO´s Peacekeeping Finance Division 
in the DPA. Furthermore, the Field 
Administration and Logistic Division – 
which formerly cooperated with the 
DPA – was moved from the Department 
of Administration and Management to 
DPKO in 1994 (see Salomons and Di-
jkzeul 2001, p. 30). Second, with regard 
to the question of UN internal responsi-
bilities: “DPA´s authority and capacity 
to coordinate UN interventions are 
limited by the department´s lack of 
operational responsibilities and the 
injunction that it ´fully respect existing 
mandates, lines of authority, and funding 
arrangements´ within the UN System. 
Moreover, when peacekeeping is at the 
core of a mission, lead responsibility 
shifts to the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations” (Forman, Patrick, and 
Salomons 1998, p. 12). 
During the last years several recommen-
dations have been made of how to get 
over the weaknesses in the Headquarters 
support structure for political and peace-
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building missions. One option is to 
establish a set of common services for 
the four “Complex Emergencies De-
partments”, i. e. the Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), DPKO; DPA, and the Centre 
for Human Rights – a proposal made in 
1997 by the former Under-Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
Marrack Goulding, in his report to the 
Secretary-General titled “Enhancing the 
United Nations´ Effectiveness in Peace 
and Security” (quoted in Salomons and 
Dijkzeul 2001, p. 30). A similar ap-
proach can be found in the Secretary-
General´s report to the Security Council 
entitled “No Exist without strategy” of 
20 April 2001. In it the Secretary-
General takes the view that the UN´s 
effectiveness (in peacekeeping and 
peace-building), inter alia, depends upon 
the extent to which it can deploy UN 
operations and agencies in collaboration 
with each other: “Given the potentially 
large challenges and costs .. comprehen-
sive peace-building often encompasses, 
it is essential to ensure that all key parts 
of the United Nations system are fully 
engaged in collaborative and construc-
tive fashion. […] No single department 
or agency can be expected to devise and 
implement, on its own, all the elements 
of a comprehensive peace strategy.” (UN 
Doc. S/2001/394). Instead the Brahimi 
Report suggests transferring the entire 
field support for all “smaller, non-
military field missions” to the United 
Nations Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS) (UN Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809, para. 243). However, such 
reforms are still due. 
That apart, the most critical aspect ham-
pering the UN to effectively bring out its 
political and peace-building missions 
mandates is the low amount of assessed 
contributions provided for these mis-
sions within the regular budget. By no 
means, the prorated US$ 140 million for 
the calendar year 2004 give sufficient 
leeway to the Secretary-General. In 
contrast to UN peacekeeping assessed 
funding is “in fact relatively rare in 
peace-building, where most activities are 
funded by voluntary donations” (UN 
Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 239).38 
Thus, voluntary contributions – allocated 
through trust funds or other extra-
budgetary arrangements – often decide 
the success of UN peace operations, 
especially of political and peace-building 
missions. 
Assessment 
• The level of resources provided as a 
part and parcel of the regular bien-
nium budget appears inadequate in 
relation to the scope and number of 
current and future political and peace-
building missions. In addition, the 
Headquarters´ support structure re-
mains fragmented – especially DPA 
as the department responsible for the 
backstopping of these missions “is 
neither designed nor equipped to be a 
field support office” (UN Doc. 
A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 241). 
Apart from the above-mentioned 
changes in the funding modality, ini-
tiated by General Assembly resolu-
                                                 
38 As mentioned above, this also serves for the 
Headquarters support offices. DPA´s Elec-
toral Assistance Division (EAD), for in-
stance, fully relies on voluntary contribu-
tions. 
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tion 53/206, further bureaucratic and 
financial reform processes aimed to 
strengthen political and peace-
building missions are still out-
standing. 
• If the UN wanted to hold on to its 
integrated vision of peacekeeping and 
peace-building as described in several 
UN documents from “An Agenda for 
Peace” (1992) to the “Brahimi Re-
port” (2000) it should abolish its arti-
ficial separation between peacekeep-
ing operations on the one hand and 
political and peace-building on the 
other hand: “If indeed peace-building 
and peacekeeping are integral aspects 
of the same or related process, the 
logic of organizational effectiveness 
would indicate that this should be re-
flected in the United Nations´ organ-
izational structure and ultimately in 
its financing mechanism” (Salomons 
and Dijkzeul 2001, p. 36). In fact, the 
current financing system does not re-
flect the approach of integrated peace 
operations. 
• Most peace-building activities car-
ried out by UN missions are financed 
through voluntary contributions – of-
ten in an uncoordinated manner and 
rarely within a strategic and inte-
grated financing framework as the 
next chapter will demonstrate. 
III.5 Voluntary Funding: Extra 
Budgetary Mechanisms 
and Tools 
The low amounts of assessed contribu-
tions from either peacekeeping accounts 
or the regular budget are just sufficient 
to cover the core costs of most of the UN 
peace operations and by no means pro-
vide all the resources required to com-
plete them successfully. For that reason 
success or failure of UN peace opera-
tions often depend on the extent to which 
and the way how voluntary contribu-
tions39 will be provided for them – and 
considering this it is small wonder that 
many Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions contain appeals for 
external funding in support of UN peace 
operations. 
This especially serves for complex 
political and peace-building missions 
characterized by a variety of tasks “that 
are essential under the missions´ man-
date, but that fall outside its budgetary 
scope.” (Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, 
p. 43).40 Unlike funding for UN peace-
making and peacekeeping operations 
contributions for those missions that 
have first and foremost a post-conflict 
recovery focus are for the most part 
voluntary, “thereby unpredictable and 
subject to lengthy and competitive fund-
raising campaigns” (Forman and Salo-
mons 1998, p. 7). In this context one 
should also bear in mind that in some 
cases worth mentioning multidimen-
sional peace operations under UN com-
mand have initiated wider and successful 
post-conflict peace-building efforts with 
                                                 
39 The term “voluntary contributions” refers 
to those contributions (made by multi- and 
bilateral donors, NGOs, and the private sec-
tor) which are not based on an obligation to 
pay (i. e. on assessed contributions). 
40 There is a wide range of examples for 
structural preventive, peace-building and 
development related activities that cannot 
be covered only by the mission´s core 
budgets, such as disarmament monitoring, 
demobilization and reintegration of com-
batants, reintegration of refugees and dis-
placed persons, conduction of democratic 
elections, reform of the judicial system, re-
building of state structures, human rights 
monitoring, repair of infrastructure, rebuild-
ing of social capital. 
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a variety of actors and donors typically 
involved in those processes. “For exam-
ple, UN-led peacekeeping or observer 
missions were in place when interna-
tional reconstruction efforts began in 
Cambodia (UNTAG), El Salvador 
(ONUSAL), Guatemala (MINUGUA), 
Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and Tajiki-
stan (UNMOT).” (Forman, Patrick, and 
Salomons 2000, p. 18). The lesson to be 
learned from these cases is that it is in 
the donors´ own interest to provide such 
missions with timely and adequate fi-
nancial support to set the right course for 
their later engagement in countries re-
covering from conflict. 
A common mechanism for raising volun-
tary contributions in support of peace-
building and development activities 
linked to UN peace operations are multi-
lateral pledging conferences41, including 
Round Tables (RTs) and Consultative 
Groups (CGs)42. In 1992, e. g. a Ministe-
rial Conference initiated by the Govern-
ment of Japan and UNDP generated 
some US$ 880 million in pledges for 
peace-building efforts in Cambodia. 
These funds were essential for the suc-
cess of the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) – the 
                                                 
                                                
41 “A pledge denotes a public expression of 
donor intent to mobilize funds for which an 
approximate sum is given.” (Forman, Pat-
rick, and Salomons 2000, p. 29) 
42 Forman and Salomons critically note that 
RTs often take place too late to address 
peace-building needs where fast response is 
of the essence, while CGs meetings cannot 
be held without the presence of a “legiti-
mate recipient government” (Forman and 
Salomons 1998, p. 5). It goes without say-
ing that this prerequisite for CGs (mobi-
lized by the World Bank) is hardly to real-
ize if peace-building missions are deployed 
in failing or failed states. 
then deployed UN operation (see Salo-
mons and Dijkzeul 2001, p. 43). In that 
same year the international donor com-
munity pledged over US$ 400 million to 
support the United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ), i. e. to fi-
nance “those components of the peace 
process, such as the conduct of elections 
and the provision of emergency food aid, 
that were not covered in the ONUMOZ 
budget, but that were presented as key 
components of ONUMOZ´s strategy” 
(Salomons and Dijkzeul 2001, p. 43). 
Unfortunately, pledging conferences 
often have the character of a “political 
theatre” as donors from time to time 
overstate “the generosity of their aid 
packages, sometimes ´double-counting´ 
amounts previously promised or already 
delivered to an implementing agency 
that also subsequently report them. 
Alternatively, donors may pledge large 
amounts that they cannot deliver, either 
ever or any time soon” (Forman and 
Salomons 1998, p. 5). 
Apart from pledging conferences there 
are some other important options that 
potentially enable the mobilization of 
resources for essential activities related 
to peace operations in a more adequate 
and coherent manner. Over the years the 
UN has employed several extra-
budgetary arrangements for collaborative 
financing (“co-financing”43) in support 
of UN peace operations, including vol-
untary funding mechanisms and tools 
 
43 UNDP, for instance, handles this term as an 
umbrella term for several modalities used 
by UNDP to administer non-core funding 
for its programmes and projects which in-
clude resources received through cost-
sharing, trust funds and parallel financing 
(see UNDP 2002). 
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like trust funds, cost-sharing, and paral-
lel financing. Salomons and Dijkzeul 
emphasize that “each of these instru-
ments can be used at the global, regional 
and country level, and may involve other 
multilateral organizations, governments, 
financial institutions, NGOs, or private 
sector institutions. In principle each of 
these financial tools, if properly applied, 
is at the disposal of the Special Repre-
sentatives of the Secretary-General 
(SRSGs)44, and can contribute to the 
effective execution of joint operations.” 
(Salomons and Dijkzeul 2002, p. 45) 
Even though voluntary contributions 
allocated through these arrangements 
usually do not flow directly into the 
missions´ budgets, but are earmarked for 
specific activities and programmes 
related to the respective missions, they 
can be seen as “supplementary budgets” 
that can avert many missions from fail-
ure. 
The next sub-chapters provide a thor-
ough analysis of the three above-
mentioned financing arrangements 
available for voluntary funding in sup-
port of UN peace operations. Thereby it 
follows, if possible, the methodology of 
the foregoing analyses and highlights, 
inter alia, the general modalities for the 
use of the mechanism, procedures for 
authorizing disbursements and allocating 
funding, administrative obstacles to 
                                                 
44 While the broad leadership and guidance 
for UN Peace Operations comes from the 
Security Council and from the Secretary-
General the operations are headed by 
SRSGs “on the ground”. Of course, this 
does not go for operations which are under 
control of coalitions of Member States and 
authorized by the Security Council as was 
the case in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), 
and Haiti (1994). 
implementation procedures as well as 
questions of management, authority and 
governance. Furthermore, the analysis 
especially focuses on the role of the UN 
peace operation´s SRSGs in getting 
access to the use of these financing 
mechanisms. 
III.5.1 Trust Funds 
Since the 1990s when UN Peace Opera-
tions increased in size and number trust 
funds have played a key role in the 
extra-budgetary voluntary financing of 
activities relating to these operations and 
have provided a temporary solution for 
timely, cross-border funding. The UN 
defines trust fund as “accounts estab-
lished with specific terms of reference or 
under specific agreements to record 
receipts and expenditures of voluntary 
contributions for the purpose of financ-
ing wholly or in part the cost of activities 
consistent with the Organization´s aims 
and policies” (UN Doc. ST/SGB/188, 
Annex p. 1). 
In August 1989 the first “Trust Fund in 
Support of United Nations Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping Activities” was estab-
lished to provide short-term financing 
for preliminary implementation and 
start-up operations at that time followed 
by the “Trust Fund for the Cambodian 
Peace Process” in August 1990 which 
was originally established to finance 
fact-finding missions in Cambodia (see 
McDermott 1994a, pp. 175 f.). Both 
funds are still active. Today´s Trust 
Funds related to UN Peace Operations 
cover various conflict prevention, peace-
keeping, –making, and –building activi-
ties in different countries such as the 
“Trust Fund to Support United Nations 
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Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra 
Leone”, the “Trust Fund for Confidence-
building Measures in Eastern Slavonia”, 
and the “Trust Fund in Support of the 
Delimitation and Demarcation of the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Border” (see UN Doc. 
A/58/5 (Vol. II), Annex II). 
Salomons and Dijkzeul (2001, p. 46) 
emphasize that those trust funds estab-
lished for humanitarian and development 
programmes in conjunction with UN 
Peace Operations “can take the role of a 
co-ordination mechanism, as joint fund-
ing stimulates joint planning, implemen-
tation and evaluation”. By way of illus-
tration the authors name the “Holst 
Peace Fund”, which was created to 
finance the start-up costs of the Palestin-
ian Authority and small-scale projects in 
the West Bank and Gaza. Established in 
1994 (closed in 2001) this multi-donor 
trust fund was not administered by the 
UN but by the World Bank and is one of 
the first examples of the international 
donor community responding through a 
single funding mechanism to needs for 
post-conflict development (see World 
Bank 2001). 
Besides country and regional specific 
funds, there are also funds that have a 
more thematic, non- geographical align-
ment. Examples are the “Trust Fund for 
Support from Government and Organi-
zations to the Department of Peacekeep-
ing Operations´ Lessons-learned Mecha-
nism”, the “Trust Fund for the Rapidly 
Deployable Mission Headquarters” and 
the “Trust Fund to Support Public In-
formation and Related Efforts in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations”. 
The 2004 Report of the Board of Audi-
tors lists no less than 31 trust funds 
which financed activities related to 
peacekeeping operations during the 
fiscal year ended on 30 June 2003 (see 
UN Doc. A/58/5 (Vol. II), Annex II). 
Trust fund income and expenditure 
amounted to US$ 14.2 million and US$ 
91.8 million respectively. The balance of 
the trust funds as of 30 June 2003 was 
US$ 92.2 million (30 June 2002: US$ 
169.9 million). The list includes large as 
well as broad-based funds such as the 
above-cited $ 42 million “Trust Fund in 
Support of United Nations Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping Activities” and small 
and narrow ones like the US$ 10.000 
“Trust Fund for the Financing of United 
Nations International Conference on 
Medical Support for Peacekeeping Op-
erations”. 
According to the distinction made within 
the UN between general and technical 
co-operation trust funds – both applied 
as financing mechanisms to support 
peacekeeping and political missions –, 
general trust funds, established either for 
long-term or specific short-term pur-
poses, are used “to enhance or expand 
the work programme of one or more 
organizational units of the Secretariat, or 
for humanitarian and relief purposes to 
provide direct assistance in respect of 
emergency situations.” In contrast tech-
nical co-operation trust funds “refer to 
those which provide economic and social 
development assistance to developing 
countries”, i. e. they are “established to 
finance specific projects of technical co-
operation.” (UN Doc. ST/SGB/188, 
pp. 3 f. and Annex, p. 1) 
The authority to establish and manage 
both types of trust funds is set out in 
Regulation 4.13 of the “Financial Regu-
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lations and Rules of the United Nations”: 
“Trust funds and reserve and special 
accounts may be established by the 
Secretary-General and shall be reported 
to the Advisory Committee.” The sup-
plementary [Financial] Rule 104.3 states: 
“Trust funds and reserve and special 
accounts may be established by the 
General Assembly or the Secretary-
General in respect of specific activities 
entrusted to the Organization. The estab-
lishment, purpose and limits of trust 
funds and reserve and special accounts 
established under the authority of the 
Secretary-General require the approval 
of the Under-Secretary-General for 
Management.” (UN Doc. 
ST/SGB/2003/7). UN Doc. ST/SGB/188 
(p. 5) stipulates that the Under-
Secretary-General for Management, in 
turn, has delegated this authority to the 
Assistant Secretary-General for Finan-
cial Services. In case of trust funds 
established by the General Assembly the 
terms of reference (TORs) of the fund 
are set out in the Assembly resolution or 
in documentation referred to in the 
resolution. 
The process of implementing a trust fund 
in support of UN Peace Operations can 
be summarized as follows (after Salo-
mons and Dijkzeul 2001, pp. 48 f.): 
First, when a peace operation´s Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) has identified the need for a 
trust fund he has to find donors willing 
to support the proposed fund. This usu-
ally happens in the context of a pledging 
conference. Second, after the TORs have 
been formulated with the parties con-
cerned the Chief Administrative Officer 
of the operation can submit the TORs to 
DPKO or DPA for review. The Depart-
ment responsible, in turn, issues a formal 
request to the Assistant Secretary-
General for Financial Services (to the 
authorized Controller of the UN respec-
tively). Third, once the trust fund is 
authorized donors can deposit funds in 
the special account set up for the trust 
fund. After the funds are received the 
SRSG can ask the Department for an 
allotment, i. e. for a “spending authority” 
(UN Doc. ST/SGB/188, p. 8). Finally, 
disbursements can be made within days. 
By decision of the General Assembly the 
UN itself charges programme support 
costs on the basis of expenditures of 13 
percent (see Salomons and Dijkzeul 
2001, p. 48). 
Instead of using voluntary trust funds 
under the aegis of the UN Secretariat 
donors can place their contributions in 
an abundance of different trust funds 
administered by the United Nations´ 
major programmes and funds, such as 
UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, and UNEP 
or by the specialized agencies of the UN 
system, such as the World Bank. Salo-
mons and Dijkzeul (2001, p. 49) point 
out that these trust funds usually imply 
more operational flexibility and lower 
fees (programme support costs) to do-
nors. Compared to the 13 % charged by 
the UN Secretariat UNDP´s Trust Funds 
are charged between 3-5 % only (see 
UNDP 2000a, p. 1). If those trust funds 
in addition are more flexible and there-
fore more “effective” (e. g. faster dis-
bursements, disbursements in advance), 
it is in the very own interest of a UN 
Peace Operation´s SRSG to choose one 
of the UN programmes as the adminis-
trative body for a required trust fund. 
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The UN programmes´ trust funds are 
likewise to be established under the 
United Nations´ financial regulations 
and rules but are subject to the adminis-
trative authority of their executive heads. 
E. g. in March 2000 UNDP established a 
“Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Preven-
tion and Recovery” which is used to 
finance a wide range of peace-building 
and prevention activities in crisis-
affected countries. This fund is managed 
and administered by the UNDP Bureau 
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and 
has mobilized over US$ 180 million 
since its establishment (see UNDP 2003 
pp. 5 and 17). As many other UN pro-
grammes´ and specialized agencies´ trust 
funds it also covers activities in support 
of peace operations directed by the DPA 
or the DPKO – and those which usually 
fall under the mandate of UN Peace 
Operations45. One example among others 
is UNDP´s implementation of a disar-
mament and demobilization programme 
in the Republic of Congo where 8,000 
ex-combatants could be demobilized 
(see UNDP 2003, p. 10). At the same 
time the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC) had a similar 
mandate in the bordering state (see UN 
Doc. S/RES/1291). 
                                                 
45 UNDP (2003 pp. 6 ff.) offers the following 
seven service lines which can be financed 
by the fund: “Conflict Prevention and 
Peace-building”; “Recovery”; “Security 
Sector Reform and Transitional Justice”; 
“Small Arms Reduction, Disarmament and 
Demobilization of Ex-Combatants”; “Mine 
Action”; “Natural Disaster Reduction”; 
“Special Initiatives for Countries in Transi-
tion”. Each of these activities usually is part 
of the performance of UN Peace Opera-
tions. 
The World Bank also has established 
several new major trust funds within the 
last years through which donors can 
support countries emerging from con-
flict. It particularly has increased its 
capacity “to contribute to international 
efforts to deal with specific aspects of 
post-conflict reconstruction” (World 
Bank 1998, p. v). Apart from the above-
mentioned “Holst Peace Fund”, in 1997 
the World Bank instituted a new grant 
facility, the “Post-Conflict Fund”, which 
gives grants to a wide range of the 
Bank´s partners to provide conflict-
affected countries with an earlier and 
broader World Bank assistance (World 
Bank 2004). 
Another example is the “Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund” established 
in 2002 which currently is one of the 
main instruments available to the Gov-
ernment of Afghanistan to finance key 
recurrent expenditures and which dis-
bursements totalled US$ 182 million in 
2003 (see World Bank 2003b). The 
whole Bank´s trust fund programme 
expanded by 30 percent in 2003 while 
the contributions received from donors 
totalled US$ 4.44 billion (see World 
Bank 2003a, p. 41). Although some of 
these trust funds are not directly related 
to UN peace operations it should be 
considered that the purposes which they 
are established for are often identical to 
those set out in peace operation´s man-
dates. While most of the operations 
suffer from outstanding contributions of 
the key donor countries the same donors 
prefer to pay quite an amount of money 
into corresponding trust funds. 
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Assessment 
• It is obvious that the evolution of trust 
funds in support of peace operations 
since the 1990´s has been caused by 
the overall budgetary crisis of the UN 
and reflects at the same time the per-
manent financial improvisation of the 
UN Secretariat in collecting addi-
tional resources to ensure short-term 
financing when necessary. To put it 
differently, there is a growing de-
pendence on non-core income – such 
as trust funds –, while core funding is 
on the decline (see ODI 1997, p. 9). 
Even some temporary posts within in 
the Headquarters peacekeeping sup-
port offices (such as DPKO and DPI) 
are financed by trust funds (see e. g. 
UN Doc. A/RES/50/221, para. 8). 
• The dilemma inherent in this devel-
opment has been that the political 
guidance comes from those countries 
that fund the trust funds and not nec-
essarily from the Security Council or 
the General Assembly. According to 
that one may infer that the more a na-
tion pays into a special trust fund the 
more it could use this fund to pursue 
pure national interests. Already in the 
start-up period of a proposed trust 
fund “willing” donors drive a hard 
bargain to reach TORs that meet their 
own interests and therefore ensure to 
have the biggest possible influence 
over their own resources. Salomons 
and Dijkzeul (2001, p. 48) formulate 
it more cautiously: “Establishing the 
terms of reference, however, is often 
a bottleneck, as negotiations between 
the mission, the donor and the UN 
Secretariat can become quite com-
plex.” Therefore the need for further 
investigation into the question of how 
democratically these funds are admin-
istered becomes apparent. 
• Another important aspect that de-
serves to be regarded critically is that 
the different UN programmes in some 
cases establish trust funds for similar 
purposes in the same countries and 
even in connection with the same 
peace operation. Considering the fact 
that each programme´s trust fund has 
its own administrative authority (with 
a diversity of donors in the back-
ground) questions of coherence and 
compatibility arise. And even if there 
is an abundance of trust funds at the 
disposal of the SRSG who leads a 
peace operation, he does not necessar-
ily know how to enter into commit-
ments because each agency handles 
its trust funds differently – based on 
different regulations and procedures. 
It is obvious that such conditions can 
have a negative impact on effective 
implementation and disbursement 
procedures. Salomons and Dijkzeul 
(2001, p. 6) hold the view that “do-
nors and UN agencies have so far 
failed to co-ordinate [trust fund 
mechanism and procedures, A.K.] 
adequately.” 
• Donors should reconsider their priori-
ties how best to finance UN Peace 
Operations as international public 
goods. The struggle with a diffuse va-
riety of trust funds can not be a con-
venient substitute for the existing 
budgetary financing mechanisms in 
place. But as Cecil rightly points out: 
“The existing pool of funds for global 
public goods reflects the current reali-
ties of prioritization and cooperation, 
no more and no less.” (Cecil 2001, 
p. 5) 
• Taking these critical aspects into 
consideration one can conclude that 
trust funds do not represent an effec-
tive long-term substitute for assessed 
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contributions, their creation rather 
represents another example of finan-
cial improvisations. 
III.5.2 Cost Sharing 
A further common method to raise addi-
tional non-core resources in support of 
UN peace operations is the employment 
of cost sharing.  
Salomons and Dijkzeul (2001 p. 46) 
define cost sharing as the “modality 
whereby bilateral donor governments, 
multilateral organizations, international 
financial institutions, NGO´s or private 
sector entities contribute financial re-
sources to an agency administering a 
project or program which involves funds 
of its own.” According to the authors, 
cost sharing is a common instrument to 
“implement a specific project with mul-
tiple funding, although occasionally 
entire programs are financed in this 
manner, often involving the recipient 
government as a financial partner.” 
Over the last years cost sharing has been 
increasingly used to finance the devel-
opment side of UN peace operations, 
especially of those including peace-
building components in its mandates. 
With its operational capability in this 
field, UNDP has consequently turned out 
as the United Nations system partner 
most frequently using this co-financing 
modality to complement the political and 
peacekeeping strategies of DPO and 
DPKO, i. e. to finance development-
related projects in addition to those 
operational measures that are directly 
covered by the core-budget resources of 
UN peace operations (see UNDP 2001). 
Based on the cost-sharing modality, 
UNDP led projects have flanked and/or 
supported several peace operations. For 
example, on the Salomon Islands, UNDP 
has helped UNOMB (United Nations 
Observer Mission in Bougainville) to 
bring out its political and peace-building 
mandate by developing a strategic alli-
ance with other development partners for 
joint peace-building initiatives and 
programme coordination. Thereby, 
significant progress could be made, 
among other things, in regard to the 
demobilization of and support to ex-
combatants and other vulnerable groups 
in that region (see UN Doc. 
DP/CFF/SOI/1/Extension I of 4 July 
2001). In Guatemala UNDP has supple-
mented MINUGUA´s (United Nations 
Verification Mission in Guatemala) 
involvement in the post-conflict transi-
tion process by promoting over 100 
different projects in partnership with the 
Government and other stakeholders. For 
that, UNDP has intended to allocate 
approximately US$ 111 million for the 
period 2001-2004 based on cost-sharing 
(see UN Doc. DP/CCF/GUA/2 of 3 
August 2001). Also UNAMSIL (United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) – one 
of the UN´s largest peacekeeping opera-
tions with an approved budget of US$ 
543.49 million for the period July 2003-
June 2004 (DPKO 2004) – is dependent 
on UNDP´s co-operation within the 
framework of a United Nations Peace-
building and Recovery Strategy (PBRS) 
for Sierra Leone. In its ´Draft country 
programme document for Sierra Leone 
(2004-2007)´ UNDP emphasizes the 
importance of its work for UNAMSIL: 
“In order to ensure the sustainability of 
activities initiated by UNAMSIL, UNDP 
and its other United Nations partners are 
working closely with UNAMSIL on a 
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number of transition issues, such as the 
reintegration of ex-combatants, the 
extension of state authority and the 
rebuilding of the justice system and local 
administrations.” (UN Doc. 
DP/DCP/SIL/1 of 9 June 2003, p. 2). 
Moreover, the co-operation between the 
peace operation and UNDP becomes 
apparent considering the fact that the 
UNDP Resident Representative concur-
rently serves at UNAMSIL as “Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary 
General for Governance and Stabiliza-
tion” (UN Doc. DP/DCP/SIL/1 of 9 June 
2003, p. 2). 
As outlined in the resources framework 
of the above-mentioned document most 
of UNDP´s projects administered in 
support of UNAMSIL are, inter alia, 
financed by cost-sharing and thus sup-
plement the operations´ work financed 
by its core budget. 
UNDP distinguishes between govern-
ment cost-sharing and third-party cost-
sharing – according to the two major 
sources where cost-sharing funds can 
come from: “(a) the recipient govern-
ment (government cost-sharing) from the 
recipients´s own budgetary resources or 
from the technical cooperation compo-
nent of loans and credits to governments 
from the IFIs46; or (b) Donor-government 
and IFI grants (third-party cost sharing 
with funding directly to UNDP)” (UNDP 
1996, Annex I)47
                                                 
                                                                   
46 International Financial Institutions. 
47 UNDP offers that cost-sharing contribu-
tions can be made for a specific project 
(project cost-sharing), for the whole UNDP 
programme or components thereof (pro-
gramme cost-sharing) or may be fully 
funded by a donor contribution (100 % 
Put differently, under government cost-
sharing agreements counterpart re-
sources are provided by the recipient 
government, whereas in case of third-
party cost sharing UNDP manages a 
specific project on behalf of and funded 
by a particular donor (see ODI 1997; 
also Galvani and Morse 2004). Usually 
the implementation of cost-sharing 
projects is based on a standard model 
agreement between the Donor and 
UNDP. The agreement outlines the 
financial and administrative handling of 
the contribution (i. e., schedule of pay-
ments, earned interest and reporting 
requirements) as well as the purpose and 
the utilization of the contribution. Fur-
thermore, it stipulates that pro-
gramme/project management and expen-
ditures have to be consistent with the 
regulations, rules and directives of 
UNDP. As in the case of its trust funds, 
UNDP charges 3-5 % fees for the ad-
ministration. If the modalities of the 
agreement are approved, it will be signed 
by the authorized UNDP country repre-
sentative and the donor (bilateral donors, 
multilateral organizations, civil society 
organizations, or private sector). 
In practice, government cost-sharing as 
well as third-party cost-sharing are used 
by UNDP to allocate resources to pro-
cost-sharing) (see UNDP 2002, p. 2). In 
addition to the donors mentioned above, 
more recently, the private sector and 
NGO´s have expressed increased interest in 
co-financing (cost-sharing) with UNDP. 
According to UNDP this new source of 
funding has been made possible “through 
an Executive Decision (Sept. 96) whereby 
UNDP can receive contributions from pri-
vate sector institutions and NGO´s regard-
less of the size of the contribution” (UNDP 
2002, p. 4). 
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jects which are implemented in connec-
tion with UN peace operations. How-
ever, even if a peace operation is the 
beneficiary of any such cost-sharing 
project the operations´ SRSG has little 
control over the actual implementation 
of the project, as the cost-sharing project 
is based on the agreement between the 
donor and UNDP. Therefore the SRSG 
relies on the close co-operation with the 
UNDP Resident Representative (or the 
United Nations System Resident Co-
ordinator, who usually also heads the 
UNDP office, see Salomons and Di-
jkzeul 2001 p. 52) and who is authorized 
under UNDP´s Financial Regulations 
and Rules to mobilize cost-sharing 
resources (see UNDP 2000b). Thereby 
UNDP Resident Representatives and 
Country offices receive support from 
their Regional Bureau and the Division 
for Resource Mobilization of the Bureau 
for Resources and Strategic Partnership 
(DRM/BRSP). Moreover, the financial 
administration (of co-financing in gen-
eral) involves various sections of 
UNDP´s Bureau of Management (BoM) 
(see UNDP 2002, pp. 5 f.). 
As early as mid 1990 the cost-sharing 
modality has become the largest funding 
category of UNDP´s co-financing ar-
rangements (see UNDP 1996). In 2000 
voluntary contributions to UNDP 
amounted to US$ 1.5 billion, comprising 
US$ 571 million in third-party co-
financing (trust funds and third-party 
cost-sharing) and US$ 933 million in 
programme country cost-sharing. Dur-
ing the period 2000-2003 third-party co-
financing amounted to US$ 2.6 billion 
and programme-country cost-sharing to 
US$ 3.8 billion (see UN Doc. 
DP/2002/7, p. 4). 
Also UNDP´s efforts in the backing and 
supplementing of UN peace operations 
are mainly funded through cost-sharing 
arrangements instead of trust funds (see 
UNDP 2001, p. 2). There are some good 
reasons for this. Unlike cost-sharing trust 
funds are not integrated into UNDP 
projects and thus require additional 
management tasks (e. g. trust funds 
require the designation of a Trust Fund 
Manager) and cause higher transaction 
costs48 for the country offices related to 
the procedures for obtaining them (see 
UNDP 1996). Moreover, cost-sharing is 
more attractive to UNDP because it can 
control directly the use of the funds 
integrated into its projects. That apart, 
trust funds lessen the influencing control 
of the Resident Representative (and 
consequently of the SRSG) as they are 
usually administered centralized and 
often have a broader focus that goes 
beyond the UN peace operations´ man-
date and the UNDP country office level: 
“Many trust funds are headquarter-
managed with little consultation and 
involvement of beneficiary countries and 
country offices, which consequently do 
not have a sense of ownership of the 
particular programme activities.” 
(UNDP 1996, Chapter IV) 
                                                 
48 Transaction costs are “the extra costs 
(beyond the price of the purchase) of con-
ducting a transaction, whether in terms of 
money, time, or inconvenience” (Kaul, 
Conceição, Le Goulven, and Mendoza 
2003, p. 606). 
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Assessment 
• From the foregoing it is clear that 
cost-sharing increasingly has been 
used to raise additional non-core re-
sources in support of UN peace op-
erations. This especially serves for 
complex, multidimensional opera-
tions with post-conflict peace-
building mandates aimed at both the 
installation of negative and, in the 
longer run, positive peace. Such 
transformation processes cannot be 
achieved solely by the UN missions 
(covered by core-budget resources), 
but rely on the close co-operation be-
tween the mission and the UN system 
partners – as UNDP – to ensure a ho-
listic strategy that takes the structural 
and development-related aspects of 
peace processes into consideration. 
• As mentioned before, the inherent 
problem is that a missions´ SRSG has 
quite little control over the actual im-
plementation of UNDP-administered 
projects which are mainly financed 
through cost-sharing. Therefore, fail-
ure or success of an operation also re-
lies on the degree to which the SRSG 
can pursue his interests in co-
operation with the UNDP Resident 
Representative – who then at best 
signs a cost-sharing agreement with 
the donor(s) suitable for the support 
of the operation. 
• However, in practice, it might be 
difficult to ascertain when a UNDP 
cost-sharing project is implemented in 
direct support of a mission and when 
it “just” takes place in a mission´s 
peace-building environment and pur-
sues strategies that by chance corre-
spond to the missions´ mandate. It 
can be assumed that UNDP does not 
understand itself as a “sub-contractor” 
mobilizing resources on behalf of a 
SRSG, but rather pursue its own 
country strategies. 
• For further assessments it is therefore 
important to establish criteria to dif-
ferentiate between projects that only 
coincidentally are related activities 
and those that are actually cost-
sharing projects in direct support of 
UN peace operations and can be re-
corded as their efforts, too. 
• In financial terms it thus is still diffi-
cult to define when voluntary contri-
butions based on such cost-sharing 
projects can directly be assigned to a 
missions´ budget and when not. But 
even if a cost-sharing project is not 
implemented in direct relation to a 
mission, the mission nevertheless in-
directly benefits from the project as 
its budgetary resources then can be 
used for those strategies not already 
approached by the system partners or 
other actors in the conflict area. 
• Given the variety of different UN 
offices, donors and other actors in-
volved, the current cost-sharing prac-
tice – whether in direct or indirect 
support of UN peace operations – 
clarifies the urgent need that the UN 
should continue strengthening its ap-
proach of common services to ensure 
that all actors will be “in a better po-
sition to supplement and comple-
ment, through their respective man-
dates, what the political or peace-
keeping missions are unequipped to 
do” (Salomons and Dijzeul 2001, 
p. 52). 
III.5.3 Parallel Financing 
Different from trust funds and cost-
sharing, parallel financing is the major 
unknown among the co-financing mo-
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dalities. There is little reporting on the 
extent to which it serves as a form of co-
financing (especially with regard to the 
support of UN peace operations) and the 
few examples of parallel financing that 
have been observed in the relevant litera-
ture (e. g. UNDP 1998, Salomons and 
Dijzeul 2001) indicate that it is a concept 
with little uniformity in practice. By 
definition, parallel financing is “the 
modality whereby one or more multilat-
eral organizations, in partnership with 
other donors (often under bilateral pro-
grams), jointly fund a program or pro-
ject, but administer their resources sepa-
rately.” (Forman and Salomons 1998, 
p. 7). The fact that it does not enter the 
organizations´ accounts and thus does 
not generate income for them from fees 
(see UNDP 1996) might constitute a 
main obstacle to its use. Instead, from 
the donors´ perspective it is a very prom-
ising modality as it guarantees them 
greater identification with their projects 
and greater independence with regard to 
their resources: “Parallel financing offers 
the possibility of joint programming, 
while allowing for distinct resource 
mobilization patterns and reporting 
responsibilities. By opting for parallel 
financing, donors are able to maintain 
their programmatic identity and visibil-
ity, while benefiting from their partners´ 
particular competencies.” (Salomons and 
Dijzeul 2001, p. 47) 
Considering this brief picture, the ques-
tion is to what extent parallel financing 
is a realistic option to raise additional 
sources in support of UN peace opera-
tions. In principle, it offers the respective 
SRSG a wide range of options for the 
implementation of collaborative projects 
that are essential to bring out the mis-
sions´ mandate, but are – for reasons of 
lacking budgets, capacities, and staff – 
hardly to realize in the solo run. How-
ever, in practice, there are a number of 
barriers hampering the SRSG to translate 
the potential benefits of parallel financ-
ing into action. Most essential is the fact 
that the different agencies´ finance 
mechanism potentially available for 
parallel financing in support of peace 
operations are not harmonized but are 
based on different regulations and pro-
cedures49: “Currently, the financial rules 
of the World Bank, and its affiliate 
organizations differ substantially from 
those of the United Nations. Moreover, 
each of the United Nations´ funds and 
programs […] has its own financial rules 
and regulations, including different 
provisions for the receipt of funds from 
the private sector. This lack of compati-
bility may present serious obstacles, 
particular when reporting and account-
ability have to meet the different stan-
dards of a variety of partners.” (Salo-
mons and Dijzeul 2001, p. 47) 
Therefore it is essential for the respec-
tive SRSG to work out the specific 
features of parallel financing with the 
donors/implementing agencies before 
entering into any commitments. 
Assessment 
• As noted, there is only little informa-
tion on the use of parallel financing in 
                                                 
49 A problem already described with regard to 
trust fund administration. As a result 
SRSGs often do not know how to enter into 
commitments without having comprehen-
sive knowledge on the different regulations 
and procedures. 
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support of UN peace operations 
available. Thus, the foregoing sug-
gests the need of further investigation 
into the question of the use and rele-
vance of this co-financing modality in 
connection with the extra-budgetary 
financing of peace operations. 
• Hitherto, it can be recorded that 
parallel financing potentially provides 
another useful financing modality that 
should be part and parcel of the 
SRSG´s option catalogue for co-
operation with donors/UN system 
partners willing to contribute to se-
lected projects/components of a mis-
sion. 
• The existing procedural barriers 
(different regulations and procedures 
among the agencies, donors, and pro-
grammes), as well as opportunities 
for harmonization should be identi-
fied in greater detail to avert lengthy 
and cumbrous pre-implementation 
requirements when speed is of the 
essence. If these problems are ad-
dressed, there will be better condi-
tions to translate the potential bene-
fits of parallel financing in support of 
UN peace operations into action. 
IV. Current and Possible Future 
Funding Sources 
The last chapter has examined in great 
detail the various financing arrange-
ments created by the UN to ensure the 
provision of its peace operations. Before 
the conclusion of the present study 
assesses the arrangements in place from 
a public good perspective, this chapter 
takes a look at the sources of funding 
allocated to them. Since there is evi-
dence that large shares of financial 
contributions to UN peace operations 
flow as aid, though the “willing donors” 
often are also the main net-beneficiaries 
of their spending, there is good reason to 
do so. The chapter then provides an 
outlook on the possible future shape of a 
financing system that is build up on 
alternative financing sources. Doing so, 
first it will recall some important pro-
posals for reform within the existing 
“conventional framework of government 
contributions” (Mendez 2001, p. 152); 
and second it will introduce more inno-
vative proposals for a system of financ-
ing beyond government contributions. 
IV.1 Intermingling of ODA and 
Financing for UN Peace 
Operations 
For assessing the use of foreign aid – or 
official development assistance (ODA) – 
in financing UN peace operations it is 
necessary to distinguish between aid that 
is spent as bilateral voluntary contribu-
tions to specific projects directly related 
to operations (especially to those with a 
post conflict peace-building alignment) 
and aid that is spent as multilateral 
assessed contributions either to the UN 
peacekeeping operations´ assessment 
accounts or, in case of UN political 
missions, to the UN regular budget. 
First and foremost aid flows become 
obvious when donors are willing to 
support specific peace-building and 
development projects implemented in 
connection with UN peace operations. 
Often the same Member States that are 
in arrears with their assessed payments 
to the peacekeeping accounts tend to 
provide high sums in aid as bilateral 
voluntary contributions. By using the co-
financing arrangements described in the 
foregoing chapters each year plenty of 
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US$ million are thus directly allocated 
from donors´ national aid budgets. 
With regard to multilateral assessed 
contributions the use of aid is more of an 
“indirect” nature. First, UN Member 
States´ multilateral assessed contribu-
tions to the UN biennium regular budget 
are partly allocated from their develop-
ment budgets (considering that these 
budgets usually contain such an item50) 
and thus indirectly finance UN political 
and peace-building missions since their 
provision has been included in the UN 
regular budget. Second, there is evidence 
that some OECD/DAC members tend to 
report their multilateral assessed contri-
butions to the UN Peacekeeping Assess-
ment Accounts as part of the ODA they 
provide – although these contributions 
are allocated from their Foreign Minis-
tries´ budgets and it is not obvious 
whether provided for the operations´ 
military or development-related compo-
nents. 
As illustrated in box 3, the question 
whether and to what extent support for 
UN peace operations should be “ODA 
eligible”51 still is under debate within the 
framework of the DAC. Even if OECD 
members meanwhile agree on a set of 
conditions under which the bilateral 
                                                 
50 Some countries only provide one item for 
specific UN programmes within their de-
velopment budgets and mainly allocate 
their assessed contributions to the UN regu-
lar budget from their Foreign Ministries´ 
budgets. 
51 The rules and issues on which types of 
expenditures should be categorized as ODA 
(“ODA eligibility”) are periodically re-
viewed and monitored by statistical experts 
of DAC Members who meet in the Work-
ing Party on Statistics of the DAC (see 
OECD/DAC 2001, p. 39). 
participation in UN post-conflict peace-
building operations is ODA eligible (see 
OECD/DAC 2001; 2003), corresponding 
reporting procedures for multilateral 
assessed contributions are still out-
standing. However, the DAC so far has 
failed to approach the question of ODA 
eligibility from a global public good 
perspective. Thus, the DAC guidelines 
are silent on the question of whether it 
would not be more appropriate to com-
pletely separate provisions for UN peace 
operations from ODA instead of thinking 
about which parts of it could be ODA 
eligible. Moreover, there is no consider-
able general debate within the DAC of 
how to treat the relationship between 
financing of international public goods 
and development assistance. 
As UN peace operations represent inter-
national public goods with high social 
and private returns the net-beneficiaries, 
in many cases, especially are the devel-
oped countries – more than in case of 
development assistance. Against this 
background there is a clear misuse of 
ODA underlying the financing of UN 
peace operations. Even if development 
and peace are closely linked to each 
other – and mutually supportive – it is a 
critical approach to finance peace opera-
tions as public goods through official 
development assistance while jeopardiz-
ing the limited resources needed to fight 
poverty. Thus, the main payers among 
UN Member States should internalize 
that the more they benefit from the 
positive externalities of UN peace opera-
tions the less ODA they should use for 
its financing. Also bilateral voluntary 
contributions to specific projects directly 
related to UN peace operations should  
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Box 3: Aid Allocation to UN Peace Operations - A Questionable Trend 
• Direct assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 
Usually Member States pay their assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations out of their Foreign 
Ministries´ budgets.a However, this does not necessarily avert countries from categorizing their contributions 
as ODA. Germany, for example, allocates its assessed contributions from the budget of the Federal Foreign 
Office - but until now has reported it as part of the ODA it provides.b Doing so, Germany undermines the 
integrity and credibility of ODA statistics as assessed contributions also cover the military, non-development-
related components of peacekeeping operations. 
• Voluntary contributions in support of activities related to UN peace operations 
During the 1990s the international donor community pledged approximately US$ 100 billion dollars in aid to 
three dozen countries recovering from conflict.c By using co-financing mechanisms and tools such as trust 
funds, cost-sharing, and parallel financing much of this aid was provided as bilateral “voluntary 
contributions” for specific peace-building and development activities directly linked to UN peace operations. 
In practice, however, it can not be excluded that some projects funded through ODA have significant 
development-military interfaces as in case of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre 
(KAIPTC) in Ghana which is partly funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ).d 
The OECD DAC standpoint 
The question whether and to what extent support for UN peace operations should be categorized as ODA 
(“ODA eligibility”) has become a topic of considerable discussion within the framework of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in recent years. According to the DAC reporting guidelinese 
members meanwhile agree on the eligibility of bilateral participation in UN post conflict peace-building 
operations to be classified as ODA. Thereby, the guidelines provide for eligibility under the following 
conditions:f  
“The costs of a donor´s bilateral participation in the activities listed below, when they are part of the post-
conflict peace-building phase of a United Nations peace operation, net of any compensation received from 
the United Nations (the cost of bilateral activities is calculated as the excess over what the personnel and 
equipment would have cost to maintain had they not been assigned to take part in a peace operation): human 
rights; election monitoring, rehabilitation assistance to demobilized soldiers; rehabilitation of basic natural 
infrastructure, monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and policy forces; training in customs and 
border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization policy; reparation and 
demobilization of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; and  explosive mine removal.” 
In contrast, the following activities are not ODA-eligible: military aid, military equipment, training of 
military personnel, and personal security.  
Note: As the existing reporting procedures exclusively focus on the bilateral participation in UN peace-
building operations, efforts are made within the DAC to apply them to a.m. multilateral contributions as well. 
“A procedure of this kind would presumable mean that only a certain percentage of UN missions - namely, 
those devoted to civil tasks - would be eligible for consideration as ODA.”g 
a Information is drawn from an interview by the author conducted at the Financial Management Office of the UN 
Department of Administration and Management, New York, in July 2003 
b See Klingebiel and Roehder (2003), pp. II and 17 
c See Forman, Patrick, and Salomons (2000), p. 1 
d See Klingebiel and Roehder (2003), p. 18 
e See OECD/DAC (2001), pp. 39 f.; for further reading see also OECD/DAC 2004 
f OECD/DAC (2003), p. 17; on new conditions currently under debate see also Elliesen (2005), p. 181 
g Klingebiel and Roehder (2003), p. 17 
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come under critical review as these 
projects often lay in a grey zone between 
public good provision and development 
assistance. Therefore the UN in coopera-
tion with the DAC should develop clear 
criteria and guidelines to determine 
when aid spending is appropriate and 
when these projects are a public good 
matter to be financed through alternative 
resources. This would constitute a suit-
able way for ensuring that development 
funds are not misused for the provision 
of UN peace operations as public goods 
and to preserve the integrity and credi-
bility of ODA statistics. 
IV.2 Towards a More 
Innovative International 
Public Financing of UN 
Peace Operations 
IV.2.1 Proposals for Reform within 
the Framework of 
Government Contributions 
Most prominent among a number of 
conventional proposals that have been 
made over the last years to address the 
problem of inadequate financial re-
sources for UN peace operations is the 
idea to provide incentives for the timely 
payment of dues. As already proposed 
by former Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali in 1991 (UN Doc. 
A/46/600/Add. 1), interest payments 
could be charged on the amounts of 
peacekeeping assessed contributions that 
are not paid on time (negative incentive). 
The interest proceeds then either could 
flow directly into the missions´ budgets 
or could be used as a form of recom-
pense for those members which pay their 
assessed contributions on time (positive 
incentive). A more radical approach 
would be to introduce a kind of “sham-
ing mechanism”, e. g. by providing a 
“well-publicized list of delinquent mem-
bers, as is done in clubs, and a ranking of 
members on the basis of degree of finan-
cial responsibility” (Mendez 2001, 
pp. 151 ff.). Considering the political 
obstacles and the current resistance of 
sovereign Member States to any such a 
proposal it, of course, is rather difficult 
to apply a system of “sticks and carrots” 
to international public finance. Neverthe-
less, the UN Secretariat at least should 
keep on trying to place it on the interna-
tional agenda since the practice has 
shown that the system of assessments in 
its present shape does not work effec-
tively. 
Other proposals that have been made 
include: changing certain financial regu-
lations of the UN to permit the retention 
of budgetary surpluses; authorizing the 
Secretary-General to borrow money 
from the commercial financial commu-
nity; authorization for the UN to borrow 
from the World Bank and the IMF; 
increasing the levels of the “Peacekeep-
ing Reserve Fund” and the “Working 
Capital Fund”; and general tax exemp-
tion for contributions made to the UN by 
foundations, business and individuals 
(see “An Agenda for Peace” (UN Doc. 
A/47/277 – S/24111, paras. 70-73); Mc 
Dermott 1994a, 1994b; Mendez 2001). 
Some of these proposals already demon-
strate the search for new funding sources 
but in the end still are deeply rooted in 
the status quo framework of government 
contributions. 
The main problem inherent in proposals 
like these is that they do not fully take 
into consideration the difficulty of ar-
ranging payments through national 
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budgetary processes, which first and 
foremost give priority to internal issues. 
If holding on to the idea of government 
contributions it therefore must be im-
perative to foster national reforms aimed 
to bridge the “jurisdictional gap” (Kaul 
2000b, p. 7)52 between domestic and 
foreign affairs. In this context Kaul, Le 
Goulven, and Schnupf recommend that 
parliaments should mandate their na-
tional ministries to assume enhanced 
responsibility in order to get more 
closely involved in international coop-
eration and to budget for expenditures 
abroad: “Authorizing ministries to un-
dertake dual-track budgeting, showing 
domestic and international expenditures 
separately, would also enhance transpar-
ency and accountability. It would then be 
possible for governments to demonstrate 
to their taxpayers how much the country 
invests in keeping the world in balance 
in order to ensure peace, security, and 
prosperity at home.” (Kaul, Le Goulven, 
and Schnupf 2002, p. 21) 
With regard to the financing of future 
UN peace (-keeping) operations this 
might constitute a useful approach. 
Instead of solely allocating their assessed 
contributions to the Peacekeeping As-
sessment Accounts out of their Foreign 
Ministries´ budgets – as currently prac-
tised – in addition, UN Member States 
should consider integrating a separate 
budget line for the financing of these 
operations into their Defense Ministries´ 
budgets. This would be conform to the 
                                                 
52 More precisely, Kaul uses the term to refer 
to “the discrepancy between the global na-
ture of today´s major policy challenges and 
the still predominantly scope and focus of 
policy-making” (Kaul 2000b, p. 7). 
idea that international peace and security 
only can be achieved effectively by 
national self-provision plus international 
security cooperation. Thus, the logical 
consequence would be that also national 
Defense Ministries fulfill a more active 
role as actors embedded in a “system of 
cooperative global governance” (Group 
of Lisbon 1996). Against this back-
ground a necessary step is that the politi-
cal involvement of national ministries in 
international affairs also is flanked by a 
corresponding higher financial involve-
ment. 
Apart from such efforts to reform the 
financing of UN peace operations within 
the framework of government contribu-
tions, a “system of financing beyond the 
nation-state” (Mendez 2001, p. 153) is 
required. Without considering more 
innovative and imaginative approaches, 
the international public financing of UN 
peace operations cannot be expected to 
be put on a firmer and more reliable 
footing. But what should be the sources 
that help the UN no more than still 
causing dependence on the daily finan-
cial will of Member States? It is well-
known that voluntary contributions 
cannot constitute a more effective fi-
nancing – not least because of the free-
rider problem inherent to the voluntary 
provision of public goods. 
IV.2.2 Proposals for a System of 
Financing beyond Govern-
ment Contributions 
A possible way towards a more innova-
tive international public financing of UN 
peace operations, for example, could be 
to apply those public finance tools that 
still primarily are utilized at the national 
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level for internalizing (negative) exter-
nalities, such as taxes, user charges, fees 
and levies. For example, in recent years 
several international tax proposals have 
been put forward for the purpose of 
financing the provision of different 
global public goods.53 With regard to the 
financing of UN peace operations the 
most relevant proposal perhaps is that a 
tax should be levied on international 
arms transfers. Such a tax would have 
two positive effects: it would decrease 
(enhanced) international arms trade, i. e. 
it would internalize arms trade as a 
negative externality (a public bad itself) 
of international public bads such as war, 
and it could provide additional resources 
for UN peace operations. As often sug-
gested, the basis for this taxation could 
be an already existing Register on Con-
ventional Arms, established by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1991, that contains data 
on state-to-state imports and exports of 
conventional arms54. Binger (2003, 
                                                 
53 Prominent examples for international 
taxation among others are a currency trans-
action tax (“Tobin Tax”), a common carbon 
tax, a tax on specific traded commodities, 
and different taxations of the global com-
mons, such as a tax on ocean fishing or 
seabed mining (see e. g. Mendez 1992 
pp. 213 ff., also 2001; Sagasti and Bezan-
son 2001, pp. 44 f.). 
54 Problematic with the register certainly is 
that only government-to-government trans-
fers are reported, while the growing private 
arms market remains outside the reporting 
system. Moreover, it is to judge critically 
that reporting to the register is voluntary 
and that it only provides information on the 
number of items traded but not on their 
monetary value so that it would be difficult 
to determine the size of the tax (see Wahl-
berg 2001). Thus, Najman and D’ Orville 
(1995), for example, judge the register as 
unsuitable for the purpose of taxing interna-
tional arms trade. Wahlberg (2001), instead, 
proposes to modify the register for this pur-
pose. 
p. 19) estimates that an annual amount of 
US$ 1.2 billion could be expected from 
this tax. This would constitute almost the 
half of the entire peacekeeping budget 
2004. Another proposal already made by 
former Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” 
is a levy on international air travel, 
which is dependent on the maintenance 
of peace. Referring to Henderson and 
Kay (1995), Sagasti and Bezanson 
(2001) instead discuss the idealistic 
notion of a “United Nations Security 
Insurance Agency” providing insurance 
against aggressions: “This idea would 
exploit the concept of scale economies: a 
global UN Peacekeeping Force can 
protect many countries, helping to re-
duce the need for military spending. The 
cost of the prepaid insurance would need 
to be considerably smaller than it costs a 
country to maintain its own military 
forces” Sagasti and Bezanson (2001, 
p. 122). 
However, these proposals are not ex-
haustive; rather do they serve as an 
orientation on how an international 
public financing system dealing with 
internalizing externalities for the purpose 
of financing UN peace operations could 
look like. It goes without saying that 
international taxes in general are a 
highly unpopular subject, often rejected 
by concluding that “no worldwide gov-
ernment exists” (Rosen 1988, p. 538) 
that has the authority to impose them. 
But such a point of view is misleading 
as, in fact, procedures for international 
taxes could be put into effect without 
creating a supranational tax authority. 
For example, Sagasti and Bezanson 
(2001, pp. 42 f.) argue that any such a 
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tax could be collected “at the interna-
tional level through existing revenue 
collection agencies” and then transferred 
to international institutions. This makes 
sense and, moreover, would constitute an 
important step to bridge the “jurisdic-
tional gap” (Kaul 2000b, p. 7) discussed 
above. Also Mendez (2001, p. 155) 
holds the view that no world government 
is needed and instead proposes a “con-
vention or multinational treaty” that 
should stipulate the legal and administra-
tive aspects of a future international tax 
system. Such a treaty certainly only 
would serve its purpose if all nation 
states signed it to avoid tax-free zones. 
However, once translated into action it 
would give the UN the necessary leeway 
to operate on a secure and steady inde-
pendent financial foundation rather than 
solely relying on the financial unreliabil-
ity of Member States. 
Given the abundance of innovative 
proposals currently under discussion for 
the financing of global public goods in 
general (including mechanisms to inter-
nalize externalities, private and public 
sources, public-private partnerships), the 
UN in cooperation with the “Interna-
tional Task Force on Global Public 
Goods” should identify which of the 
several options besides those suggested 
above are suitable to allocate additional 
resources to its peace operations. Many 
of the innovative means that have been 
suggested for the financing of other 
global public goods – or for ensuring 
additional resources to the UN in gen-
eral, also could be considered as appro-
priate for the financing of peace opera-
tions. These include international fees 
and levies such as a surcharge on airline 
tickets, parking fees for geostationary 
satellites, and charges for the utilisation 
of the geomagnetic spectrum; a “bit tax” 
(a small tax on the amount of data sent 
through the Internet); a global lottery 
(with direct and voluntary citizen par-
ticipation); a “UN Communication Day” 
(on which all postage charges and tele-
phone calls would carry levies accruing 
to the UN); and resource mobilization 
from income earners such as credit-card 
sponsorship (see e. g. Mc Dermott 
1994a; Sagasti and Bezanson 2001; 
Wahlberg 2001; Mendez 2001). More-
over, still unrealized is the establishment 
of a US$ 1 billion global Peace Endow-
ment Fund55 as suggested by former 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros 
Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” which 
could follow the model of the already 
existing “Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria”. Finally, 
another innovative proposal made by 
Forman, Patrick, and Salomons (2000, 
p. 26) is the creation of a full-fledged 
Strategic Recovery Facility which inter 
alia could be used to finance peace-
building activities related to UN peace 
operations.56 With the “Global Environ-
                                                 
55 Boutros Boutros Ghali originally intended 
that resources to the fund should flow as as-
sessed and voluntary contributions - one-
third to be provided by governments, and 
the remainder to come from the private sec-
tor as well as individuals (see Mc Dermott 
1994a, p. 176). Given the experience with 
assessed contributions it would be more ap-
propriate to de-link the allocation of re-
sources to such a fund from any assess-
ments. 
56 According to the authors the Facility would 
be open for participation to a variety of 
relevant actors and would have “dedicated 
funds available for its own analytical and 
preparatory tasks as well as a standing trust 
fund….” (Forman, Patrick, and Salomons 
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ment Facility” a similar arrangement 
already exists in the field of international 
environment policy. 
Considering the various financing pro-
posals introduced here the question to be 
raised is whether these proposals are 
realistic and political feasible or rather of 
utopian nature. Against the background 
of the current political realities it can be 
expected that most of the innovative 
proposals are likely to encounter opposi-
tion from Member States – at least in the 
immediate future. But Member States 
should internalize that the more alterna-
tive financing sources for UN peace 
operations will be found the less finan-
cial burdens will have to be shouldered 
through their national budgets – without 
loosing policymaking sovereignty on a 
bigger scale. 
V. Conclusion 
The present study has addressed three 
main issues: the international public 
good nature of UN peace operations; 
current UN Member States´ burden-
sharing behaviour underlying their pro-
vision; and in greater detail the perform-
ance of the various international coop-
erative financing mechanisms and tools 
currently existing to ensure the provision 
of UN peace operations. 
It has shown that UN peace operations 
represent international joint product 
public goods yielding both international 
purely public and nation-specific bene-
                                                                   
2000, p. 26). Such a Facility, however, 
would contribute to a more integrated fi-
nancial cooperation among the several ac-
tors which currently are involved in the 
voluntary support of peace-building activi-
ties related to UN peace operations. 
fits. Since there is evidence that purely 
public benefits are predominant UN 
peace operations tend to be undersup-
plied. This is mainly due to the fact that 
nation states are not fully aware of these 
benefits. Thus, no less than a radical 
change of views towards the provision of 
UN peace operations is needed. To 
encourage purely public externalities is 
not only a matter of normative consid-
erations. It also expresses a realistic 
understanding on how best to manage 
the process of globalization. In an in-
creasingly interdependent world the 
adequate provision of UN peace opera-
tions is in the very own interest of all 
nation states. Thus, UN member states 
should reconsider their current burden 
sharing behaviour – in terms of financial 
as well as personnel contributions. The 
overall level of funding for UN peace 
operations is inadequate, reflecting the 
often lukewarm or token support given 
by Member States. As described in the 
foregoing, the ratio of expenditures for 
UN peace operations to world military 
expenditures was 1:284 in 2002. What 
does this ratio say? It says that nation 
states are not willing to pay an amount 
that exceeds 0.35 percent of that amount 
they are willing to pay for their national 
defense. From a global public goods 
point of view it also says that nation 
states still prefer to control global public 
bads (i. e. to correct negative external-
ities) instead of promoting global public 
goods (i. e. encouraging positive exter-
nalities) – and that they still prefer doing 
this nationally instead of internationally. 
This reflects “old-style power politics” 
(Czempiel 2003, p. 41) at its best and by 
no means constitutes an adequate way to 
deal with international security chal-
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lenges in a today´s increasingly interde-
pendent world. While war-lords and –
economists already “have gone global”, 
(see Duffield 2001; Cater 2002) nation 
states still act in “Westphalian catego-
ries”, not willing or able to subscribe to 
the idea of cooperative security – with 
the United Nations as its crystallization 
point. 
With regard to the performance and 
“appropriateness” of the several interna-
tional public financing mechanisms and 
tools applied by the UN to allocate 
resources to its peace operations the 
overall conclusion is mixed. 
On the positive side, it can be concluded 
that many of the UN internal reforms 
described in the foregoing sub-chapters 
have resulted in significant improvement 
in the efficiency of UN administrative 
practices related to the use of the differ-
ent core-budgetary financing mecha-
nisms currently “in operation”. Several 
examples have been given in the forego-
ing: budgetary processes have been 
standardized and streamlined; the collec-
tion of resources to the Peacekeeping 
Assessment Accounts has been im-
proved by creating a new methodology 
(peacekeeping scale of assessments) on 
the basis of more objective criteria 
(avoiding free-riding of “high-income 
developing countries”) and the resource 
reimbursement to troop-contributing 
countries has been improved by revising 
the underlying “standard cost-
reimbursement formula”; higher start-up 
funds were placed at the Secretary-
General´s immediate disposal (Peace-
keeping Reserve Fund); and the result-
based budgeting format has been intro-
duced to the Support Account. In short, 
these reforms have optimized the alloca-
tion of existing resources to UN peace-
keeping operations and thus have con-
tributed to a more effective provision of 
this type of peace operations as interna-
tional public goods. 
On the negative side, these improve-
ments, important as they may be, are by 
no means sufficient to place the financ-
ing of UN peace operations on a solid 
and sustainable basis. There are two 
major reasons for it: First, no procedural 
reforms related to the financing mecha-
nisms in place can solve the core prob-
lem the UN faces, namely the negative 
impact of the delinquency of some UN 
Member States with regard to their 
peacekeeping assessed contributions. 
According to the previous analyses the 
different core-budgetary financing 
mechanisms are closely linked to each 
other and, directly or indirectly, derive 
its income from Member States´ as-
sessed contributions. Against this back-
ground it is of urgent need that the UN 
considers to apply alternative sanction 
mechanisms for late or unpaid assessed 
contributions (others than Article 19). It 
should also completely de-link the col-
lection of resources to the Support Ac-
count and to the UNLB as well as the 
replenishment of the Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund from any assessed contri-
butions to the Peacekeeping Accounts. 
Second, reforms which have been intro-
duced successfully to the financing of 
peacekeeping operations are still out-
standing for the financing of political 
and peace-building missions. Thus, it is 
imperative to foster a more integrated 
financing approach helping to bridge the 
gap between peacekeeping and peace-
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building. Moreover, such an approach 
should finally intend to overcome the 
UN´s separate financing of peacekeeping 
operations on the one hand and political 
and peace-building missions on the other 
hand. One way forward could be to 
expand the scope of the core-budgetary 
financing mechanisms in place towards 
its use for all mission types. For exam-
ple, this could imply to increase the total 
amount of income of the Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund to meet the start-up needs 
of UN political and peace-building 
missions as well. Furthermore, the Gen-
eral Assembly should review its decision 
to provide the core financial resources 
for political and peace-building missions 
within the UN regular budget. The thus 
budgeted amounts are not only insuffi-
cient in relation to the number and man-
date of these missions, but are also at the 
expense of other activities of the organi-
zation to be covered by the regular 
budget. Should the UN, as currently 
under debate, establish a unified peace-
keeping budget by consolidating the 
different Peacekeeping Assessment 
Accounts, a possible future option would 
be to integrate the provisions for politi-
cal and peace-building missions into this 
unified budget. As a result UN Members 
States would be assessed for all mission 
types only once a year. The resulting 
“surplus” within the UN regular budget 
then could be used to fund additional 
posts at DPKO (instead of using the 
Support Account for that purpose) and 
DPO needed for the administrative and 
political backstopping tasks of the vari-
ous operations. In the long term, how-
ever, it should be considered to merge 
the engaged offices of both departments 
to ensure an effective organizational 
structure that, in an adequate manner, 
reflects the integrated vision of peace-
keeping and peace-building.  
The challenge of developing a more 
holistic broad-based approach will not 
only require to integrate the various 
core-budgetary financing mechanisms 
into a more coherent framework. Con-
sidering the fact that the flow of funds 
for political and peace-building missions 
is almost completely voluntary, political 
motivated, and patchwork in nature, a 
more systematic approach to financing 
UN peace operations must also be based 
on a more effective use of the different 
voluntary financing mechanisms and 
tools. Thereby it is essential to improve 
the cooperation between the UN Secre-
tariat and those United Nations system 
partners most frequently using these 
arrangements to complement the peace-
keeping and –building strategies of the 
UN Secretariat. The foregoing examina-
tions have identified and described the 
most important non-core budgetary 
financing mechanisms (trust funds) and 
tools (cost-sharing, parallel financing), 
and have pointed at some of the relevant 
UN offices and programmes that pres-
ently implement them. Further research 
that can build up on these findings 
should also identify the average time 
required to establish these arrangements. 
Moreover, it would be useful to develop 
a sort of guide enabling a peace opera-
tions´ SRSG to establish quickly a 
mechanism and/or or tool suitable for his 
operation (see Fafo 1999). As also pro-
vided in this study, the guide should 
entail information on the programme 
support costs and procedures associated 
with the respective mechanisms and 
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tools so that an SRSG can choose among 
a range of options. In this context it is of 
great importance to further strengthen 
the position of the SRSGs in getting 
access to the different voluntary financ-
ing arrangements: “[…] the UN Secre-
tariat must provide the SRSG with a 
clear mandate and terms of reference, 
stronger administrative and policy sup-
port and more generous and flexible 
financial instruments. To improve coor-
dination within the crisis country, each 
SRSG should be given clear authority to 
speak on behalf of the various programs, 
departments, and agencies of the UN 
family. Most importantly, the SRSG 
should be granted direct access and 
supervision over the resources of these 
entities.” (Forman, Patrick, Salomons 
2000, p. 18) 
In order to promote a more integrated 
financing approach to UN peace opera-
tions, it is moreover up to the different 
UN programmes and offices to do their 
part to facilitate the access and use of the 
different voluntary financing arrange-
ments they provide. This especially goes 
for the administration of trust funds. 
Thus, those programmes which establish 
trust funds in support of UN peace (-
building) operations should foster more 
coherent and compatible administrative 
procedures. Appropriate measures would 
be to: (a) consolidate and reduce the 
number of trust funds to avoid unneces-
sary overlaps; (b) harmonize as much as 
possible the rules and requirements 
relating to trust fund management and 
reporting; (c) revise and harmonize the 
system of support cost charges; (d) 
streamline procedures for accessing trust 
fund monies. 
But even if the UN overcame its present 
lack of strategic policy design by inte-
grating the various core- and non core-
budgetary financing elements into a 
more coherent framework, it would be 
far away from creating a suitable and 
sustainable public finance architecture 
that ensures an enhanced provision of 
UN peace operations. The present pat-
tern of international public financing for 
UN peace operations is based on an 
insufficient system of assessments due to 
the absence of any serious sanction 
mechanisms for non-payers. Conse-
quently it highly depends on voluntary 
contributions that “cannot constitute an 
effective system of public finance in the 
international arena any more than it can 
in nation-states” (Mendez 1992, 
pp. 35 f.). Moreover these voluntary 
contributions often flow as aid – at the 
expense of those core purposes which 
aid spending was originally thought for. 
Against the background of these findings 
it must be concluded that international 
public financing for UN peace opera-
tions currently does not work in a struc-
tured way. A more comprehensive pro-
vision of UN peace operations as inter-
national public goods does not only 
require to foster policy coherence re-
garding the financing arrangements in 
place, but, in the light of chronic under-
funding, the challenge also is to create 
alternative financing arrangements that 
could be used to channel additional 
resources to UN peace operations. Sev-
eral proposals were made in the forego-
ing chapter of the present study. Never-
theless, it is unlikely that even a more 
innovative financing system can do 
without government contributions in the 
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near future. Thus, as long as Member 
States are neither willing to reconsider 
their current burden-sharing behaviour 
nor to support the establishment of new 
and innovative financing mechanisms 
and tools beyond government contribu-
tions the financing of UN peace opera-
tions as international public goods can-
not be expected to be put on a firmer and 
more predictable footing. 
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ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
AU African Union 
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwick-
lung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
BoM Bureau of Management (UNDP) 
CGs Consultative Groups 
DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD) 
DPA Department of Political Affairs 
DPI Department of Public Information 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DRM/BRSP Division for Resource Mobilization of the Bureau for Resources and 
Strategic Partnership (UNDP) 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
GPGs Global Public Goods 
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
IFIs International Financial Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IOs International Organizations 
IPGs International Public Goods 
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre 
LDCs Less Developed Countries 
LLDCs Least Developed Countries 
LPGs Local Public Goods 
MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala 
MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic 
MINUSTAH United Nations Mission in Haiti 
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations 
NPGs National Public Goods 
NICs Newly Industrializing Countries 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
ODS Office of Development Studies (UNDP) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo 
ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America 
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
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ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador 
PBRS United Nations Peace-building and Recovery Strategy (for Sierra Leone) 
PCGNP Per Capita Gross National Product 
PCI Per Capita Income 
P5 Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council 
PMCs Private Military Companies 
PSCs Private Security Companies 
RPGs Regional Public Goods 
RTs Round Tables 
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
TORs  Terms of Reference 
UN United Nations 
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEF I First United Nations Emergency Force 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children´s Fund 
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group 
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Cote d´Ivoire 
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services 
UNSF United Nations Security Force in West Guinea 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority 
UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti 
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission 
WCF Working Capital Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
